Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-3592.
April 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court are the cross Motions for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, Lynn Lacy, and Defendant, Commissioner of Social Security Jo Anne Barnhart. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10.) This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi. After reviewing the Report and Recommendation (Doc No. 13), and Plaintiff Lacy's Written Objections To The United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Doc. Nos. 14, 15), we will overrule Plaintiff's objections, deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Much of the procedural and factual history is taken from the Report and Recommendation.
The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to which the Plaintiff has objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental social security income ("SSI") under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383f. Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on March 15, 2000, due to hepatitis C and a mental condition. (Tr. at 11.) This application was initially denied. Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing, which was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on January 28, 2002. ( Id. at 28-51.) On April 8, 2002, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claim. ( Id. at 10-15.) On June 6, 2002, Plaintiff properly filed a Complaint with this Court seeking review of the decision of the ALJ. The Complaint was referred to Magistrate Judge Scudieri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.1(d)(1)(C). Magistrate Judge Scudieri recommended that we affirm the decision of the ALJ. In response to the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff has submitted her Written Objections to the United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15.)
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of a Social Security claim is based upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact. Frazier v. Apfel, No. Civ. A. 99-715, 2000 WL 288246, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2000) (citing Berger v. Apfel, 200 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also Schmidt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2000); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999); Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999); Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999); Armstrong v. Comm'r of Social Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1998); Walters v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). "The Court is bound by the ALJ's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Frazier, 2000 WL 288246, at *2 (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). "The court cannot conduct de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record." Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). However, in making a decision, the ALJ must articulate the evidence that supported his or her decision and discuss that evidence that was rejected. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
III. Disability Standard
Title II of the Social Security Act, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons who have contributed to the program and suffer from a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). "Disability" is defined as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify for disability benefits, therefore, a claimant must establish that "she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). A claimant can establish such a disability in either of two ways: (1) by producing medical evidence that she is disabled per se as a result of meeting or equaling certain listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1; or (2) by demonstrating impairment of such severity as to be unable to engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The burden of proving disability rests with the claimant. Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000); Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F. Supp. 2d. 640, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), when deciding the merits of a disability claim the ALJ applies a five-part inquiry to determine whether the claimant is entitled to disability benefits. Step one involves determining whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity. An individual who is working will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(1). Step two involves evaluating the severity of claimant's alleged impairments. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Step three requires determining whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Step four involves determining whether the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work. Considering claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), if claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, claimant will not be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Finally, at step five, if the ALJ determines that claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ considers the assessment of claimant's RFC and claimant's age, education, and work experience to see if claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy. If it is found that claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the ALJ will find that claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
IV. The Proceedings Before the ALJ
In this case, the ALJ went through all of the steps required by the regulation. At the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity." (Tr. at 11.) At step two, the ALJ assessed whether Plaintiff's impairments significantly limited her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, i.e. whether Plaintiff has a "severe impairment." The regulations require that if a severe impairment exists, it must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923. At this stage of the analysis, the ALJ reviewed the following evidence: the report from Dr. Shafia who examined Plaintiff's physical condition, (Tr. at 178-184), the clinical psychological evaluation of Plaintiff by Dr. Wagner, ( id. at 156-163), and the notes from Plaintiff's therapy sessions, ( id. at 240-51). Upon consideration of this evidence, the ALJ determined that "[t]he medical evidence indicates that claimant has hepatitis C, major depression, and personality disorder, impairments that are severe within the meaning of the Regulations but not severe enough to meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4." ( Id. at 12.) Thus, at step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not justified the finding of a disability by producing medical evidence that she is disabled per se as a result of meeting or equaling the listed impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. As to the hepatitis C, the ALJ found that "claimant's liver disease has not resulted in any of the conditions described [in Listing 5.05] such as esphogeal varicies, ascities, abnormal liver enzymes, or inflammation." ( Id.) With respect to her depression and personality disorder, the ALJ found that "as evaluated under [ 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1] Listings 12.04 and 12.08 neither has resulted in marked restrictions in activities of daily living, social interaction, and concentration." ( Id.) At the fourth step, the ALJ considered whether despite her ailments, Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. In considering this issue, the ALJ recognized that at this step the ALJ:
must consider all symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably by accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, and Social Security Ruling 96-7p. The undersigned must also consider any medical opinions, which are statements from acceptable medical sources, which reflect judgments about the nature and severity of the impairments and resulting limitations. . . .
