Opinion
6:18-CV-06516 EAW
2020-04-15
John LAND, Plaintiff, v. Kristin M. SALOTTI, Jessica B. Burnett, Karen Rinere, RN Young, John Doe, Draft Room Officer, John Doe, Officer, Nurse Jane Doe, Luci Wilson, Regional Health Services Administrator, Mary J. Coleman, Regional Health Services Administrator, Defendants.
John Land, Beacon, NY, pro se.
John Land, Beacon, NY, pro se.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff John Land ("Plaintiff"), an inmate currently incarcerated at the Fishkill Correctional Facility, filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants Kristin M. Salotti ("Salotti"), Suzanne Amy Burnett ("Burnett"), and John C. Colvin ("Colvin") were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical condition. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis . (Dkt. 2).
The Amended Complaint now identifies defendant Suzanne Amy Burnett as "Jessica B. Burnett." (Dkt. 6).
The Court granted Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the Complaint with respect to the 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A criteria. (Dkt. 5). For purposes of initial review, the Court determined that the claims against Salotti and Burnett could proceed to service and that the claim against Colvin was subject to dismissal. (Id. ). Plaintiff was granted leave to replead his claims. (Id. ).
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 6). He again asserts claims against Salotti and Burnett but has added the following additional defendants to his claims of deliberate indifference: Karen Rinere ("Rinere"), RN Young ("Young"), Draft Room Officer John Doe ("John Doe #1"), Officer John Doe ("John Doe #2"), Nurse Jane Doe, Regional Health Service Administrators Luci Wilson ("Wilson") and Mary J. Coleman ("Coleman") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Id. ).
The Court has screened the Amended Complaint with respect to the §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A criteria. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the claim against John Doe #2 must be dismissed, but that the claims against the remaining Defendants may proceed to service.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and, as required at this stage of the proceedings, are accepted as true. Plaintiff alleges that in 2015, he was in a car accident that resulted in injuries to his back and knee. (Dkt. 6 at ¶ 11). As a result, Plaintiff was prescribed back and knee braces and pain medication upon his admission to Downstate Correctional Facility, which continued upon his transfer to Sing Sing Correctional Facility. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17). Plaintiff also received "a bus pass as a result of his limited mobility." (Id. at ¶ 17).
On July 21, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to Five Points Correctional Facility ("Five Points"). (Id. at ¶ 18). John Doe #1 confiscated Plaintiff's braces and informed Plaintiff that they would have to be reissued by the facility's medical department. (Id. at ¶ 19). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff went to sick-call and requested the return of his braces, pain medication, and a bottom bunk permit as his condition limited him from climbing up and down a top bunk. (Id. at ¶ 20). Defendant Nurse Jane Doe denied Plaintiff's requests. (Id. ). Plaintiff wrote to the Five Points medical department several times requesting his back and knee braces be re-issued, but received no response. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff's requests were denied on August 22, 2016, by Rinere, and on September 12, 2016, by Young. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23). Plaintiff then filed several grievances regarding the denial of his requests and on September 22, 2016, Plaintiff received a memorandum from Burnett informing Plaintiff that he had an appointment with a nurse practitioner to evaluate his knee. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff was then seen by Salotti who failed to provide Plaintiff with his braces, pain medication, and a bottom bunk permit. (Id. at ¶ 25). On January 2, 2017, Plaintiff again wrote to Burnett about still having not received the items, but Plaintiff's complaint went unanswered. (Id. at ¶ 26).
On April 9, 2017, as a result of not having his medically necessary knee brace, Plaintiff stepped into the shower when his knee gave out, causing him to fall and sustain injuries to his left shoulder and head. (Id. at ¶ 27). Because he was in extreme pain from the fall, Plaintiff requested that he be taken to emergency sick-call. (Id. ). John Doe #2 refused to take Plaintiff to emergency sick-call or to provide Plaintiff any other form of medical attention. (Id. ).
The next day, Plaintiff went to sick-call and was seen by Defendant Nurse Jane Doe who informed Plaintiff that he would be seen by a provider in the near future. (Id. at ¶ 28). Later that month, Plaintiff was seen by Salotti. (Id. at ¶ 29). Plaintiff explained to Salotti that he fell while stepping into the shower due to the lack of a knee brace, and that he was experiencing extreme pain in his shoulder and head, as well as blurred vision. (Id. ). Salotti provided Plaintiff with pain medication and scheduled Plaintiff for an x-ray exam. (Id. at ¶ 30). On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff received an x-ray of his shoulder, which Salotti concluded was a "normal left [s]houlder." (Id. at ¶ 31).
