Opinion
C.A. No. 01-10186-NG
January 31, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Daniel LaPlante brought this action against the Commonwealth and various prison officials to vindicate his right of access to the courts and to enforce a settlement agreement concerning access to legal materials in a previous case from this district that alleged very similar facts. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment on both claims against all defendants except Larry DuBois. The claims against Mr. DuBois must be dismissed because he has retired from the Department of Correction and had no personal role in the events of this case.
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Daniel LaPlante is serving multiple life sentences in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC") stemming from his conviction for a notorious triple murder. He was admitted initially to MCI-Cedar Junction on October 25, 1988 and transferred to MCI-Concord on October 28, 1988, where he was placed in a special housing unit to protect him from other inmates. After a brief stint in a Connecticut state facility, he was transferred to the physical custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons on August 1, 1990, while remaining at all times in the formal legal custody of the Massachusetts DOC.
LaPlante I
Mr. Laplante filed his first action concerning access to the courts in 1996 while confined at the Administrative Maximum Unit of the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado ("ADMAX"). See LaPlante v. Maloney, No. 96-11116-RCL (D.Mass. Aug. 18, 1998) ("LaPlante I"). His complaint alleged that there were no lawyers or other persons trained in Massachusetts law available to assist him at ADMAX, and that the facility kept no Massachusetts legal materials. In order to conduct research on Massachusetts law, Mr. LaPlante was required to provide Massachusetts prison officials with the exact citation of a particular statute or case that he wished to review.
In 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in Mr. LaPlante's favor, finding that the "exact citation system" violated his constitutional right of access to the courts, and that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. See LaPlante I, Slip. Op. at 12.
The parties thereafter entered a settlement agreement whereby the defendants agreed to pay $1,500 to Mr. LaPlante and $15,000 to his attorneys. Defendants also agreed to "provide LaPlante with access to the Courts of Massachusetts in at least one of the following ways: 1) through the provision in some form (e.g., print, CD-ROM, or other technology) of legal resource materials which are made available to LaPlante at the place of his incarceration; or, 2) through the assistance of an attorney admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." The agreement further contained detailed specifications of the type and extent of legal resource materials to be provided. The agreement also stated that "[i]n the event that LaPlante is required to initiate any future proceedings to enforce this Agreement, the parties agree that LaPlante will be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses related to any such proceeding if he is deemed by the Court to be a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988."
LaPlante II
On or about July 25, 2000, Mr. LaPlante was returned to the Massachusetts prison system and placed in the East Wing Segregation unit at MCI Cedar Junction before moving to the Modular Unit on August 3, 2000. Mr. LaPlante was classified for placement in general population (where he would have had ordinary law library access, like any other inmate) but he indicated that he feared for his safety and wanted to remain in protective housing. While the defendants dispute the bonafides of Mr. LaPlante's safety concerns, on August 11, 2000 he was placed in Awaiting Action status rather than general population.
While on Awaiting Action status, Mr. LaPlante did not have access to the law library and could only request legal materials by precise citation for delivery to his cell. After exhausting administrative remedies, Mr. LaPlante filed this lawsuit on January 24, 2001 ("LaPlante II"). He seeks injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state common law contract principles.
Eventually, in late April of 2002 Mr. LaPlante was assigned to a special housing unit at MCI Cedar Junction and "special provision" was made for him to access the law library. Since September 26, 2002, Mr. LaPlante has been incarcerated at the Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, where he has weekly access to the law library.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
The defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The plaintiff has cross-moved for summary judgment.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969)
Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1999).
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST LARRY DUBOIS
Defendant Larry DuBois retired as Commissioner of the DOC on July 31, 1997, prior to the district court's ruling in LaPlante I and prior to entry of the settlement agreement. Since he thus had no personal involvement in the facts that gave rise to this lawsuit, claims against him are dismissed.
V. DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Mr. LaPlante has demonstrated clearly that the defendants infringed his constitutional right of access to the courts, that his claims are not moot, that he has suffered a sufficiently "actual injury" to confer standing, and that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Legal Materials and Right of Access to the Courts
The First Amendment entitles prisoners to "the means for ensuring `a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'" Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977)). While correctional officials are entrusted with flexibility in managing their institutions, they typically must provide "prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from person trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
It is undisputed that for approximately twenty-one months, from August of 2000 through April of 2002, the defendants denied Mr. LaPlante access to the law library and required him to request legal materials by exact citation. Courts in this circuit repeatedly have held over the years that this "exact citation" system is constitutionally inadequate. See, e.g., Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1984) (calling the exact citation system "suspect" because "[i]t is unrealistic to expect a prisoner to know in advance exactly what materials he needs to consult") (internal citation omitted); Rich v. Zitay, 644 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1981) (declaring that the exact citation system "is obviously a Catch 22"); Messere v. Fair, 752 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.Mass. 1990) (finding that the exact citation system "fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. It is doubtful that many lawyers and judges could do minimally adequate research if they were required to request materials by mail via specific citations.") Moreover, in LaPlante I, brought against many of the same defendants, Judge Lindsay expressly held that forcing Mr. LaPlante to use the exact citation system unconstitutionally denied him meaningful access to the courts.