(Tr. at 12.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff's testimony regarding her depression and her ability to function doing daily activities. ( Id.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff's treatment notes, which showed that "her depression has not resulted in any significant limitations in activities of daily living. . . . Claimant is able to run a household, take care of her personal needs, maintain relationships, and has never required hospitalization. Her hepatitis does not prevent her from walking for at least five blocks, and lifting at least [fifteen] pounds." ( Id. at 13.) Finally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's medical records. These records showed that "claimant does not show signs of liver damage, and her viral loads . . . are normal." ( Id.) And while the ALJ considered Plaintiff's testimony that she suffered "flu-like symptoms after taking her hepatitis medication" to be credible, the ALJ took note of the fact that although Plaintiff had taken her medication earlier in the day, she was able to testify without any apparent difficulty. ( Id.) Based on consideration of these facts and the record as a whole, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "retains the residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive 1-2 step, light and sedentary work." ( Id.)
At this point, the ALJ posed various questions to a vocational expert ("VE") regarding Plaintiff's abilities:
Q: I'd [like] you to begin by assuming that we're talking about an individual of this claimant's age, education and past work history. I'd like to further assume the individual is capable of performing a light and sedentary work that is limited to simple repetitive one to two step tasks. Could an individual with these limitations perform any of the jobs that Ms. Lacy has done?
A: Working packing and machine packing would fall within those categories.
Q: Are there other jobs, as well, that could be performed?
A: Yes, you would have assemble work at light exertion; 1.9 million nationally, 5,200 regionally. At a sedentary level, assembly; 1.4 million nationally, 4,000 regionally. . . .
( Id. at 46.) Based on Plaintiff's RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been disabled. ( Id. at 13.) The ALJ, also concluded alternatively that "[e]ven assuming it were determined that claimant could not do her prior job, based upon her residual functional capacity, she would still be found not disabled, as she is still capable of performing a significant range of light and sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 and 416.967." ( Id.)
V. Discussion
Plaintiff contends that the evidence of record demonstrates that she is disabled, and that the ALJ's findings at steps four and five of the disability evaluation process are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously formulated Plaintiff's RFC by failing to take account of all of Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations. (Pl. Lynn Lacy's Br. in Supp. of Her Mot. for Summ. J. at 19). Plaintiff argues that as a result of the ALJ's failure to account for these non-exertional limitations, the ALJ failed to ask the VE a hypothetical question that fairly reflected the evidence in this case. ( Id. at 20.)
Non-exertional limitations include both mental impairments, and other sensory impairments. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c), (d)). These can be distinguished from exertional limitations, "such as a claimant's ability to meet strength requirements for lifting, pushing, or pulling. . . ." Brown, 845 F.2d at 1214 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b)).
In Plaintiff's Written Objections to the United State Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff makes specific objections and also incorporates all of the arguments made in Plaintiff's earlier submissions.
