Opinion
No. 1-1000 / 00-1669
Filed August 28, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Ronald H. Schechtman, Judge.
Carroll County appeals the district court's determination that a township trustee was the County's employee at the time of a work-related injury.
REVERSED.
Anne Clark of Hopkins Huebner, Des Moines, for appellant.
Colin McCullough of the McCullough Law Firm, Sac City, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Carroll County appeals the district court's determination that a township trustee was the County's employee at the time of a work-related injury. We reverse.
I. Facts and Background Proceedings.
Lavern Langel fractured his ankle on February 22, 1993, in the course of his duties as a township trustee. He sought workers' compensation benefits from Carroll County. On May 30, 1996, a deputy industrial commissioner concluded Langel was an employee of Carroll County at the time of the injury and filed an arbitration awarding benefits to Langel. Carroll County sought intra-agency review of the decision. On August 29, 1997, the industrial commissioner concluded Langel was not entitled to benefits under Iowa Code chapter 85 because he was not an employee of Carroll County at the time of the injury. Langel sought judicial review of the final agency action. His counsel mailed a petition for judicial review to the Carroll County district court and to Carroll County's counsel on September 25, 1997.
The commissioner is now known as the Iowa workers' compensation commissioner. See Iowa Code § 86.1 (2001).
On May 28, 1998, the district court concluded Langel was an employee of Carroll County at the time of the injury and reversed the agency's decision. Carroll County appealed the district court's ruling. In its appellate reply brief, Carroll County first contended the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Langel's petition for judicial review was not filed within thirty days after the agency issued its appeal decision. In its remand order of December 13, 1999, a panel of this court concluded Carroll County properly raised the question of whether Langel complied with statutory procedures in its appellate reply brief because it implicated the district court's "jurisdiction for judicial review." Moreover, our court remanded the case to the district court with instructions "to receive evidence with regard to Langel's compliance with Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) to determine whether [the district court] had authority to hear the petition for judicial review." Langel v. Carroll County, No. 98-1044, (Iowa Ct.App. Dec. 13, 1999).
On remand the district court concluded (1) it had subject matter jurisdiction of the case; (2) Carroll County's contention that Langel's petition for judicial review was not timely filed constituted a challenge to the court's authority to hear the case; and (3) the County had waived any challenge to the court's authority to hear Langel's petition for judicial review by failing to raise it before filing its reply brief in the previous appeal. Carroll County appeals.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of a final decision of the workers' compensation commissioner, like that of the district court, is for correction of errors of law. Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether the district court erred in exercising its power of judicial review, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. Williamson v. Wellman Fansteel, 595 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 1999); E.N.T. Assocs. v. Collentine, 525 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1994).
III. The District Court's Authority.
Carroll County first contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court "to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case . . . occupying the court's attention." Smith v. Smith, 646 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 2002); State v. Mandacino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993); Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989 ); City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass'n., 360 N.W.2d 729, 730-31 (Iowa 1985). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or estoppel, and may be raised for the first time on appeal, State ex rel. Vega v. Medina, 549 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Iowa 1996), Carroll County asserts its reply brief attack upon the late filing of Langel's petition for judicial review was timely. Langel contends the district court correctly concluded (1) the County's reply brief presented not a question of subject matter jurisdiction, but instead one of the district court's authority to hear and decide this particular case; and (2) a defect in the district court's authority to hear this case can be, and was, obviated by consent, waiver, or estoppel.
Langel did not file an application for rehearing before the agency. Iowa Code section 17A.19(3) (1997) provided that under such circumstances, the petition for judicial review "must be filed within thirty days after the issuance of the agency's final decision . . ."
Our analysis begins with the statutory authority for Langel's access to the court in this case. Judicial review of decisions of the workers' compensation commissioner may be sought in accordance with chapter 17A. See Iowa Code § 86.26 (1997). Except as otherwise provided by statute, the judicial review provisions of chapter 17A are "the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review" of agency action. Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1997). It is at once clear that the statutory texts do not expressly answer the specific question we must decide in this case: whether Langel's failure to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days after issuance of the agency's final decision deprived the district court of jurisdiction or merely placed the court's authority to decide the particular case in jeopardy.