For approximately seven months, Plaintiff continued to complain regarding the pain in his left shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 32). On November 1, 2017, Plaintiff was sent to an outside hospital for an MRI exam. (Id. ). Plaintiff was diagnosed with a tear in his tendon and a rotator cuff injury as a result of the fall. (Id. ). Upon outside specialists advising Plaintiff that he needed to undergo arthroscopic surgery, Plaintiff underwent the surgery on February 5, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34). After the surgery, Plaintiff was prescribed physical therapy, however, "weeks went by" and Plaintiff never received any form of physical therapy. (Id. at ¶ 36).
Plaintiff wrote to the Five Points medical department, requesting physical therapy. (Id. ). After receiving no response, Plaintiff requested Deputy Commissioner Koenigsmann to intervene. (Id. ). On February 23 and May 10, 2018, Coleman and Wilson responded, but took no action to provide Plaintiff with physical therapy. (Id. at ¶ 37). Plaintiff eventually received physical therapy, approximately 36 days after his arthroscopic surgery. (Id. at ¶ 38). At the time the Amended Complaint was filed, Plaintiff was still undergoing treatment for his shoulder and had limited mobility in his shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 39).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Section 1915 "provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims." Abbas v. Dixon , 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v. Selsky , 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) ). The court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, if the court determines that the action (1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Generally, the court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Abbas , 480 F.3d at 639 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu , 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
In evaluating the Amended Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage , 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson , 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). "Specific facts are not necessary," and a plaintiff "need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp , 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly : "even after Twombly , dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases"). Although "a court is obliged to construe [pro se ] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis , 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wynder v. McMahon , 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004).
"To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. County of Fulton , 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido , 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994) ). " Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James , 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ).
II. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim—Inadequate Medical Care
A claim of inadequate medical care rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where the facts alleged show that defendant was deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). See also Ross v. Kelly , 784 F. Supp. 35, 43-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd , 970 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992). This standard includes both an objective and subjective component. First, the plaintiff's medical needs must be objectively serious. "A serious medical condition exists where ‘the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ " Harrison v. Barkley , 219 F.3d 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong , 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Second Circuit has provided that:
[medical] conditions ... vary in severity and ... a decision to leave a condition untreated will be constitutional or not depending on the facts of the particular case. Thus, a prisoner with a hang-nail has no constitutional right to treatment, but if prison officials deliberately ignore an infected gash, "the failure to provide appropriate treatment might well violate the Eighth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Chance , 143 F.3d at 702 ). When assessing whether a serious medical need exists, the Court examines a number of factors, "including whether the plaintiff had an injury or condition ‘that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’ " Lewis v. Zon, 920 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 ).
Second, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's serious medical needs but was deliberately indifferent. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ; Brock v. Wright , 315 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003). An isolated failure to provide medical treatment, without more, is generally not actionable unless the surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of deliberateness, rather than inadvertence, in the failure to render meaningful treatment. Gill v. Mooney , 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1987). "Mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation." White v. Clement , 116 F. Supp. 3d 183, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Chance , 143 F. 3d at 703 ).
A. Claim as Alleged Against Salotti, Burnett, Rinere, Young, John Doe #1, and Nurse Jane Doe
Plaintiff alleges that despite his well-documented need for knee and back braces, Five Points medical staff denied the renewal of his pre-existing medical permits for his braces and the issuance of a lower bunk pass. He asserts that his shower fall, rotator cuff injury, and arthroscopic surgery were a direct result of the facility's failure to provide him with a knee brace. For purposes of initial review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a deliberate indifference claim against Salotti, Burnett, Rinere, Young, John Doe #1, and Nurse Jane Doe and, thus, Plaintiff's claim against these Defendants may proceed to service. See Burgess v. Gerbing , No. 15 CV 9256 (VB), 2017 WL 2992208, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2017) (adequate allegations of deliberate indifference to serious medical need where the inmate alleged the defendant refused to provide prescribed knee and back braces and where the plaintiff had subsequently suffered injuries from a slip and fall).
