Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University

9 Citing cases

  1. Hatcher v. Conifer Realty LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:04-CV-1872 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2007)   Cited 5 times

    In other words, Hatcher did not oppose an unlawful employment practice by Conifer. Our sister court in the District of Delaware held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII retaliation claim when the "plaintiff does not allege any discriminatory action taken against an employee."Rossell v. County Bank, No. 05-195-SLR, 2006 WL 777074, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2006); see also Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (D. Del. 2001) ("Because plaintiff did not oppose a discriminatory action that is proscribed by [Title VII], plaintiff has failed to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII."), aff'd, 39 F. App'x 748 (3d Cir. 2002).

  2. Rossell v. County Bank

    Civ. No. 05-195-SLR (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2006)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that "an employee's efforts to shield her employer's customers from discrimination by the employer is not a protected activity under Title VII"

    The anti-retaliation section of Title VII provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment . . . practice by this subchapter." Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University, 152 F. Supp.2d 553, 559 (D. Del. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action.

  3. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., Wilmington

    450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006)   Cited 570 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “basic advocacy” on an issue does not constitute opposition to an illegal employment practice

    Having failed to mention discrimination in any way, let alone employment discrimination, and absent any context from which it is reasonable to conclude that the advertisement was directed at employers generally or at Ursuline specifically, Curay-Cramer did not engage in activity protected by Title VII when she lent her name to the pro-choice position articulated by the advertisement. Although not directly on point, we believe that Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University, 152 F.Supp.2d 553 (D.Del. 2001), provides a useful comparison. In that case, the District Court held that a female basketball coach did not engage in protected opposition activity by communicating her displeasure with defendant's perceived violation of Title IX, which prohibits schools from providing disparate levels of funding to men's and women's sports programs.

  4. Garcia v. Mariana Bracetti Acad. Charter Sch.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-CV-1117 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    This allegation, even if Plaintiff had provided supporting evidence, does not form the basis for a retaliation claim under Title VII. See Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ. , 152 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (D. Del. 2001) (finding that Plaintiff's protest against the unfair treatment of student athletes, even if a discriminatory practice in violation of Title IX, was not by implication an allegation that the school engaged in unlawful gender discrimination in employment, and therefore not a protected activity upon which Plaintiff could base her Title VII retaliation claim); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 136 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006). But even if she engaged in protected activity, Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated the causal relationship required to sustain a retaliation claim against Defendant. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Roshong was contacted with regard to his discriminatory conduct by these individuals and then refused to renew Plaintiff's employment contract in retaliation for reporting him.

  5. Comans v. Scott County School District

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06CV505 HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Apr. 30, 2010)   Cited 2 times

    Even if Comans' allegations were true, all of the teachers (both male and female) would have been affected by Scott Central's preference for athletics and its "preferential treatment" of its coaches. See Hannon v. R.L. Polk Co., No. 94-10457, 1994 WL 684969 at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 1994); and Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University, 152 F.Supp.2d 553 (D. Del. 2001), aff'd 39 F.Appx. 748 (3rd Cir. 2002). Accordingly, this court concludes that Comans' allegations of "preferential treatment" do not raise an inference of sex discrimination.

  6. Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC

    CIVIL ACTION No. 07-5121 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 2009)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered some form of adverse employment action; and (3) that this action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when a similarly situated person not of the protected class is treated differently.Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University, 152 F.Supp.2d 553, 558-59 (D. Del. 2001), aff'd, 39 F. App'x 748 (3d Cir. 2002). Federal Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting analysis to Title VII claims of discrimination and retaliation.

  7. Cole v. Delaware Technical Community College

    459 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Del. 2006)   Cited 17 times
    Restating elements of hostile work environment claim

    ) Under Title VII, a person engages in "protected activity" when he or she opposes discrimination based on membership in a protected class. Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 (D. Del. 2001). General complaints of unfair treatment do not constitute an explicit charge of illegal race discrimination.

  8. Baker v. Wilmington Trust Company

    320 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Del. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that plaintiffs' claim for "associational discrimination" not well founded "because it was based on their acquaintance as bank tellers with the Patels as customers," and observing that "the courts have recognized that associational discrimination claims must have as their basis a much more significant relationship"

    ( Id. at 17; See D.I. 1 at ¶ 17, ¶ 24, ¶ 31.) In support of its position that Plaintiffs have not opposed an unlawful employment practice, WTC cites Lamb-Bowman v. DelawareState Univ., 152 F. Supp.2d 553 (D. Del. 2001). (D.I. 26 at 17.)

  9. Hill v. Chicago Board of Education

    No. 02 C 3534 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2004)

    Id. In Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State Univ., 152 F. Supp.2d 553 (D. Del. 2001), aff'd, No. 01-2045, 2002 WL 1404762 (3d Cir. Jun. 28, 2002), the plaintiff, who was employed as the defendant university's head women's basketball coach, complained to the university's athletic director about disparities between the women's and men's athletic programs over a period of seven years. Id. at 554.