Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:18-03232-HMH-MGB
07-02-2019
Jesse Vernon LaLone, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Philip Thompson, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by Plaintiff, pro se and in forma pauperis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 17). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee housed at J. Reuben Long Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed the instant case on November 30, 2018, alleging that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when they held a hearing regarding Plaintiff's destruction of certain county property and failed to give Plaintiff proper notice or time to prepare his defense. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 11-13.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges that on December 22, 2017, "due to being placed in a lock down cell with severe mental issues, [Plaintiff broke] the porcelain sink and toilet and the window, [and] then cut [him]self. " (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff went to the hospital for approximately five days, and he was placed on maximum security when he returned. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that on January 10, 2018, Plaintiff "was served an infraction for destruction of county property over $50 dollars, then within 30 minutes [Plaintiff] was given a hearing. Within 30 minutes after the hearing, $754.62 was taken from [Plaintiff] jail account." (Id. at 12.) The Complaint alleges these proceedings did not comply with prison policy, which allegedly require: (1) a hearing within 72 hours of the incident or notification of an extension in writing; and (2) 24-hour notice in advance of the hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint his "Account Summary" for the time period of November 9, 2017 (the date he arrived at the Detention Center) through November 30, 2018. (Id. at 20.) The Account Summary shows that $754.62 dollars were deducted from Plaintiff's account on January 10, 2018 for "damage to sink, toilet and door in B2-237." (Id.)
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Sargent Sandra Lowe did not "notify [Plaintiff] in writing about an extension for [his] hearing and . . . gave [Plaintiff] a hearing within 30 minutes." (Id. at 5.) The Complaint alleges that Major Johnny Johnson "gave the order to violate the facility's procedures and gave the order to violate Plaintiff's" due process rights. (Id. at 6.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendant Director Wayne Owens "was fully aware of both Defendant Johnson and Defendant Lowe's actions [and] did nothing," and that Defendant Sheriff Philip Thompson ignored Plaintiff's requests that he "intervene on the Defendants' actions." (Id.)
The Complaint alleges a § 1983 claim for violation of Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) The Complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 9.) Specifically, it asks the Court for a declaration that "the acts and omissions described herein violate his rights under the constitution and laws of the United States." (Id. at 7.) The Complaint also seeks injunctive relief to order "all named defendants . . . to stop their further harassment of the Plaintiff." (Id. at 15.) Finally, the Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
STANDARDS
A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
DISCUSSION
As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights in connection with the hearing which resulted in the deduction of $754.62 from Plaintiff's inmate account. Defendants assert that this action should be dismissed because any claims brought against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible due process claim for which relief can be granted against them in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 17 at 2-3.) The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. Constitution, Am. 11.6 The Eleventh Amendment protects states from suit regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ("[W]e have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment").
As Sheriff of Horry County, Defendant Phillip Thompson is immune from suit in his official capacity. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) Sheriff's departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-550 (2008); 1975 S.C. Att'y. Gen'l. Op. No. 47 (Jan. 22, 1975); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-10 (Westlaw 2012); see also Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the sheriff is an "arm of the State"); Cash v. Thomas, No. 6:12-cv-1278-MGL-KFM, 2013 WL 3804375, *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court.") (citing Cromer, 88 F.3d at 1332); Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 386 S.C. 285, 688 S.E.2d 125, 127 n.1 (S.C. 2010) ("[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county, employees.").
With respect to Defendants Director Wayne Owens, Major Johnny Johnson, and Sargent Sandra Lowe, Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that they are employees of the Detention Center. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.) As state officials, they would also be entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 549 (4th Cir. 2014) ("State officials sued in their official capacities for . . . money damages have the same sovereign immunity accorded to the State."); Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Detention Center, 987 F. Supp. 2d 690 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (observing that county detention center was administered by the Sheriff and that its employees were protected by sovereign immunity in official capacity); Jamison v. Bamberg, No. 0:11-cv-2245-DCN-PJG, 2012 WL 7656426, *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2012) ("the Detention Center defendants [sued in their official capacities] are entitled to sovereign immunity"), adopted by, 2013 WL 819193 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2013). Thus, any claims brought against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed. However, they are still subject to suit in their individual capacities.
B. Alleged Due Process Violation
A pre-trial detainee's constitutional claims are governed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16. (1979). "The due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner . . . ." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected property interest in their prison trust account. Burks v. Pate, 119 F. App'x 447, 450 (4th Cir. 2005).
In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that "due process required written notice to the inmate of the charges, an opportunity for the inmate to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, and a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1990). In Dilworth v. Adams, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the core component of due process in the prison discipline context is the right to a hearing." 841 F3d 246, 254 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding pretrial detainee's placement in disciplinary segregation implicated a protected liberty interest and that a due process violation occurred when detainee was not given a hearing prior to segregation placement). The Dilworth Court found a disciplinary hearing where the pretrial detainee may contest the charges against him "is the minimal requirement of the Wolff process." Id. To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property by governmental action. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997).
Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's funds were withdrawn pursuant to S.C. Code § 24-13-80(B)(1)(a) to "repay the costs of public property willfully damaged or destroyed by the inmate during his incarceration." (Dkt. No. 17 at 10.) Defendants assert that "Plaintiff could not be said to have a protected property interest in property forfeited by virtue of statutory authority." (Id.)
Pursuant to this statute, "'Inmate' means a person who is detained in a detention facility by reason of being charged with or convicted of a felony, a misdemeanor, a municipal offense, or violation of a court order." S.C. Code § 24-13-80(A)(2).
