This Court refuses to create a catch-22 situation in which it dismisses Plaintiff's complaint for a failure to obtain facts that could not be proven before discovery. See Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3130392, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017) (finding that, in a claim for equitable accounting, the Court could not “determine the level of complexity of the account until a factual record [was] developed.”).

If RediBag so chooses, it is granted leave to amend the Complaint to include pertinent and specific allegations concerning its alleged alter ego liability theory in the body of the amended pleading and then identify, under each relevant count, which Defendant RediBag asserts is liable based on an alter ego liability theory. See, e.g., Lan Li v. Walsh,No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3130388, at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. July 24,2017) (dismissing alter ego clam with leave for plaintiff to replead allegations in body of its amended complaint); Gumbel v. Scott, No. 09-60480-CIV, 2010 WL 11505125, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2010) (same).

See, e.g., Kaikov, 2020 WL 9812923, at *9 (“[A]lthough the misappropriation may have occurred in the United States, the focus of the RICO domestic injury requirement is not on a defendant's conduct ....”); Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3130388, at *10 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017) (“Even accepting . . . that the basis of the RICO claim occurred in the United States because Defendants moved the money around in the United States and diverted funds from the Palm House real estate project, that does not change the fact that the injury was felt by Plaintiffs in their home countries.”). Ultimately, the alleged scheme to defraud in the instant case deprived investors of money originally held abroad.

The focus of the domestic injury inquiry is the geographic location of the injury to Plaintiffs, not the location of the Defendants' wrongful acts. Id. at 2108; see also Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, 233 F.Supp.3d 1297, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (holding that corporate plaintiffs did not suffer domestic injuries because their injuries were felt outside the United States, and explaining it was immaterial where the predicate acts were performed); Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3130388, at *10 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017) (“Even accepting Plaintiffs' claims that the basis of the RICO claim occurred in the United States because Defendants moved money around in the United States . . . does not change the fact that the injury was felt by Plaintiffs in their home countries.”)

And this allegation seems plausible, since: (1) the transaction at issue has generated three separate lawsuits in two federal courts; (2) it involves a “multi-tiered structure for securing payment” for SFI's sale; and (3) implicates a number of different contractual agreements and many different parties/related corporations/relevant actors, (D.I. 39 at ¶ 167; D.I. 44 at 18). See Lan Li v. Walsh, CASE NO. 16-81871-CIV-MARRA, 2017 WL 3130392, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017). Finally, as for Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, the FAC pleads that Plaintiff cannot assert breach of contract claims against C2B (or the Individual Defendants) because they are not parties to the SPA, and thus cannot obtain an adequate remedy at law at least as to them.

The PNC Defendants rely on Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-CV-81871, 2017 WL 3130388, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (Marra, J.) in support of their argument that the RICO claims should be dismissed with prejudice. In Lan Li, the plaintiffs asserted RICO claims predicated on facts nearly identical to those here, and the case involved another of Walsh's alleged schemes to defraud foreign investors interested in obtaining permanent residency through the EB-5 Program of their investments.

Under Florida law, the elements of conversion are "(1) an act of dominion wrongfully asserted; (2) over another's property; and (3) inconsistent with his ownership therein." Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-CIV-81871-MARRA, 2017 WL 3130391, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2017) citing Special Purpose v. Prime One, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099-1100 (S.D. Fla. 2000). A defendant must possess the property in order to convert the property.

Instead, CITGO conclusorily lumps Allen and the Askars together in its allegation that these Defendants transferred assets out of Mid-State to one or more of them or that one or more of these Defendants benefitted from the transfer of assets. See Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3130388, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017)(dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims because "these claims impermissibly lump[ed] together Defendants and fail[ed] to identify any specific transfer of assets, funds or property of Walsh (the alleged debtor) to other Defendants"); Court-Appointed Receiver of Lancer Offshore, Inc. v. Citco Grp. Ltd., No. 05-60055, 2008 WL 926506, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2008)("CGL's objection to the Receiver's 'lumping' of the three Defendants in this manner is valid. Because all three Citco defendants are treated as one, neither the Court nor the Defendants can determine whether CGL is an initial transferee as the Receiver argues."), on reconsideration in part, No. 05-60055-CIV, 2008 WL 7950241 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2008).

As an aside, the Undersigned notes that some federal courts have refused to treat piercing the corporate veil theories as independent causes of action, and as such, have dismissed counts that exclusively seek that relief, while allowing the piercing allegations to remain in the body of the complaint. See, e.g., Lan Li v. Walsh, No. 16-81871-CIV, 2017 WL 3140522, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017) (collecting cases). Defendants, however, did not raise that argument as a basis for dismissal, so I will not dismiss Count I for that reason.

The Court notes that federal courts generally treat alter ego "as a theory to impose liability on an individual for the acts of a corporate entity" rather than as a separate cause of action. Lan Li v. Walsh , No. 16-81871-CIV-MARRA, 2017 WL 3130388, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2017) ; see alsoPeacock v. Thomas , 516 U.S. 349, 354, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) ("Piercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent cause of action, but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action."). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS :