Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2211, Section "C" (1).
January 4, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Third Party Defendant Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution, Inc.'s ("Harbor Branch") Motion for Summary Judgement pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Background
On May 21, 2003, James Laird, an employee of Deep Marine Technology, Inc. ("DMT") stepped inside a Launch and Recovery System ("LARS unit") in an attempt to disassemble it. The LARS unit, designed and manufactured by Harbor Branch for DMT, was being suspended from a crane by a strap allegedly manufactured by Bridgeport Wire Rope and Chain, Limited ("Bridgeport") when the strap broke, causing the A-frame of the LARS unit to collapse, crushing Laird. Laird brought suit against DMT and Atlas Boats and Ashton Marine, L.L.C. ("Ashton Marine"), who employed the crane operator. Ashton Marine then brought a third party suit against Harbor Branch and Bridgeport. In the instant motion, Harbor Branch moves for summary judgement of Ashton Marine's claim against it.
Standard of Review
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or it is significantly probative, 'summary judgement is not appropriate.'" Id., at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (citations omitted).
Louisiana Products Liability Act
Ashton Marine's Third Party cause of action against Harbor Branch is brought under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"). LSA-R.S. 9:2800.52. The LPLA provides that a manufacturer of a product shall be liable for any damage caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another. LSA-R.S. 9:2800.54. For a LPLA claim to succeed, the threshold issue is whether the damage arose from a "reasonably anticipated use" of the product. If the use is not reasonably anticipated, then there can be no LPLA claim. However, if the use is reasonably anticipated, the question then becomes whether the plaintiff can succeed under one of the theories of liability provided under the LPLA. Both parties indicate in their memoranda that the theories relevant to this case are whether the LARS unit was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in the design (LSA-R.S. 9:2800.56), or whether it was unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product had not been provided (LSA-R.S. 9:2800.57). See LSA-R.S. 9:2800.54. Harbor Branch argues that the DMT employees were not dismantling the LARS unit in a way that was reasonably anticipated by Harbor Branch. Even if such use were reasonably anticipated, Harbor Branch argues, the LARS unit was not defectively designed, nor was there inadequate warning of the dangers of the unit. Analysis
Harbor Branch attempts to demonstrate that it could not have reasonably anticipated the manner in which the DMT employees would try to dismantle the LARS unit. "Reasonably anticipated use" means a use or handling of a product that the product's manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. LSA-R.S. 9:2800.53(7). Harbor Branch is not responsible for "every conceivable foreseeable use of a product," nor is it responsible for uses "clearly contrary to warnings." LSA-R.S. 9:2800.53, Note 1.
There is no set criteria for determining whether a use was reasonably anticipated. Harbor Branch notes that courts have previously considered factors such as (1) whether the injured party used the product in a manner that was obviously dangerous; (2) whether the use of the product was warned against in the product's operators manual; and (3) whether the product user was an experienced worker trained in the operation of heavy machinery. See Frith v. John Deere Co., 955 F.Supp. 663; Kampen, 157 F.3d at 312, 314; Lockart v. Kobe Steel Ltd. Const. Mach. Div., 989 F.2d 864, 866 (5th Cir. 1983); Hunter v. Knoll Rig Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd., 70 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1995). Despite Harbor Branch's assertions to the contrary, none of the factors are dispositive of reasonably anticipated use.
Harbor Branch asserts that the Court must consider, among the other factors listed above, "whether the use of the product was warned against in the product's operators manual" in order to determine whether the use was reasonably anticipated. (Rec. doc. 119 at 11, citing Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 314 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998)). As Ashton Marine notes, the "reasonably anticipated use" analysis is therefore intertwined with the adequate warning analysis. (Rec. doc. 129 at 4). In other words, reasonably anticipated use depends on what the DMT employees were instructed to do and warned not to do with respect to dismantling the LARS unit.
The LPLA defines "adequate warning" as "a warning or instruction that would lead an ordinary reasonable user or handler of a product to contemplate the danger in using or handling the product and either decline to use or handle the product or, if possible, to use or handle the product in such a manner as to avoid the damage for which the claim is made." LSA-R.S. 9:2800.53(9). Interestingly, this definition contains both a warning component and an instruction component. See Swope v. Columbia Chemicals Co., 281 F.3d 185, 207, note 75 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
Harbor Branch argues that the LARS unit's preliminary operators manual, in the possession of DMT at the time of the accident, "specifically warned against" the manner in which the unit was disassembled. (Rec. doc. 119 at 12). Specifically, the manual provided that:
It is the responsibility of the owner/operator to have all personnel who installs or uses this equipment to read this manual (and any other relevant publications) before installing or operating this equipment. To minimize the risk of potential safety hazards, the operator should follow local and national codes that regulate the installation and operation of this equipment
The manual further provided that:
All slings, shackles, bolts, pins, and any other hardware used for lifting or handling must be certified for the weight requirement. INSPECT LIFT GEAR PRIOR TO USE! The use of lift gear, sling, shackles, etc. that are not certified for the load requirements may result in component failure causing loss of life or limb.
And:
To ensure Handling/Lifting Safety, always observe heavyweight lifting safety precautions . . . It is recommended that the handling of the equipment be done by only certified riggers and crane operators. (Rec. doc. 119 at 13 and Exhibit 8). "The warnings provided by Harbor Branch were grossly ignored" because DMT used an uncertified crane operator and a strap that was not properly marked with its weight certification, Harbor Branch argues. (Id. at 14).
