Opinion
Case Number: 01-74502
July 30, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Michael Wayne Laney, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Kinross Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with the Statute of Limitations. Because the Court finds that the petition was not timely filed, the Court shall grant the Motion.
II. Procedural History
Following a jury trial in Monroe County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder. He then pleaded guilty to being a habitual offender, third. On September 14, 1989, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 80 to 130 years imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, which was vacated in favor of a sentence of 90 to 140 years imprisonment for the habitual offender conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, but reversed the sentence imposed and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. People v. Laney, No. 191131 (Mich.Ct.App. July 10, 1989). Petitioner was resentenced to 39 to 60 years imprisonment. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on March 30, 1990. People v. Laney, No. 86668 (Mich. March 30, 1990).
On April 9, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. People v. Laney, No. 86-21534 (Monroe Cty Circuit Court June 16, 1999). Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied. People v. Laney, No. 228432 (Mich.Ct.App. March 13, 2001). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied on July 30, 2001. People v. Laney, No. 118904 (Mich. July 30, 2001).
On November 20, 2001, Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
III. Analysis
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was not timely filed. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997).
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where a prisoner's conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the prisoner is permitted one year from the AEDPA's effective date to file a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1999).
However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
In the pending case, Petitioner's conviction became final before the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner was required to file his application for habeas corpus relief by April 24, 1997, to comply with the one-year limitations period. Petitioner sought state collateral review of his conviction by filing a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. He filed his motion for relief from judgment on April 9, 1997, thereby tolling the limitations period with just fifteen days remaining. The limitations period continued to be tolled until July 30, 2001, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's delayed application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Thus, on July 30, 2001, the limitations period, of which only fifteen days remained resumed running. See Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2138 (2002). Petitioner did not file his habeas corpus petition until November 20, 2001, almost four months after the limitations period expired. His petition therefore is untimely.
Petitioner argues that his petition should not be dismissed as untimely because he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has identified the following five factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of equitably tolling a statute of limitations: (1) the petitioner's lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner's lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. Dunlap v. U.S., 250 F.3d 1001, 1008 (2001).
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period because a state-created impediment prevented him from timely filing his petition. Specifically, Petitioner claims that a forensic report prepared by Terry L. Laber related to blood spatter and bloodstain evidence was not made available to Petitioner until after conclusion of his direct review. The documents attached to the petition reflect that Mr. Laber sent the forensic report to Petitioner on October 12, 1997. Thus, even assuming that Petitioner could not pursue collateral relief until he obtained the report, Petitioner has failed to show that, after obtaining that report, he diligently pursued his rights.
An essential component of the doctrine of equitable tolling is a petitioner's diligent pursuit of federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Morgan v. Money, 2000 WL 178421 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that a petitioner must show that he exercised due diligence in pursuing § 2254 relief to support equitable tolling). See also Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that petitioner "did not meet the high threshold for obtaining [equitable tolling] because he did not act diligently to pursue his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in either state or federal court"); Jones v. Gundy, 2000 WL 745411 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2000) (rejecting a petitioner's argument for equitable tolling where petitioner did not diligently pursue his rights and failed to provide any explanation to excuse such failure). Petitioner was in possession of this purportedly essential report at the time collateral review in state court was completed. Yet, he waited an additional four months to file a petition in this Court. Petitioner's failure to file a petition for habeas corpus relief until almost four months after the conclusion of collateral review in state court evidences a lack of diligence in pursuing his rights. Moreover, the claims presented in the petition are not limited to arguments derived from the blood spatter and bloodstain evidence. Petitioner fails to explain why these claims were not timely presented. Therefore, the Court holds that he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Finally, Petitioner claims that his petition should not be barred from review by the one-year limitations period because he is actually innocent. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard applicable to claims of actual innocence that are accompanied by claims of constitutional violations. To make a showing of actual innocence, "a petition must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327. The Court further explained this standard as follows:
The . . . standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual innocence. In assessing the adequacy of petitioner's showing, therefore, the district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on `actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial. . . . The habeas court must make its determination concerning the petitioner's innocence in light of all the evidence, including . . . evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after trial.
. . . .
. . . [A]ctual innocence does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Petitioner does not present a credible claim of actual innocence. The forensic report attached to the petition fails to establish that no juror or judge, acting reasonably, would have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the habeas corpus petition was filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Further, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).