Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super.Ct. No. 1-06-CV075228
Duffy, J.
In June 2000, respondent First American Title Insurance Company recorded a deed in favor of appellant Eugenia Laolagi, who had contracted to purchase San Jose property located at 2198 Crystal Hills Court. This recordation was erroneous because Laolagi had not deposited into escrow any portion of the nearly $1.9 million purchase price. After learning of the mistake, First American had Laolagi sign a deed correcting the public record to clarify that she held no interest in the property. Over six years later, Laolagi brought suit against First American and the owners of the property, respondents Thanh Hua and Cam Hua, seeking to invalidate the correcting deed in order “to perfect [her] title to [the] property....” First American and the Huas cross-complained against Laolagi to quiet title. The court granted the motion of First American and the Huas for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication, and judgment was thereafter entered in their favor.
Laolagi contends on appeal that the court erred in granting summary judgment. We will affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2006, Laolagi in propria persona filed a pleading captioned “petition for writ of mandate” (hereafter, complaint), naming First American as respondent and the Huas as real parties in interest. She alleged that she sought to “solidify [her] rightful ownership” to the property based on a grant deed in her favor signed by Cecil and Alicia Gregg on June 28, 2000, and recorded in Santa Clara County two days later (the Greggs deed). Laolagi alleged further in the complaint that she had been deceived by First American into signing on July 11, 2000, a deed transferring any interest she held in the property to the Greggs (the Laolagi deed). That deed was recorded with a cover page entitled “Correction Deed” on July 14, 2000. Laolagi sought an order setting aside and declaring void the Laolagi deed, and a judicial declaration as to her rights to the property conferred through the Greggs deed.
Both the Greggs deed and the subsequent July 14 Laolagi deed identified the grantee and the grantor, in the respective documents, as Eugenia L. Hunkin, an unmarried woman. We understand, based upon the caption of her complaint and summary judgment motion, that Laolagi is also known as Eugenia L. Hunkin.
First American and the Huas filed an answer to the complaint. They alleged a number of affirmative defenses, including a defense that the complaint was barred by applicable statutes of limitation. They filed a cross-complaint to quiet title concurrently with their answer. In their cross-complaint, they sought a judgment declaring that the Huas owned the property in fee, free of any adverse claims by Laolagi. First American and the Huas also sought an order declaring Laolagi to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(3).
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
Laolagi filed an answer to the cross-complaint. She averred in it that (1) First American “created a self-imposed liability” by recording the Greggs deed “without collecting consideration”; (2) the Laolagi deed was “a void document” because First American willfully concealed from Laolagi that the property had been transferred to her through the prior Greggs deed; and (3) the deed under which the Huas claimed ownership of the property was therefore void because the Greggs deed controlled.
Laolagi filed on March 21, 2007, a motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of claims (Laolagi’s motion), pursuant to section 437c. She claimed that there was no defense to her complaint and that she was entitled to the relief prayed as a matter of law. Thereafter, First American and the Huas filed a motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of claims (First American’s motion). They asserted that they were entitled to judgment on Laolagi’s complaint and on their cross-complaint. The court ordered that the hearings on Laolagi’s motion and First American’s motion be coordinated. After a hearing, on July 30, 2007, the court entered an order denying Laolagi’s motion, granting First American’s motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action of the cross-complaint to quiet title, and denying without prejudice First American’s motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action of the cross-complaint to declare Laolagi to be a vexatious litigant. First American thereafter filed a motion for an order declaring Laolagi to be a vexatious litigant and for a prefiling order under section 391.7. The motion was granted on October 11, 2007.
A judgment was entered in favor of First American and the Huas on November 15, 2007. Laolagi filed a timely notice of appeal. The matter is a proper subject for appellate review. (§ 437c, subd. (m)(1).)
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Motions
A. Standard of Review
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) As such, the summary judgment statute (§ 437c), “provides a particularly suitable means to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and/or of the defendant’s [defense].” (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203.) A summary judgment motion must demonstrate that “material facts” are undisputed. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The pleadings determine the issues to be addressed by a summary judgment motion. (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1980) 26 Cal.3d 848, 885, revd. on other grounds Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490.)