B. Mr. LaPlante's Housing and Security Classification
Against this legal backdrop, the reprise of defendants' unconstitutional behavior is very disturbing, and their position in this litigation can only be described as obtuse. Essentially, defendants claim that if Mr. LaPlante wanted access to the law library, he had merely to agree to a "general population" security classification. They contend that Mr. LaPlante was trying to use law library access to "manipulate" his housing placement.
This argument is wholly unconvincing. First, there is no basis for complete denial of the right of access to legal materials simply because Mr. LaPlante is not housed in "general population"; the constitutional right of access to courts is not limited to a particular housing or security arrangement. Second, unconstitutional treatment of a prisoner is never excused simply because the prisoner can avoid that treatment by changing his behavior — in this case, accepting a "general population" classification. See Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513-14 (2002) (finding punitive attachment of inmate to hitching post unconstitutional even though inmate could have ended punishment by agreeing to return to work). Third, defendants admit that they retain absolute discretion to house and classify Mr. LaPlante over his objection. It is the defendants who have linked library access to housing classification. Throughout this litigation, Mr. LaPlante has sought only law library access, not any intervention of the court in his security or housing status.
If there was any manipulation going on, it would appear that defendants were trying to use denial of law library access as a "stick" to coerce Mr. LaPlante into accepting a general population classification.
I therefore need not wade into the rivers of ink that the parties have spilled debating the bonafides of Mr. LaPlante's safety fears. It is, however, telling that Mr. LaPlante spent years in out-of-state facilities based on security concerns and that even now, defendants eventually decided to put Mr. LaPlante into special housing. Defendants obviously cannot "force inmates to choose between relinquishing their constitutional rights and jeopardizing their lives." Sitckney v. List, 519 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D.Nev. 1981).
C. Mootness
Contrary to defendants' assertion, this action is not moot simply because the defendants, after twenty-one months, made a self-described "special provision" to grant law library access to Mr. LaPlante. It is axiomatic that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). "A case may be rendered moot only if the defendant satisfies the `heavy burden' of demonstrating that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'" Nunez-Soto v. Alvarado, 956 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Here, the defendants maintain that they have absolute discretion to determine the classification and placement of prisoners and, presumably, the power to revoke the "special provision" of law library access to Mr. LaPlante. Under such circumstances, the controversy is not moot. See Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.Mass. 2000) (Gertner, J.) (holding that voluntary cessation of strip search policy did not moot constitutional claims).D. Standing — Actual Injury
Mr. LaPlante has alleged sufficient "actual injury" to confer standing in this case even under the more stringent standards that the Supreme Court recently has imposed in access-to-courts litigation. In Lewis, the Court rejected the notion that a prisoner could "establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Instead, in order to prove that he was injured by the prison's failure to provide him with meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must demonstrate that he was or is currently impaired in his pursuit of a non-frivolous legal claim challenging his conviction or the conditions of his confinement. See id. at 356.
There is no merit to defendants' suggestion that the very fact of this lawsuit proves that Mr. LaPlante already enjoys adequate access to the courts despite lack of law library access. Acceptance of that argument would place Mr. LaPlante in a Catch-22 where he would be without constitutional remedy, deprived of standing the moment he brought a suit to challenge infringement of his right of access to courts in other matters. The fact that Mr. LaPlante managed to bring this lawsuit does not in any way suggest that he has sufficient legal knowledge to assess the legal merits of his other grievances and bring appropriately crafted actions where possible or appropriate to address them. Likewise, the fact that he may have been able to exercise various administrative and legal remedies to address some of his underlying grievances does not mean that his efforts were not impaired by lack of access to legal research materials.
