”); Long v. McAllister–Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (“A marital dissolution agreement, like any other contract, contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing both in the performance and in the interpretation of the contract.”).See also Lamar Adver. Co. v. By–Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009); Austa La Vista, LLC v. Mariner's Pointe Interval Owners Ass'n, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005).See also Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (“Parties to a contract owe each other a duty of good faith and fair dealing as it pertains to the performance of a contract.

"In Tennessee, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed in the performance and enforcement of every contract." Lamar Advert. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996)). "The purpose of this implied covenant is (1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered."

Tennessee law imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of every contract. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. Co. v. By–Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009). The purpose of this implied covenant is: “(1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered.”

Tennessee law imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of every contract. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2009). The purpose of this implied covenant is: "(1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered."

In Tennessee, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed in the performance and enforcement of every contract. Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979)); Lamar Advertising Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). The purpose of this implied covenant is (1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered.

Dick Broad. Co., Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tenn. 2013); Lamar Adver. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). "The purpose of this implied covenant is (1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered."

Consequently, "'[t]he implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing does not . . . create new contractual rights or obligations, nor can it be used to circumvent or alter the specific terms of the parties' agreement.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lamar Adver. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). See also John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun Co., Inc. (R&M), 831 A.2d 696, 706-07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (stating that, since the "'obligation of good faith is tied specifically to and is not separate from the [express] duties a contract imposes on the parties,' it cannot imply a term not explicitly contemplated by the contract" (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 434 n.11 (Pa. 2001))).

Importantly, whether a party acted in good faith is a question of fact. Lamar Adver. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996).

The duty of good faith and fair dealing serves "(1) to honor the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties and (2) to protect the rights of the parties to receive the benefits of the agreement into which they entered." Lamar Advertising Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn Ct. App. 2009); see Barnes Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 642-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The duty, however, is aimed at effectuation of the agreement's terms, not their expansion.

And we must read court orders "'in the light of the pleadings and the other parts of the record.'" Lamar Advert. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting John Barb, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 653 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). After entry of the injunction against Mr. Jones, Metro put a notice on his door saying he needed a permit.