Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246. See also LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989) ("the surrender of jurisdiction in deference to parallel state proceedings . . . is warranted only under `limited' and `exceptional' circumstances."). As a threshold matter, in order for the Colorado River doctrine to be applied the concurrent federal and state action must in fact be parallel.

Accordingly, I believe that the district court should have stayed, not dismissed, the instant action. See Attwood v. Mendocino Coast Dist. Hosp., 886 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a stay is the proper procedural mechanism for a district court to employ when deferring to a parallel state-court proceeding); LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1562 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Noonan S., Inc. v. County of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The dismissal of an action in deference to parallel state proceedings is an extraordinary step that should not be undertaken absent a danger of a serious waste of judicial resources."). A.

No single factor is determinative, and the weight given to any particular factor will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. Colorado River, 424 U.S. 818-19 ("No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counseling against that exercise is required."); Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16; LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989). The factors are not intended to be a "mechanical checklist," but instead are "to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand."

This doctrine "permits a district court to dismiss or stay an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in state court. As the Court explained inColorado River, the principles underlying this doctrine `rest on considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Our "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction means that abstention must be limited to "exceptional" circumstances.

In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246-48, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), the Supreme Court held that district courts can dismiss or stay an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in state court. As the court explained, "the principles underlying the doctrine rest on considerations of `[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" LaDuke v. Burlington N.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989) ( citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246 ( quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, 221, 96 L.Ed. 200 (1952))). Jurisdiction, however, should not be given up lightly.

The Colorado River abstention doctrine "permits a district court to dismiss or stay an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in state court." LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989). The principles underlying the doctrine "'rest on considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'"

No single factor is determinative, and the weight given to any particular factor will vary depending on the circumstances of the case. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983); LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989). The factors are not intended to be a "mechanical checklist," LaDuke, 879 F.2d at 1559, but instead are "to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand."

1) whether the state has assumed jurisdiction over property; 2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; 3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; 5) the source of governing law, state or federal; 6) the adequacy of state-court action to protect the federal plaintiff's rights; 7) the relative progress of state and federal proceedings; 8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction; 9) the availability of removal; and 10) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim. LaDuke v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1559 (7th Cir. 1989) The court also must consider any special factors that apply to the specific case.

[citations omitted.]LaDuke v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989). Before a district court may exercise its discretion under the Colorado River doctrine, it must first determine whether the concurrent state and federal actions are actually parallel.

Simply because an action is pending in state court is "ordinarily no bar to parallel federal proceedings." Id. (citing LaDuke v.Burlington N.R.R. Co. , 879 F.2d 1556, 1558 (7th Cir. 1989)). Determining whether a stay is warranted in a federal proceeding pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine involves a two-part analysis.