B. Claim as Alleged Against Coleman and Wilson
Plaintiff alleges that after undergoing arthroscopic surgery, Plaintiff was prescribed physical therapy. Plaintiff made several requests for physical therapy, including writing to the Five Points medical department and to Deputy Commissioner Koenigsmann. Coleman and Wilson "responded but fail[ed] to take actions concerning the providing of necessary physical therapy." (Dkt. 6 at ¶ 37). Plaintiff received physical therapy approximately 36 days after his arthroscopic surgery. As a result, Plaintiff continues to receive treatment for his shoulder and possesses limited mobility in his shoulder. For purposes of initial review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a deliberate indifference claim against Coleman and Wilson and, thus, Plaintiff's claim against these Defendants may proceed to service. See Sulton v. Wright , 265 F. Supp. 2d 292, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The delay in treatment received by Sulton, including the referrals to orthopedic specialists ..., the physical therapy and the major Achilles tendon surgery, create a factual issue as to whether the Defendants acted reasonably or with deliberate indifference, an issue which cannot be resolved on the Complaint alone.").
C. Claim as Alleged Against John Doe #2
Plaintiff's claim as alleged against John Doe #2 must be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that John Doe #2 refused to take Plaintiff to emergency sick-call or to provide Plaintiff any other form of medical attention on one isolated occasion, but the next day Plaintiff was seen by Nurse Jane Doe. (Dkt. 6 at ¶¶ 27-28). Plaintiff's claim fails because one isolated failure to provide medical treatment, absent additional allegations indicating deliberate indifference, will not suffice to state a claim. See Dorsey v. Fisher , No. 9:09-CV-1011 (GLS/DEP), 2010 WL 2008966, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) ("Dorsey's conclusory allegation that an unidentified Medication Nurse and escort correctional officer refused Dorsey access to emergency sick call on one occasion fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Eighth Amendment.") (citing Brown v. Sheridan , 894 F. Supp. 66, 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[O]ne isolated failure to provide medical treatment to a prisoner, without more, is generally not actionable" unless the "surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of deliberateness, rather than inadvertence, in the failure to render meaningful treatment")). Accordingly, John Doe #2 is dismissed from this action, albeit without prejudice.
III. Valentin Order
As noted above, Plaintiff has listed John Doe #1 and Nurse Jane Doe as Defendants. Pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins , 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam), the Court requests that the Attorney General of the State of New York ascertain, if possible at this time, the full name of these Defendants. The Attorney General is also requested to provide the address where these Defendants can currently be served. The Attorney General need not undertake to defend or indemnify these individuals at this juncture. This Order merely provides a means by which Plaintiff may name and properly serve these Defendants as instructed by the Second Circuit in Valentin .
The Attorney General of the State of New York is hereby requested to produce the information specified above regarding the identity of these Defendants within 35 days. Once this information is provided to the Court, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shall be deemed amended to reflect the full names of John Doe #1 and Nurse Jane Doe, summonses shall be issued, and the Court directs service on Defendants.
The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Decision and Order and the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6) to Ted O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General in Charge, 144 Exchange Street, Rochester, New York 14614.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's claim against John Doe #2 is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A, and the U.S. Marshals Service is directed to serve the Summonses and Amended Complaint on Kristen M. Salotti, Jessica B. Burnett, Karen Rinere, RN Young, John Doe #1, Nurse Jane Doe, Luci Wilson, and Mary J. Coleman. ORDER
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's claim against John Doe #2 is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court terminate John Doe #2 as a party to this action; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court cause the United States Marshals Service to serve copies of the Summonses, Amended Complaint, and this Decision and Order upon Kristen M. Salotti, Jessica B. Burnett, Karen Rinere, RN Young, John Doe #1, Nurse John Doe, Luci Wilson, and Mary J. Coleman without Plaintiff's payment therefor, with unpaid fees to be recoverable if this action terminates by monetary award in Plaintiff's favor; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court utilize the mailing address for non-inmate mail provided by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's website, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/faclist.html, as needed; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Decision and Order by email to Ted O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General in Charge, Rochester Regional Office < Ted.O'Brien@ag.ny.gov>; and it is further
ORDERED that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Defendants are directed to respond to the Amended Complaint.
SO ORDERED.