In addition to the above-mentioned warnings in the manual, Harbor Branch claims that it fulfilled the instruction component by providing "multiple hands-on demonstrations and training sessions during which DMT employees were shown how to safely and properly break-down the LARS unit into transportable position." (Rec. doc. 119 at 19).
Despite these demonstrations and the general warnings in the preliminary manual, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Harbor Branch provided adequate warning or instruction on how to dismantle the LARS unit. With respect to the demonstrations, Ashton Marine points out that Shawn Bartlett, Harbor Branch's representative, testified that the demonstrations were done more to verify that the breakdown process worked properly than to instruct. (Rec. doc. 129, ex. A at 101). In fact, it is unknown whether Harbor Branch even provided the DMT employees with the written breakdown procedures it had prepared, as one might expect at an instructional demonstration. (Rec. doc. 129, Ex. A at 103).
More significantly, with respect to the preliminary manual, the manual that Harbor Branch provided to Ashton Marine did not contain the 14-step breakdown procedure, even though Bartlett testified that it should have been included. Harbor Branch did not submit the written breakdown procedures until a "Final" version of the LARS operator's manual was provided to DMT on March 3, 2004. (Rec. doc. 128 at 3 and Ex. D). Furthermore, the generalized warnings that were included in the preliminary manual were not designed to address, in particular, the collapsing function of the LARS unit. The warnings and recommendations in the preliminary manual therefore cannot be construed as instructions on the proper way to collapse the unit. Accordingly, it is questionable whether the manual, devoid of any instructional component, and the demonstrations provided "adequate warning" within the meaning of the LPLA.
At the times of the demonstrations and the accident, Harbor Branch had prepared a 14-step written procedure for collapsing the LARS unit. The instructions contained 17 steps by the time Harbor Branch included them in the manual.
Furthermore, the LARS unit itself contained no decals or instructions on how to break it down.
With a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harbor Branch provided the DMT employees with the requisite knowledge for collapsing the LARS unit, it is likewise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harbor Branch could have reasonably anticipated that the offshore workers would have followed the proper breakdown procedure or come up with their own. Harbor Branch has not established that it provided DMT with written instructions for collapsing the LARS unit, despite having prepared such instructions prior to the accident, and it is questionable whether the demonstrations and general warnings in the preliminary manual were an adequate substitute. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue as to whether Harbor Branch could have reasonably anticipated that DMT would have collapsed the unit using an improper method. Put simply, if Harbor Branch did not provide instructions, then what procedure did it expect DMT to use?
In light of the uncertainties surrounding the collapsing procedure, the questions of whether Laird was handling the product in an obviously dangerous manner or whether he was an experienced operator are also genuine issues of material facts. The significance of these factors is questionable given that there may have been no obviously safe way to collapse the LARS unit.
Accordingly, the Court finds a genuine issue as to whether Harbor Branch should have reasonably anticipated DMT handling the LARS unit in an unsafe manner. Because this is a threshold question, summary judgment of Ashton Marine's claim inappropriate. Furthermore, even if the use could have been reasonably anticipated, there would be a genuine issue of whether Harbor Branch is liable for failing to provide "adequate warning."
Harbor Branch also argues that DMT is a "sophisticated user/purchaser" and therefore should have known of the dangers involved in collapsing the LARS unit. Status as a "sophisticated user/purchaser" is relevant because Harbor Branch could reasonably anticipate that a sophisticated user/purchaser would handle the LARS unit with the proper precautions. Also, even if DMT's improper handling of the unit could have been reasonably anticipated and one of the theories of liability under the LPLA were thus implicated, "sophisticated user/purchaser" is a defense to the charge that the product was unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warning. While the Court agrees that "sophisticated user/purchaser" status would shield Harbor Branch against the LPLA, the Court finds a genuine issue as to whether DMT is a "sophisticated user/purchaser" of the LARS unit.
The terms "sophisticated user" or "sophisticated purchaser" are not in the LPLA. Rather, they are terms of convenience. The statutes actually reads, "A manufacturer is not required to provide an adequate warning about his product when: (2) The user or handler of the product already knows or reasonably should be expected to know of the characteristic of the product that may cause damage and the danger of such characteristic." LSA-R.S. 9:2800.57(B)(2). Whether a party is a sophisticated user/purchaser is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide. See Mozeke v. International Paper Co., 933 F.2d 1293, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991).
On the one hand, DMT is involved in a specialized industry. It can be compared to the construction industry, which has been called "specialized per se." Contranchis v. Travelers Insurance Co., 839 So.2d 301 (La.App. 5 Cir. 01/28/03), thereby implying that it is presumed to know about industry products. Furthermore, Laird arguably should have known not to step into harm's way while the LARS unit was suspended from a crane. On the other hand, the LARS unit was one of a kind, designed specially for DMT. DMT had not previously operated a unique piece of machinery such as the LARS unit, and was not provided with written instructions on how to handle it or, in particular, collapse it into transport mode. Therefore the issue of what DMT and Laird knew or should have known is a genuine issue of material fact.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Harbor Branch's Motion for Summary Judgement is DENIED. New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of January, 2005.