Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2211 Section "C" (1).
October 15, 2004
Third-Party Defendant Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution, Inc. ("Harbor Branch") moves the Court to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiff Ashton Marine's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, to require Ashton Marine to provide a more definitive statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). For the following reasons, Harbor Branch's motion is DENIED. Background
Plaintiff James Laird ("Laird") was injured when a launch and recovery system (LARS) unit for the vessel on which he worked was dropped on him. (Rec. doc. 1, ¶ 5). While the vessel was in a loading dock owned by Ashton Marine, the LARS unit was being lifted by a crane operated by Ashton Marine employees, and was dropped when the crane's strap broke. (Rec. doc. 1, ¶¶ 5-6). Laird sued Ashton Marine, among other parties. Ashton Marine brought a Third-Party complaint naming Harbor Branch as Third-Party Defendant. Ashton Marine claims that Laird was injured while the Ashton Marine crew was transporting the LARS unit and A-frame, both of which were manufactured by Harbor Branch. (Rec. doc. 61, ¶¶ 3-6). Ashton Marine essentially alleges that "the defective design, manufacturer and/or inadequate warnings of or on the (LARS unit) and the A-frame caused or contributed to (Laird's) alleged damages," and seeks indemnity or contribution from Harbor Branch for any liability. (Rec. doc. 61, ¶¶ 16-17). Harbor Marine argues that Ashton Marine has failed to either state a claim or allege facts sufficient to support, or respond to, a products liability claim under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"). La.Rev.Stat. 9:2800.51-6.0.
James Laird sued: Deep Marine Technology, his employer; Ashton Marine, owner of the docking/loading facility; and Atlas Boats, Inc., the alleged owner of the vessel. (Rec. doc. 1, ¶).
Laird's complaint makes no mention of an "A-frame." Ashton Marine's Third-Party complaint implies that the LARS unit and A-frame are components of the same piece of equipment. Harbor Branch makes no argument in its motion to challenge this implication.
Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve all ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). Unless it appears "beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim," the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 284-285 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not defeat a motion to dismiss. See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284).
LPLA Claims
Under the LPLA, "a manufacturer of a product is liable to a claimant for damage 'proximately caused' by a characteristic of the product that rendered it 'unreasonably dangerous' when the damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by 'the claimant or another person or entity.'" Jefferson v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1251 (5th Cir. 1997). A claimant may prove a product was "unreasonably dangerous" because of a (1) construction or composition defect; (2) design defect; (3) inadequate warning; or (4) nonconformity to an express warranty. 9:2800.54(B)(1-4). Thus, the elements of a products liability cause of action under the LPLA are:
1. That the defendant is a manufacturer of the product;
2. That the claimant's damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product;
3. That that characteristic made the product unreasonably dangerous in one of the four ways provided in the statute; and
4. That the claimant's damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else.
La.Rev.Stat. 9:2800.54. "In order to maintain a cause of action under any of the four theories, the Petition must allege the elements required by the LPLA." Barrette v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 2002 WL 31365598 (E.D.La.) (Zainey, J.).
With respect to the first element, Ashton Marine alleges that "the launch and recovery system and A-frame were designed and manufactured in part or in whole by Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution." (Rec. doc. 61, ¶ 4). Thus, Ashton Marine has sufficiently alleged the first element.
With respect to the second element, Ashton Marine claims that "the defective design, manufacture and/or inadequate warnings of or on the launch and recovery system and A-frame caused or contributed to plaintiff's alleged damages." (Rec. doc. 61, ¶ 16). In its opposition memorandum, Ashton Marine clarifies that the characteristic of the LARS unit and A-frame that rendered them unreasonably dangerous was the lack of a proper collapsing mechanism. (Rec. doc. 86, p. 3). In its reply to Ashton Marine's opposition memorandum, Harbor Branch argues that the cause of the accident was likely "a faulty lift chain or human error" and therefore, even if there were "any unidentified or mysterious design defect or failure to warn could," it could "not possibly constitute the legal cause of plaintiff's accident." (Rec. doc. 89, pp. 3-4). This may or may not be true, but it is not the issue before the Court. Ashton Marine has sufficiently alleged the second element — that some defect or defects in Harbor Branch's LARS unit and A-frame was the proximate cause of the accident.
With regard to the third element, the question is whether Ashton Marine has clearly alleged that the lack of a proper collapsing mechanism made the LARS unit and A-frame unreasonably dangerous because of a (1) construction or composition defect; (2) design defect; (3) inadequate warning; or (4) nonconformity to an express warranty. 9:2800.54(B)(1-4). Only the second and third theories are at issue; Ashton Marine has not attempted to allege that there was a construction or composition defect or nonconformity to an express warranty. Paragraphs 13 and 14 in Ashton Marine's Third-Party Complaint state that the LARS unit and A-frame were unreasonably dangerous in design both because "there existed an alternative design for the products(s) that was capable of preventing the plaintiff's damage, and the adoption of said alternative design would not affect the utility of the product," and because "the cost of manufacturing the alternative design was not outweighed by the likelihood and gravity of plaintiff's alleged damages." (Rec. doc. 61, ¶¶ 13-14). In paragraph 12, Ashton Marine alleges that the LARS unit and A-frame were unreasonably dangerous because "adequate warning was not provided regarding proper and/or improper procedure for dismantling the unit(s) for transportation." (Rec. doc. 61, ¶ 12). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ashton Marine has sufficiently alleged that a design defect and inadequate warning made the product unreasonable dangerous.
With regard to the fourth and final element, Ashton Marine alleges that Harbor Branch should have "reasonably anticipated" that the lack of a proper collapsing mechanisms on the LARS unit and A-frame would require the dangerous "alteration or modification" of the product that would result in injury (Rec. doc. 61, ¶ 15) "so that it could be collapsed." (Rec. doc. 86, p. 2). Accordingly, Ashton Marine has sufficiently alleged that the injury arose from the reasonably anticipated need to modify the unit due to the lack of a proper collapsing mechanism.
Harbor Branch argues that Ashton Marine fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable claim under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. (Rec. doc. 84, p. 5). Furthermore, Harbor Branch faults Ashton Marine for alleging facts in its Third-Party complaint that are not the same, and are somehow contrary to, some of the facts Laird alleges in his complaint. (Rec. doc. 89, p. 2). The Court finds that neither argument has merit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require a party's pleading to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs need only give defendants fair notice of the basis or grounds of their claims and a "general indication" of the type of litigation involved. See Wright Miller, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1215, at 138. The discovery process fills in the details. Id. In addition, the facts alleged by Plaintiff James Laird are not at issue in this motion. At issue is the complaint of Third-Party plaintiff Ashton Marine, not James Laird. Ashton Marine's complaint satisfies the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules to state a claim under the LPLA.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Harbor Branch's motion to dismiss or for a more definitive statement is DENIED.