The parties vigorously contest the putative merits of Mr. LaPlante's legal claims which he alleges to have been frustrated by lack of access to the law library. While I will briefly detail Mr. LaPlante's specific grievances below, this discussion does not bear long attention because his claims are at least plausible. Even the Lewis majority acknowledged that the bar for actual injury in this context is very low — if a claim would survive Rule 11, it is not frivolous. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n. 2 n. 3 (explaining that even a procedurally defaulted claim is non-frivolous). The plaintiff need not prove likelihood of success on the merits because "the right of access to the courts means the right to rise to the level of being a failure. The right of access is at its base a right to be heard." Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of access-to-courts claim based on impairment of inmate's ability to appeal denial of public benefits and noting that "not every `challenge to the conditions of confinement' takes the form of a civil rights action").
Indeed, "the testimony of [one of the Lewis plaintiffs] which led the district court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to conclude that he had suffered an actual injury did not address the merits of his underlying legal claim. In fact, [that plaintiff's] only testimony relating to the merits of his claim was that he had filed a claim based on `access to outside recreation, access to the library, and medical.'" Gomez v. Vernon, 962 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (D. Id. 1997) (citing transcripts in Casey v. Lewis, CV 90-0054, CV 91-1808 (D.Ariz. 1992)). The Supreme Court majority found this bare statement sufficient to meet the "actual injury" requirements. See id. All that was required was some articulable grievance that the inmate wished to pursue through legal means which had been impeded by lack of access to legal research materials.
It is also worth noting that Lewis was a class action where the district court had entered an injunction that micro-managed inmate law library access across an entire prison system. The gravamen of the Supreme Court's holding was that plaintiffs' failure to show "widespread actual injury" rendered the district court's finding of a "systemic" Bounds violation invalid. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The concerns about overbreadth that caused the Supreme Court to hone in on standing in Lewis are absent here, where a single inmate seeks relief only for himself.
Moreover, courts should avoid being drawn into protracted adjudication of underlying grievances for prudential reasons.
First, allowing access to courts claims to be dismissed when a prisoner arguably stood no chance of success on the merits of his underlying claim would lead to a "trial within a trial." Parties would be obliged to submit and defend what amounted to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, summary judgment, or other dispositive motions, but for hypothetical cases at hypothetical stages. That would hardly be efficient. Second, courts would have to speculate about what another court would have done if, contrary to fact, a prisoner had had adequate access to the courts. Third, in many instances, weighing the chances of theoretical success on the merits would require a federal court hearing an access to courts claim to decide whether an unrelated issue could have hypothetically succeeded in state court. Federal courts are not the preferred fora for such determinations.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d at 560.
Furthermore, one of the potential benefits of providing Mr. LaPlante with the means to research his grievances is that he may himself come to conclude that they do not amount to a cause of action, thereby conserving court resources from adjudiction of a "shot in the dark" lawsuit that he might otherwise have filed.
Here, regardless of whether or not Mr. LaPlante's claims ultimately have merit or would even require extensive legal research, they certainly have sufficient gravitas to survive Rule 11. His putative underlying claims include:
The Lewis "actual injury" test is based on the constitutional requirement of standing, which is determined by the facts at the time the complaint is filed. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n. 4 (1992). The fact that Mr. LaPlante now has law library access and is no longer impaired in pursuing these particular claims does not deprive him of standing. The "actual injury" consists of impairment of ability to pursue underlying claims at the time this lawsuit was filed. The fact that he may still have time, under relevant statutes of limitations, to pursue the claims now that he does have law library access is thus irrelevant.
1. Deprivation of Personal Property Following a Disciplinary Hearing
Mr. LaPlante claims that his procedural due process rights were violated in a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in confiscation of certain personal property for two weeks. While defendants may well be correct that the deprivation did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), his claim is not "frivolous" and would survive Rule 11.
2. Denial of Out-of-Cell Exercise
Mr. LaPlante alleges that prison officials denied him exercise and recreation outside of his cell for over 250 days — from August 11, 2000, to May 15, 2001 — in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Deprivation of exercise for an eight-month period without a legitimate penological justification is sufficient to state a prima facie Eighth Amendment claim. See Delaney v. Ditella, 256 F.3d 679, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that six-month denial of exercise violated 8th Amendment); Jefferson v. Southworth, 447 F. Supp. 179 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd sub nom., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980) (issuing order requiring one hour of exercise per day for prisoners subjected to three and a half month lockdown); Beckford v. Portuondo, 234 F.3d 128, 129 (2nd Cir. 2000) (remanding case to district court to reconsider whether six month denial of out of cell recreation was actionable under the Eighth Amendment).