"Courts have recognized that inmates possess a protected property interest in their funds." Sturkey v. Ozmint, No. 8:07-cv-1502-MBS, 2009 WL 649569, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2009) (citing Burks, 119 F. App'x at 450), aff'd, 368 F. App'x 337 (4th Cir. 2010). However, courts have found no constitutional deprivation occurs where money is debited from an inmate account pursuant to statutory authority. See, e.g., Hanvey v. Blankenship, 631 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir. 1980) ("When statutory authority permits a forfeiture such as this one, no constitutional violation occurs."); Harper v. NFN Cawthan, Bus. Office, No. 9:16-cv-0404-RBH-BM, 2017 WL 5197229, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (no evidence of constitutional violation where "[t]he evidence submitted shows that Plaintiff was charged for medical services, which is allowed pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.§ 24-13-80") (citing cases), adopted by, 2017 WL 5176836 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2017); Olszowy v. DeWitt, No. 9:09-cv-1662-JMC, 2010 WL 5479663, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2010) ("the subsequent seizure of Plaintiffs' personal property was therefore allowed by statute"), adopted sub nom. Olszowy v. Sheriff Wayne DeWitt, 2010 WL 5463598 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 2010).
In Plaintiff's response brief, Plaintiff admits "there is no question" that he damaged the cell. (Dkt. No. 29 at 2.) Further, the Account Summary attached to Plaintiff's Complaint states that the $754.62 was deducted for the "destruction of property"; specifically, "damage to sink, toilet, and door in B2-237." (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 20.) The monetary deduction in this case therefore appears to fall squarely under S.C. Code § 24-13-80(B)(1)(a), and the above precedent indicates that the deduction from his inmate account in this instance does not amount to a constitutional violation.
However, Plaintiff now claims in his response brief that he "was not guilty by reason of insanity" and that he would have presented this defense at his hearing "had [he] been given a chance to prepare a defense." (Id.) While it does not appear such a defense would prohibit the deduction of Plaintiff's funds in this instance pursuant to S.C. Code § 24-13-80(B)(1)(a), the Court need not reach this issue. Due process is satisfied here because "there exists a statutory provision for a post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation." Richardson v. Duncan, No. 4:16-cv-0835-RBH-TER, 2018 WL 851342, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 2018), adopted sub nom. Richardson v. Wilkes, 2018 WL 835227 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2018), aff'd, 735 F. App'x 67 (4th Cir. 2018).
Several courts in this district have dismissed similar due process claims based on the plaintiff's ability to challenge the withdrawal of funds through a prison's grievance system or by bringing a claim under South Carolina law. For example, in Richardson v. Duncan, the court dismissed a plaintiff's due process claim arising from the deduction of inmate funds because post-deprivation remedies were available to the plaintiff through the detention center's grievance system. 2018 WL 851342, at *4. Specifically, the Richardson plaintiff alleged his due process rights were violated where defendants took money "out of his inmate trust account to pay for his medical expenses instead of submitting the expenses to the federal government for payment." Id. The court held that "[D]ue process is fully satisfied where post-deprivation procedures are available through the normal prison grievance system, . . . and it is well-established that the Darlington County Detention Center (DCDC) where Plaintiff was housed has a grievance procedure." Id. (quoting Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 464 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (E.D. Va. 2006); see Drakeford v. Thompson, No. 2:09-cv-02239-RBH, 2010 WL 4884897, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 24, 2010) ("Plaintiff's claims do not give rise to a due process violation. Other district courts have held that 'procedural due process is satisfied where prison grievance procedures are available to evaluate a plaintiff's challenge to the withdrawal from his account . . . .'")
Similarly, in Harper v. NFN Cawthan, Bus. Office, the court dismissed a plaintiff's due process claim arising from the deduction of inmate funds because "South Carolina has an adequate post-deprivation remedy for an alleged deprivation of property." Harper v. NFN Cawthan, Bus. Office, No. CV 9:16-0404-RBH-BM, 2017 WL 5197229, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq.), adopted by, 2017 WL 5176836 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2017). The Harper court focused on the availability of a remedy to the plaintiff under state law rather than the availability a prison's internal grievance system. Id.; see also Campbell v. Wright, No. 6:14-cv-1832-BHH, 2015 WL 1400363, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2015) (finding "the loss of the plaintiff's personal property is not a basis for a federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983" where "plaintiff has available state law remedies to recover any lost property" pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-69-10 et seq. and S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq.), adopted by, 2015 WL 1400368 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2015), aff'd, 616 F. App'x 99 (4th Cir. 2015).
Here, the availability of the grievance system is evident from Plaintiff's Complaint. Specifically, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff "used the grievance procedure available at J.R.L. Detention Center to try and solve this issue" and he "filed several grievances and appealed them." (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 13.) In addition to the grievance system available at the Detention Center, "state law also provides [Plaintiff] with a viable remedy for the loss of personal property." Harper, 2017 WL 5197229, at *4. As discussed above, courts in this district have found due process is satisfied by the availability of these post-deprivation procedures. Plaintiff's due process claim should therefore be dismissed on this basis.
Given the above findings, the undersigned does not address Defendants' other arguments for dismissal. (Dkt. No. 17 at 6, 8, 11.)
Given that the undersigned finds no constitutional violation, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief should also be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 17) and dismiss this action.
AND IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE July 2, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).