In determining an individual's RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704). In Cotter, the court explained that:
an examiner's findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision. This is necessary so that the court may properly exercise its responsibility under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) to determine if the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence.642 F.2d at 705 (quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974)). In support of her decision, the ALJ cites medical and psychiatric reports, Plaintiff's testimony, the testimony of a vocational expert, and the ALJ's personal observations of Plaintiff at the hearing. We will assess each of these pieces of evidence in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ first addressed Plaintiff's medical records related to the effects of the treatment for hepatitis C. On October 10, 2000, Plaintiff met with Dr. Hass Shafia, who performed a consultative examination and completed an RFC assessment. (Tr. at 178-84.) Plaintiff reported having high blood pressure, hepatitis C, neck spasms, diverticulitis, emphysema and memory problems. Dr. Shafia noted that Plaintiff had no symptoms related to the liver problem, and that at that time she was undergoing no treatment for hepatitis C. ( Id. at 180.) In addition to finding no symptoms related to hepatitis C, Dr. Shafia determined that Plaintiff has very poor memory, does not read or write, has no social interests, has very poor general knowledge, and has a low level of comprehension. ( Id.) In assessing Plaintiff's RFC, Dr. Shafia noted that Plaintiff has no physical function limitations or any environmental limitations. ( Id. at 181-82.)
Next, the ALJ examined the records of Plaintiff's psychiatric care. On August, 14, 2000, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Mark Wagner. ( Id. at 156-63.) Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff to be reliable, ( id. at 159), and repeated much of the history that she had given him in his report:
With regard to mental health concerns, the cl[aimant] is reporting that she had previously been seen by a psychiatrist when she was a child under the age of [eleven] years. She is very vague with regard to any of this past information however. She is denying any psychiatric hospitalizations over the years. She is however, reporting an [sic] history of alcohol abuse dating back to when she was [eleven] years of age. She is further stating that she has now been sober for the last [nineteen] months, following her only detox and rehabilitation involvement.
( Id. at 156-57.) With regard to Plaintiff's prognosis, Dr. Wagner stated that "[Plaintiff's] prognosis is viewed as guarded at this time." ( Id. at 159.) He also summarized his findings in a section titled Effect of Impairment on Functioning:
A. Activities of Daily Living: At the present time the c1 is reportedly doing her own shopping, cooking and cleaning. She is relying on her boyfriend to pay the bills within the household.
B. Social Functioning: At this time she is denying any difficulties with regard to those individuals who she talks with. However, there is a history of her having problems with regard to interpersonal relationships in general. This has adversely effected her employment in the past as well.
C. Concentration, Persistence or Pace: The c1 is acknowledging that she has difficulty in following things as to the logic of things that she might be watching on television or trying to read. She is acknowledging concentration difficulties.
( Id.) In addition to conducting the Clinical Psychological Disability Evaluation, Dr. Wagner completed a Medical Assessment of Plaintiff's ability to do work-related activities. ( Id. at 161-63.) Dr. Wagner found that Plaintiff's ability to follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public, use judgment, interact with supervisors, deal with work stresses, function independently, maintain attention/concentration, behave in an emotionally stable manner, relate predictably in social situations, and demonstrate reliability was only fair. ( Id. at 162-63.), Dr. Wagner reported that Plaintiff's ability was poor/none when it came to the ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex job instructions, and understand, remember and carry out detailed, but not complex job instructions ( Id. at 162.) Finally, Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff to have a fair to good ability to understand, remember and carry out simple job instructions. ( Id. at 162.)
For the purposes of this assessment, fair was defined as the "[a]bility to function in this area is seriously limited, but not precluded." (Tr. at 161.) In Plaintiff's Written Objections to the United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff argues that using the term "fair" creates "the inference that Dr. Wagner found no limitations of any significance other than a restriction to `simple' activities." (Doc. No. 14 at 5 (citing Cruse v. Sec'y of HHS, 49 F.3d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1995).) We disagree with Plaintiff's argument that Dr. Wagner's use of the term "fair" to describe each of eleven abilities "evinces his endorsement of significant functional deterioration." (Pl.'s Written Objections to the United State's Magistrate's R R at 7.) Moreover, as discussed in our analysis, when it came to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple job instructions, Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff's skills to be fair to good.
For the purposes of this assessment, poor/none was defined as the "[n]o useful ability in this area." (Tr. at 161.)
For the purposes of this assessment, good was defined as the "[a]bility to function in this area is limited but satisfactory." (Tr. at 161.)