“A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (§ 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Like summary judgment, the moving party’s burden on summary adjudication is to establish evidentiary facts sufficient to prove or disprove the elements of a claim or defense. (§ 437c, subds. (c), (f).)
The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.) A defendant moving for summary judgment must “ ‘show[ ] that one or more elements of the cause of action... cannot be established’ by the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 853, quoting § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) A defendant meets its burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) Alternatively, a defendant meets its burden by submitting evidence “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence” supporting an essential element of its claim. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)
Since both summary judgment and summary adjudication motions involve pure questions of law, we review the granting of summary judgment or summary adjudication de novo to ascertain from the papers whether there is a triable issue of material fact. (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438; Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1450.) In doing so, we “consider[ ] all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
In our independent review of the granting of summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to “decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue. [Citation.]” (Chavez v. Carpenter, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438; see also Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 681, 688.) We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale. (Kids’ Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)
B. Merits of Summary Judgment Motions
1. First American’s motion
We first address the merits of First American’s motion—more specifically, the motion for summary adjudication of the quiet title cause of action of the cross- complaint. As cross-complainants seeking summary judgment in their favor on their cross-complaint, First American and the Huas meet their “burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if [they have] proved each element of the cause of action entitling [them] to judgment on that cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
As we have noted, the court denied First American’s motion without prejudice as to the second cause of action, but later granted the motion of First American and the Huas to have Laolagi declared a vexatious litigant. Laolagi has not challenged the latter order in her opening brief and did not file a reply brief. Accordingly, any argument that the court erred in declaring Laolagi to be a vexatious litigant is forfeited. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4 [appellate arguments “neither timely nor fully made” deemed forfeited].)
Section 760.020, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n action may be brought under this chapter to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein.” A quiet title action “ ‘is brought, as authorized by the statute, “for the purpose of determining” any adverse claim that may be asserted therein by a defendant to the land in controversy; and this does not mean that the court is simply to ascertain, as against a plaintiff shown to have a legal interest, whether or not such defendant has some interest, but also that the court shall declare and define the interest held by the defendant, if any, so that the plaintiff may have a decree finally adjudicating the extent of his own interest in the property in controversy. The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to....’ [Citation.]” (Lechuza Villas West v. California Coastal Com’n (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 218, 242, quoting Peterson v. Gibbs (1905) 147 Cal. 1, 5.)
Here, First American and the Huas established in their motion that the Huas are the record title owners of the property. In First American’s motion, evidence was submitted—through requests for judicial notice, granted by the court—that the Huas are the owners of record because (1) the Greggs conveyed the property by grant deed in July 2000 to Douglas and Pamela Glader, and (2) the Gladers conveyed the property by grant deed to the Huas in June 2006. Laolagi did not submit any evidence to refute that the Huas are the owners of the property.
Indeed, Laolagi submitted no written opposition at all to First American’s motion. First American and the Huas apparently treated Laolagi’s reply memorandum in support of her motion as serving also as opposition to First American’s motion. Although Laolagi’s failure to file the mandatory separate statement responding to each of the material facts that were contended in First American’s motion to be undisputed could have served as a basis for the granting of the motion in the court’s discretion (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3)), before doing so, the court was required to determine that First American and the Huas had met their initial burden of showing that they were entitled to summary judgment. (Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)
The central issue was whether the moving parties demonstrated that the Huas were entitled to quiet title in their favor against the adverse claim of Laolagi. That adverse claim—as alleged in Laolagi’s complaint, her answer to the cross-complaint, and in her summary judgment motion—was founded on (1) the Greggs deed purportedly conveying the property to her, and (2) her assertion that the subsequent Laolagi deed allegedly conveying the property back to the Greggs was invalid. We therefore describe the undisputed facts material to issues concerning this adverse claim and the law applicable in resolving whether there was any potential merit to the claim.
Under the purchase and sale contract entered into on June 8, 2000, by Laolagi and the Greggs, Laolagi was obligated to purchase the property for $1,880,000 with a close of escrow to occur on June 30, 2000. Laolagi testified that she understood that she was obligated under the agreement to deposit $1,880,000 into escrow before the stated closing date in order to complete the purchase of the property. The contract contained no contingency that Laolagi would finance the purchase by (1) obtaining a new loan, (2) assuming an existing loan, or (3) obtaining seller financing. Laolagi was required to deposit $100,000 of the total purchase price into escrow. The $100,000 check drawn on Laolagi’s bank account for this deposit was returned by the bank based upon insufficient funds. She was informed by First American that her check had “bounced.”
Indeed, Laolagi admitted in her deposition that she was aware at the time she issued the check that she did not have sufficient funds in her account.
Although Laolagi’s deposit check had been returned for insufficient funds, the Greggs proceeded ahead by signing documents on June 28, 2000, to close escrow, based upon Laolagi’s continuing representations that she was expecting to receive money necessary to purchase the property. Included among those documents was a grant deed (i.e., the Greggs deed), and separate buyer’s and sellers’ escrow instructions. The buyer’s instructions reflected that the escrow officer was authorized to deliver the funds tendered for the purchase of the property when it had “received for [Laolagi’s] account” the grant deed. Likewise, the Greggs authorized the escrow agent in their instructions “to deliver and/or record” the deed they had signed when the agent had “received for [their] account” the “[b]alance of sales proceeds....”
Laolagi never deposited the $1,880,000, or any other amount, into escrow. However, due to a mistake on the part of First American, the Greggs deed was recorded with the Santa Clara County Recorder’s Office on June 30, 2000. Laolagi acknowledged in her deposition that the recording of the Greggs deed was the result of a mistake by First American. In the meantime, because Laolagi had not performed under the contract, the parties signed an acknowledgment on or about July 10, 2000, indicating that the contract had been terminated.
The escrow officer, Kim Blackstone, explained that because there was a tight deadline for the closing in the event Laolagi timely deposited the funds into escrow, she sent the Greggs deed to the First American department responsible for recording documents in Santa Clara County with a note indicating that the deed should be recorded only after further instruction from Blackstone. However, for some reason, the deed was sent to the Recorder’s Office “as a ‘special recording.’ ”
It is undisputed that after the contract had expired and on or about July11, 2000, the escrow officer, Blackstone, contacted Laolagi and arranged for a meeting at the latter’s place of business (a branch of the post office). It is also undisputed that on July 11, 2000, Laolagi (at her work) signed the one-page grant deed conveying any interest in the property to the Greggs. That document contained the words “grant deed” in boldfaced, large type and in all capital letters.
What is in dispute are the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Laolagi deed. According to Blackstone, she explained to Laolagi that the Greggs deed “had been recorded in error, and asked that she sign the deed [Blackstone] had prepared, explaining that this would return record title to the Greggs.” Laolagi indicated that she was willing to sign the deed but also expressed an intention to buy the property. Blackstone told her that “if the parties did indeed intend to complete their transaction, new escrow instructions would have to be executed, extending the date for close of escrow.” On the other hand, Laolagi declared that Blackstone never explained to her that the property had been mistakenly conveyed to her on June 30, 2000, or that it was necessary for her to sign a deed conveying the property back to the Greggs. According to Laolagi, when Blackstone contacted her to arrange a meeting, she said that Laolagi needed to sign some documents “to extend escrow proceedings....” When Blackstone went to Laolagi’s work, she did not explain that the document being presented for signature would convey the property to the Greggs. Laolagi did not read the document before signing it.