3. Seizure of Photographs
Mr. LaPlante alleges that on or about November 30, 2000, prison officials violated his First Amendment rights when they seized three commercial photographs of women that had been sent to him. Of course, inmates' First Amendment rights are subject to restrictions consistent with legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). However, prison officials' discretion to prohibit intimate photographs may arguably be limited to actual images of loved ones, spouses, or girlfriends. See, e.g., Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding prison policy permitting commercial erotica but banning nude photos of spouses and girlfriends). Here, Mr. LaPlante alleges that the confiscated photographs were no different from the contents of magazines such as Playboy, which the DOC "routinely permits."
4. Small Claims
Mr. LaPlante alleges that prison officials deprived him of property without due process of law when they lost or destroyed items of his personal property during his transfer from the Bureau of Prisons in August 2000 and during a security inspection at MCI-Cedar Junction in October of 2000. He claims that he was impaired in his ability to ascertain proper legal remedies available to him.
5. Sex Offender Classification
Mr. LaPlante alleges that he has been unable to correct false and misleading Criminal Offender Record Information that improperly classifies him as a sex offender. As a result, he claims that he may be compelled to participate in sex offender programming, is stigmatized, and at increased risk of assault by other inmates.
E. Qualified Immunity
Defendants' qualified immunity defense has no merit, particularly since LaPlante I found that many of the same defendants violated the constitution by engaging in activities similar to those alleged here. The qualified immunity defense shields government defendants "from liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Hope, 122 S.Ct. at 2515 (citation omitted). Qualified immunity "operates `to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice that their conduct is unlawful.'" Id. The defense fails here because the law in this circuit has been clear for decades: the "exact citation" system is unconstitutional.
Defendants' argument that Lewis changed the legal landscape for purposes of qualified immunity has no traction. While Lewis imposed more stringent standing requirements on plaintiffs in access to courts cases, it did not legitimize what previously had been unconstitutional conduct. In other words, Lewis rearranged procedural hoops without significantly altering the underlying constitutional terrain. Certainly, at all events, it did not undermine the line of cases invalidating the "exact citation" system. While Lewis thus may have had the unfortunate effect of lulling defendants into a belief that they could "get away with" infringing the right of access to courts given new procedural obstacles facing prospective plaintiffs, it could not have led reasonable prison officials to believe that their behavior in this case was actually constitutional.
VI. BREACH OF THE LAPLANTE I SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Mr. LaPlante is also entitled to summary judgment on his claim that defendants have violated the LaPlante I settlement agreement.
Under Massachusetts law, a settlement agreement is enforceable as a contract. See United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1127 (1st Cir. 1987). Contract interpretation ordinarily is a question of law for the court. See Freelander v. G K Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516 (1970). Where the wording of the contract is unambiguous, it must be enforced according to its terms. See Edmonds v. U.S., 642 F.2d 877, 881 (1st Cir. 1981). A question of fact for determination by a jury arises only when contractual terms are ambiguous. See id.
Here, the settlement agreement unambiguously obligated the defendants to provide Mr. LaPlante with access to specified legal materials. While the defendants argue that "the sole purpose of the agreement was to provide Mr. LaPlante with Massachusetts state law material during his out-of-state incarceration," the terms of the agreement contain no such limitation. Indeed, it treats out-of-state incarceration as only one possibility, which necessarily implies that it also contemplated in-state incarceration. Further, the agreement contains no limitation that would restrict its application to a particular housing unit or disciplinary classification. Defendants' argument that legal materials were "available" at Mr. LaPlante's place of incarceration even though he could not access them from his housing unit is obtuse, as described in Section V above. In short, the terms of the agreement and the DOC's flagrant disregard for those terms could not be more clear.
"The DOC shall ensure that all of the materials listed . . . are provided to any out-of-state or federal prison facility to which LaPlante is transferred during the course of his commitment to DOC."
VII. CONCLUSION, FINDINGS, AND REMEDY
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion To Dismiss [document # 22] is hereby GRANTED with respect to defendant Larry DuBois only and DENIED in all other respects. Defendants' Motion in the Alternative for Summary Judgment [document #22] is hereby DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [document #30] is hereby GRANTED. It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1. Defendants have infringed Mr. LaPlante's constitutional right of access to the courts and have acted with deliberate and reckless indifference to his federally protected rights.
2. In the absence of proven or quantifiable monetary damages, Plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages of $21 (one dollar for each month deprivation of legal materials access, August 2000 — April 2002) from the individual defendants sued in their individual capacities.
3. Defendants are permanently enjoined from infringing Mr. LaPlante's constitutional right of access to the courts.
4. Defendants are permanently enjoined from violating the terms of the LaPlante I Settlement Agreement.
5. Plaintiff is the "prevailing party" in this action in the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
6. Plaintiff's counsel is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and under the express terms of the LaPlante I Settlement Agreement.
SO ORDERED.