Opinion
No. 07-953-B.
October 30, 2007. November 5, 2007.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Bernard Lamoureux, acting pro se, brought this action alleging various violations of his federal and state civil rights, and a civil conspiracy. The case is now before this court on all of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.
BACKGROUND
Taking the contents of the complaint and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom as true, the facts are as follows:
I. Actions of Juvenile Court-Chief Probation Officer David DeBouch, Superior Court Clerk-Magistrate Loring Lamoureux, Juvenile Court Head Administrative Assistant Barbara Beauregard, and Juvenile Clerk Edwin L. Brennan
In 1973, at the age of sixteen, Lamoureux had a heated argument with then-Juvenile Court Chief Probation Officer David Debouch and then-Superior Court Clerk-Magistrate Loring Lamoureux on a public street. At the end of the argument, Debouch smiled and said, "They'll eat you up in Summer Street." One week later, Lamoureux was arrested on a warrant. He was taken to the police station and then to the Summer Street County Jail, an adult facility. He did not receive a hearing before being placed in the adult facility.
While being held in that facility, Lamoureux was physically and mentally abused by other inmates, and there was a general lack of supervision of the inmates. He observed another inmate being raped and another who was stabbed. Lamoureux never received a hearing to determine whether he should be held there. He was held there for approximately one year before trial and one year after trial.
Lamoureux states that then-Juvenile Court Chief Probation Officer David Debouch and then-Superior Court Clerk-Magistrate Loring Lamoureux conspired to have him arrested and sent to the Summer Street facility because he and they were involved in a dispute. He states that then-Juvenile Court Head Administrative Assistant Barbara Beauregard's failure to adequately supervise the facility is evidence of her involvement in the conspiracy. Then-Juvenile Clerk Edwin L. Brennan also "arranged" Lamoureux's incarceration.
Lamoureux's wrongful imprisonment caused him to suffer mental disorders, including A.D.H.D., that he only became aware of in 2004 after meeting with a psychologist.
II. Actions of Juvenile Clerk-Magistrate Craig D. Smith
In 2007, Lamoureux attempted to retrieve his old juvenile record from Juvenile Court Clerk-Magistrate Craig D. Smith, but the record was incomplete. Smith also informed Lamoureux that "dummy docket numbers" were assigned to Lamoureux's cases by Probation in order to allow his information to be entered into "CARI".
The record was apparently incomplete because many of the documents had been destroyed in accordance with the document destruction policy of the Trial Court.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to dismiss standard
In considering a motion to dismiss, "the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, are to be taken as true." Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977). The defendant is entitled to judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."Id. The court is "not to consider the unlikelihood of the Plaintiff's ability to produce evidence to support otherwise legally sufficient complaint allegations." Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 322 (1998) (citing Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 619-620 (1985)).
II. Statute of limitations
Lamoureux argues that there have been violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), including violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. He also argues that there was a conspiracy to have him arrested and incarcerated, and that Smith became part of the conspiracy when he did not report the "dummy docket numbers" to his supervisor.
For the purposes of this motion, the defendants do not and need not deny that the events stated in the Complaint occurred. Before filing an Answer to the Complaint, the defendants have brought this procedural argument — the statute of limitations — which does not require that the defendants deny the facts in the Complaint.
Due to the statute of limitations, which is a procedural bar on all of Lamoureux's claims, they must be dismissed. In Massachusetts, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have a statute of limitations of three years. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267-280 (1985);Street v. Vose, 936 F. 2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1991). Lamoureux's claims brought under the MCRA are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See G.L. c. 260, § 5B. Civil conspiracy claims likewise have a three-year statute of limitations. Pagliuca v. City of Boston, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 820, 823 (1994).
This court has attempted to classify the claims asserted in Lamoureux's complaint as best as possible. The remainder of Lamoureux's claims that do not fall under these causes of action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The defendants argue that Lamoureux's claims accrued at the latest on August 20, 1974 when he reached the age of majority. G.L. c. 260, § 7. Lamoureux implies that the "discovery rule" should toll the statute of limitations until more recently, when he became aware that the mental disorders he suffers from were caused by his incarceration in an adult facility when he was a juvenile. A cause of action accrues when an individual knows or has reason to know of his alleged injury. SeePoy v. Boutselis, 352 F. 3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 2003); Sampson v.Town of Salisbury, 441 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275-276 (D. Mass. 2006). Specifically with regard to the claim under the MCRA, for a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that a plaintiff know the extent or severity of the harm suffered. Pagliuca, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 822-823. A cause of action accrues on the date of the wrongful act, "unless the wrong is inherently unknowable." Id.; see Gonzales v. U.S., 284 F. 3d 281 (1st Cir. 2002).
Imprisonment tolled the statute of limitations until 1987, when the Legislature amended G.L. c. 198 to delete imprisonment as a tolling condition. Street v. Vose, 936 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1991).
There are several cases that have held that civil rights claims accrue at the time that the event occurs that underlies the cause of action. See Messere v. Murphy, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 917 (1992); Nieves v.McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, although Lamoureux may not have been aware of the underlying cause of or the extent of his injuries until they were uncovered in treatment in 2004, he was injured for the purposes of the statute of limitations when he was imprisoned in an adult facility as a juvenile without receiving a hearing. See G.L. 119, §§ 24-26, 61-74; Mass. R. Crim. P. 7(d)(2). Although Lamoureux did not become aware of the causal connection between his mental disorder and his juvenile imprisonment in an adult facility until 2004, he knew, or should have known, at the time of that incarceration that pursuant to § 1983 and the MCRA he had been injured. See Pagliuca, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 822-823. A civil conspiracy claim accrues on the date of the first allegedly wrongful act, and another wrongful act in that same conspiracy does not reset the time period during which a plaintiff may file suit.Nieves, 241 F. 3d at 51; Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 2007 WL 927679 (D. Mass. 2007) (rejecting argument that "last overt act" was proper time to begin statute of limitations time period). Lamoureux alleges that this conspiracy began in 1973, with his unlawful arrest and imprisonment because of the actions of Debouch and Loring. Therefore, Lamoureux's claim for civil conspiracy should have been brought by 1976; it is time-barred and will be dismissed.
III. Immunity of Smith
Section 1983 claims and MCRA claims cannot be brought against a Commonwealth employee in his official capacity. Forte v.Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1, 2 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1991); Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 591-592 (2001). They also may not be brought against Smith in his individual capacity in this case because he is protected by, at a minimum, qualified immunity. In order to recover from a government official who was performing a discretionary function of their job, a plaintiff must show the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right. See Longval v. Comm'r of Correction, 448 Mass. 412, 418-419 (2007). Analysis of the qualified immunity defense generally requires a two-part inquiry into whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right," and, if so, whether the right was clearly established so that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 437 Mass. 396, 403-404 (2002), quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 202 (2001).
Here, Smith, according to his job duties, informed Lamoureux that many of his requested documents were destroyed pursuant to the Trial Court's document destruction policy. Smith sent other records to Lamoureux. He also informed Lamoureux that some cases, whose files had been destroyed, had been given "dummy docket numbers" so that they could be entered into Probation's system. None of these allegations could be construed as violating a well-established constitutional right. Therefore, all counts against Smith must be dismissed.
ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, it is ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss be ALLOWED and the Complaint be DISMISSED.