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Lanphere Enterprises, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc.

United States District Court, D. Oregon
Sep 9, 2003
CV 01-1168-BR (D. Or. Sep. 9, 2003)

Opinion

CV 01-1168-BR

September 9, 2003

CRAIG A. NICHOLS, Nichols Associates, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff

DUANE A. BOSWORTH, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff

RANDOLPH C. FOSTER, STEVEN T. LOVETT, DAVID L. SILVERMAN, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant


OPINION AND ORDER


This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Jiffy Lube International, Inc.'s Petition for Attorney Fees (#125). For the following reasons, Defendant's Petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Lanphere Enterprises, Inc., is a franchised automobile dealer in Portland, Oregon. Defendant offers oil change services in the Portland area. This action arose from Plaintiff's objections to Defendant's radio advertisements relating to the qualifications of Defendants' service employees and the convenience of the services offered by Defendant to potential customers. Plaintiff asserted the advertisements violated Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605, et seq., and tortiously and intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's existing or prospective business relations with its own customers or potential customers to whom it offered similar services.

On June 18, 2003, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Motion, Defendant requested the Court to exercise its discretion to award Defendant reasonable attorneys' fees under Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(3) if Defendant prevailed on its Motion. In its Opinion and Order, the Court noted Defendant's request for attorneys' fees was unsupported by factual or legal submissions and gave Defendant leave to file this Petition.

Defendant now seeks an award of $465,728.35 for attorneys' fees and costs.

DISCUSSION

The UTPA is the only basis for an award of attorneys' fees to Defendant. Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(3) provides "the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party under this section" except in class actions. In its June 18, 2003, Opinion and Order, however, the Court found "UTPA provides a cause of action only for consumers." Accordingly, the Court concluded Plaintiff lacked standing to bring a UTPA claim because it brought its action against Defendant in its capacity as a merchant that was competing for the same business as Defendant, rather than as a consumer. The Court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the UPTA claim. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003).

In Warren, the plaintiff brought an action for copyright violations under the Copyright Act of 1976. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish his standing to bring the action under the Copyright Act as "a legal or beneficial owner of the copyright." Id. at 1140. The court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and dismissal was appropriate" if the plaintiff lacked "standing to assert his federal copyright claims." Id. That principle also governs here.

Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's UTPA claim, it also lacks the power to award attorneys' fees under UTPA's attorney fee provision. In Branson v. Nott, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's civil rights action against several state court officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to prosecute. 62 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1995). The district court sua sponte awarded attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to defendant as the prevailing party because the plaintiff's claim was frivolous.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit described the claim as "nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on prior state court decisions" over which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 291. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's attorneys' fee award and stated:

[B]ecause the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] purported civil rights claim in the first instance, it also lacked the power to award attorney's fees under the civil rights attorney fee statute.
Id. at 292-93.

In addition, only a party who "prevails" on a UTPA claim may be entitled to an award for attorneys' fees. Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(3). In Branson, the Court held:

[A]ttorney's fees are only available under § 1988 to a party who has "prevailed" on the merits. Where as here, dismissal is mandated by a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant is not a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988. See Keene, 908 F.2d at 298. ("Where a complaint has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the `defendant has not "prevailed" over the plaintiff on any issue central to the merits of the litigation.'") [citation omitted]. Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep't of Social Servs., 699 F. Supp. 846, 849 (D. Colo. 1988) (denying attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
Id. at 293.

Because this Court found Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the UTPA claim, the court also lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a ruling on the merits that might have made Defendant a "prevailing party" for purposes of the UPTA attorneys' fees provision. Warren, 328 F.3d at 1140 (" [S]tanding . . . must be supported at each stage of the litigation in the same manner as any other essential element of the case.").

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Petition for Attorney Fees(#125).

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Lanphere Enterprises, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc.

United States District Court, D. Oregon
Sep 9, 2003
CV 01-1168-BR (D. Or. Sep. 9, 2003)
Case details for

Lanphere Enterprises, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LANPHERE ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff, v. JIFFY LUBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.…

Court:United States District Court, D. Oregon

Date published: Sep 9, 2003

Citations

CV 01-1168-BR (D. Or. Sep. 9, 2003)