Opinion
CAUSE NO. 1:03-CV-006
October 1, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Crystal Langston's ("Langston") Motion to Reschedule Deadline Dates, filed on September 18, 2003. The motion requests extension of the already-expired deadline for completion of discovery and all pending deadlines. For the following reasons, Langston's motion will be DENIED.
All parties have consented to the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Represented by counsel Michael C. Kendall ("Kendall"), Langston filed a race discrimination and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and against the City of Fort Wayne and the City of Fort Wayne Communications Department ("Defendants"), on December 3, 2002, in the Alien County Circuit Court. (See Compl.) Defendants removed the case to this Court on January 3, 2003, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (See Notice of Removal.) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b), the parties conducted a preliminary pretrial conference on March 11, 2003, at which the Court established the following deadlines and dates: (1) an August 11, 2003, deadline for amendment of pleadings; (2) a September 12, 2003, deadline for completion of all discovery; (3) an October 17, 2003, deadline for filing of dispositive motions; (4) a February 19, 2004, final pretrial conference; and (5) a March 23, 2004 jury trial. (Docket #18; Report of Parties' Planning Meeting at 2; Scheduling Order at 1-2.) At this conference, the Court admonished counsel that these deadlines were not subject to extension unless good cause could be shown. (Docket #18.)
Kendall withdrew his representation of Langston on June 27, 2003; in response, the Court ordered the case stayed for thirty (30) days. (Order Granting Mot. for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for the Pl. and Mot. to Stay Proceedings for Thirty (30) Days at 1.) The Court's order also provided that the stay would be lifted on July 29, 2003, with the original deadlines in full force and effect. ( Id.) The Court further deemed that Langston now represented herself in the case. ( Id.)
On September 18, 2003, six (6) days after the deadline for completion of discovery expired, counsel Christopher C. Myers ("Myers") entered his appearance as Langston's counsel. (Docker #26.) Langston contemporaneously filed the instant motion, seeking to extend the discovery deadline and all subsequent deadlines. (Mot. to Reschedule Deadline Dates at 1.) At the September 30, 2003, hearing regarding this motion, it was confirmed that Langston (1) has not made any discovery requests to date; (2) owes Defendants several discovery documents, including her initial disclosures as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a); and (3) failed to appear at her own properly noticed deposition on September 10, 2003.
By the scheduling order entered on March 11, 2003, the initial disclosures were to be exchanged by March 28, 2003, making Langston's more than six (6) months overdue.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b) provides that the schedule set at a pretrial conference "shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the . . . magistrate judge." "To demonstrate 'good cause' a party must show that despite their diligence the time table could not have reasonably been met." Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D.Ind. 1995). Accordingly, the Court imposes deadlines with the clear expectation that the parties will abide by them, absent some showing of good cause for enlargement. Indeed, "[c]ourts have a legitimate interest in ensuring that parties abide by scheduling orders to ensure prompt and orderly litigation." United States v. 1948 S. Martin Luther King Dr., 270 F.3d 1102, 1110 (7th Cir. 2001); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) (allowing imposition of sanctions where a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling order).
Rule 16(b)'s "good cause" standard dovetails with Rule 6(b)'s more general pronouncement that an expired deadline can be extended in the case of "excusable neglect." Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Excusable neglect is "a somewhat elastic concept," Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 391, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1496 (1993), demanding an equitable determination that can "encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence." Robb v. Norfolk Western Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 355-56 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 394, 113 S.Ct. at 1497). The relevant factors in this equitable determination include "the danger of prejudice to the defendant, the length of the delay and its potential impact on the judicial proceedings, the reasons for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted [with] good faith." Id. at 359 (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498).
Langston argues that the withdrawal of Kendall and the approximately three (3) months it took her to obtain new counsel are good cause for extension of the deadlines in this case. However, this falls considerably short of demonstrating good cause or excusable neglect. Cf. Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that lack of legal counsel does not by itself provide good cause for overturning a default judgment). For example, we do not know why Kendall was allegedly dilatory, but he seems to put the onus on Langston, who he claims failed to comply with his requests. (See Mot. for Leave to Withdraw ¶¶ 1, 4.) Nevertheless, the Court does not need to determine whether it was Kendall or Langston who was at fault, because even if Kendall must share some of the blame, his shortcomings are attributable to his client. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962).
Moreover, after Langston started representing herself, attention to the case did not improve. For example, Langston does not explain why she failed to secure new counsel before the close of discovery, does not say why she did not ask to have the stay extended, and is silent about not seeking earlier to continue the deadlines. Instead, she merely claims that she "acted as quickly as possible in contacting replacement counsel." This conclusory assertion, even if true, does not excuse her obligation to meet (or at least attempt to meet) the Court's deadlines. While civil litigants without counsel benefit from many procedural protections not granted to represented litigants, they "are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed deadlines." Jones, 39 F.3d at 163.
Of course, none of this excuses Langston's failure to appear at her own properly noticed deposition, which alone evinces some lack of good faith. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d)(1). Moreover, the extension of the deadlines she urges now will necessarily mean that the pretrial conference and trial dates will be postponed, to the obvious prejudice of the Defendants and to the detriment of this Court's ability to manage its docket. See, e.g., Gordon v. Northeastern REMC, No. 1:02-CV-171, 2003 WL 21919179 at *2 (N.D.Ind. June 2, 2003).
The Seventh Circuit recognizes that "district courts must manage a burgeoning caseload" and that "part of that job means that they are entitled — indeed they must — enforce deadlines." Reales v. Consol Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1996). In short, "[d]eadlines must have teeth." Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1992). Because Langston fails to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect, her Motion to Reschedule Deadline Dates is hereby DENIED.