Our supreme court has previously observed that one seeking judicial review of final agency action must file a timely petition for judicial review. Sharp v. Iowa Dep't. of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Iowa 1992) (holding that "Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(d) is inapplicable to expand the district court's judicial review jurisdiction by permitting an appeal of an Employment Appeal Board decision beyond the time limit specified for that purpose by the legislature"); Sioux City Brick Tile v. Employment Appeal Bd., 449 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1989) (noting that the courts of our state "cannot expand their judicial review jurisdiction by allowing appeal of agency action in contested cases beyond the time limit specified for that purpose by the legislature"); Price v. Fred Carlson Co., 117 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Iowa 1962) ("when it appears claimant has failed to perfect his appeal by filing a timely notice . . . the district court would have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal"). It is evident that these and other decisions of our appellate courts have used the words "jurisdiction" and "judicial review jurisdiction" but have failed to clearly specify whether "subject matter jurisdiction" or "authority to hear a particular case" was intended.
Carroll County relies upon Anderson v. W. Hodgeman Sons, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 418 (Iowa 1994), for the proposition that Langel's failure to timely file his petition deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. In that case, Anderson sought workers' compensation benefits after she was injured in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of her employment. Her claim was dismissed by the agency on statute of limitations grounds. Anderson then filed her petition for judicial review of the workers' compensation commissioner's decision in Lyon County where the accident occurred. Notwithstanding Hodgeman's motion to dismiss the petition, the district court transferred the case to Polk County where venue would have been proper. On interlocutory appeal, our supreme court reversed the district court's decision and concluded the Lyon County district court lacked (1) jurisdiction to hear Anderson's petition, and (2) power to transfer the case to a county where it could have been properly filed. Anderson, 524 N.W.2d at 421. In a footnote to its decision our supreme court observed that "[j]udicial review of administrative agency action is a special proceeding . . . in all respects dependent upon the statutes which authorize its pursuit." Id. at 420, n. 1. In yet another footnote, the court noted that the distinction observed in Mandicino and Rolscreen between a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to hear a particular case is not controlling in cases seeking judicial review of final agency action. Id. at 421, n. 2. "In administrative appeals compliance with the statutory prerequisites for judicial review is required for the district court to obtain jurisdiction." Id. Thus, we believe Anderson stands for the proposition that the legislature has given the district court subject matter jurisdiction in these special proceedings only when petitions for judicial review of final agency action are filed in compliance with section 17A.19.
Accordingly, we now conclude our remand order of December 13, 1999, was improvidently issued. We conclude Anderson dictates the dismissal of Langel's petition for judicial review because it was not filed within thirty days after the agency issued its final decision. Our conclusion rests upon the determination that our supreme court views the timely filing of a petition for judicial review as a jurisdictional matter that cannot be conferred by consent of or waiver by the parties. We acknowledge our disposition achieves a harsh result, particularly in view of the fact that Langel's counsel clearly appears to have mailed the petition for judicial review to the clerk of the Carroll County district court sufficiently in advance of the filing deadline to expect it to arrive for filing in compliance with Iowa Code section 17A.19. Nonetheless we are bound by our supreme court's decisions in Sharp and Anderson and therefore reverse.
We must distinguish between the timeliness of the mailing and the untimeliness of the filing. In Sharp, our supreme court concluded timely service (mailing) of a petition for judicial review is not tantamount to filing with the district court. Sharp v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Iowa 1992).
This is evidenced by the fact that the petition for judicial review mailed from Sac City to Carroll County's counsel in Des Moines (a distance in excess of 100 miles) apparently arrived there in advance of the filing deadline because the County served its answer on September 30, 1997. The distance from Sac City to Carroll is less than forty miles, but the petition was not file-stamped by the Clerk of Court until October 1, 1997.
REVERSED.