We first examine the legal effectiveness of the Greggs deed. Legal delivery of a deed revolves around the intent of the grantor. (Osborn v. Osborn (1954) 42 Cal.2d 358, 363-364.) Where the grantor’s only instructions concerning the transaction are in writing, “ ‘the effect of the transaction depends upon the true construction of the writing. It is in other words a pure question of law whether there was an absolute delivery or not.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. at p. 364.) As explained by the Supreme Court, “Where a deed is placed in the hands of a third person, as an escrow, with an agreement between the grantor and grantee that it shall not be delivered to the grantee until he has complied with certain conditions, the grantee does not acquire any title to the land, nor is he entitled to a delivery of the deed until he has strictly complied with the conditions. If he does not comply with the conditions when required, or refuses to comply, the escrow-holder cannot make a valid delivery of the deed to him. [Citations.]” (Promis v. Duke (1929) 208 Cal. 420, 425.) Thus, if the escrow holder does deliver the deed before the buyer complies with the seller’s instructions to the escrow, such purported delivery conveys no title to the buyer. (Montgomery v. Bank of America (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 563; see also Borgonovo v. Henderson (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 220, 226-228 [purported assignment of note deposited into escrow held invalid, where maker instructed escrow holder to release note only upon deposit of certain sum of money by payee].)
Here, there was a contract calling for the transfer of title to the property in consideration for the payment of a purchase price of $1,880,000. The deposit of the Greggs deed into escrow was based upon instructions under which the escrow agent was authorized by the sellers to deliver and record the deed only after receipt of the full purchase price for the Greggs’ account. Clearly, there was no delivery of the Greggs deed because the condition the sellers placed on its delivery and recordation—plainly expressed in both the contract and sellers’ instructions—never occurred.
It is generally the case that whether a deed has been delivered is determined by the trier of fact based upon an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the grantor’s intent. (Priest v. Bell (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 528, 531.) However, where “the undisputed evidence... unerringly points to one conclusion on the issue of delivery..., the issue should be determined as a matter of law.” (Mecchi v. Picchi (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 470, 482.)
In this instance, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the Greggs deed was never delivered. Therefore, the Greggs were never divested of title and Laolagi could not claim an interest in the property based upon the invalid deed. Furthermore, although the focal point of Laolagi’s argument is that she was allegedly induced into signing the subsequent Laolagi deed by Blackstone’s representation that the document represented an extension of the escrow, that argument is irrelevant to the question of title to the property. Since Laolagi never held any title to the property (through the invalid Greggs deed), it is unnecessary to address the validity of the Laolagi deed—since it only purported to transfer an interest in the property to the Greggs that Laolagi did not possess.
The Huas established that they were the owners in fee of the property, and there was no triable issue of material fact concerning the validity of Laolagi’s adverse claim to the property, founded as it was upon the ineffective Greggs deed. Accordingly, the court properly granted summary judgment in favor of cross-complainants as to their quiet title cause of action. (See Barisich v. Lewis (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 12 [summary judgment in favor of property owner suing to quiet title affirmed where the plaintiff established his ownership interest and negated defense that title was acquired through conveyance in fraud of grantor’s creditors]; People ex rel. State of Cal. v. Drinkhouse (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 931 [summary judgment in quiet title action properly granted where the plaintiff established its interest in land and the defendants’ declarations failed to raise a triable issue of fact that they had valid interest in property].)
2. Laolagi’s motion
The court below held that there was no basis for Laolagi to assert a claim for writ of mandate. She does not challenge that conclusion in her appeal and any claim of error is thus forfeited. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 761, fn. 4.) The court went on to treat Laolagi’s purported petition for writ of mandate as a claim for declaratory relief based upon her assertion of rights in the property. Because her claim in the property was based on the Greggs deed that was never delivered, the court concluded that her motion should be denied and that First American’s motion should be granted.
We have concluded above that the Huas met their burden of showing an entitlement to summary judgment on their quiet title action and that Laolagi raised no triable issues in support of her claim to an interest in the property. For those same reasons therefore Laolagi was not entitled to declaratory relief on her complaint that she held an interest in the property. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying her motion and in granting First American’s motion. (Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [“A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the record establishes as a matter of law that none of the plaintiff's asserted causes of action can prevail”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., McAdams, J.