In addition to reviewing Dr. Wagner's notes, the ALJ reviewed the notes from Plaintiff's therapy sessions. (Tr. at 240-50.) In discussing these records, the ALJ stated that the "[t]herapy records from December 2001, generally show that claimant was doing well. Although she has been dysthymic, claimant was described as doing `much better' and was sleeping well." ( Id.)
Most of these notes are illegible. (Tr. at 240-50.)
The ALJ relied on Plaintiff's testimony at the disability hearing as well. Plaintiff's testimony consisted of discussions about her health problems, her social life, and her ability to function daily. The ALJ concluded that based on Plaintiff's testimony she is "able to run a household, take care of her personal needs, maintain good grooming, use public transportation, interact with others appropriately, maintain relationships. . . ." ( Id. at 13.) Plaintiff also testified that on the days she takes her hepatitis-A shot she gets flu symptoms, and cramps in her leg. While the ALJ determined that "[Plaintiff's] allegations of suffering flu-like symptoms after taking her hepatitis medication are credible . . . it was observed that on the day of the hearing, she was able to testify without any apparent difficulty, despite taking the medication earlier in the day; claimant did not appear in any distress and did not complain about, or demonstrate any side affects from the medication." ( Id.)
Plaintiff's contention that the decision is not substantially supported by the record is based on several different arguments. First, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Wagner's reports concerning Plaintiff supports a finding of disability, and that by selecting isolated pieces of the report the ALJ misconstrued Dr. Wagner's findings. Plaintiff argues that the finding by Dr. Wagner that Plaintiff's responses were reliable and honest, should somehow have persuaded the ALJ to come to a different conclusion. We find no logic in this argument. Even in finding Plaintiff to be honest, Dr. Wagner still came to the conclusion that Plaintiff had a fair to good ability to remember and carry out simple job instructions. This conclusion supports the finding of the ALJ that Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform simple, and repetitive work.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the findings of Dr. John Chiampi also illustrate the error of the ALJ's decision. Dr. Chiampi completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form ("PRTF"). (Tr. at 169-177). Dr. Chiampi evaluated Plaintiff under Listings 12.04 (Affective Disorders) and 12.09 (Substance Addiction Disorders). ( Id. at 169, 176). He concluded that Plaintiff had "slight" restriction of activities in daily living; "moderate" difficulties in maintaining social functioning; "often" experienced deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace; and "once or twice" experienced episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings. ( Id. at 176). As a result, Dr. Chiampi found that Plaintiff had an affective disorder and a substance addiction disorder in sustained remission, but concluded that she did not meet or equal a Listing. ( Id. at 169, 175, 176).
Dr. Chiampi then completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment of Plaintiff. ( Id. at 165-68.) Dr. Chiampi concluded that with respect to the following tasks, Plaintiff was not significantly limited:
the ability to remember locations and work-like procedures; the ability to understand and remember very short and simple instructions; the ability to carry out very short and simple instructions; the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision, the ability to work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; the ability to make simple work-related decisions; the ability to interact appropriately with the general public; the ability to ask simple questions or request assistance; the ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; the ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, and; the ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation.
(Tr. at 165-66.) Dr. Chiampi determined that with respect to the following tasks, Plaintiff was moderately limited:
the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; the ability to carry out detailed instructions; the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; the ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; the ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, and; the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others.
( Id.) Dr. Chiampi's findings in no way support Plaintiff's contentions that the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's RFC was erroneous based on a failure to account for non-exertional limitations. While Dr. Chiampi found that Plaintiff was moderately limited when it came to understanding detail-oriented work, when it came to simple work Dr. Chiampi found that Plaintiff had no significant limitations. In fact, all of the evidence concerning Plaintiff's non-exertional disorders support the ALJ's findings. The evidence clearly established that although Plaintiff would be limited in many ways because of her non-exertional limitations, Plaintiff retains the ability to handle simple and repetitive work of the kind she was employed in before her alleged disabilities.
Plaintiff contends that the Chiampi's observations are premised solely on Plaintiff's "Section 12.04" disorder. (Pl. Lynn Lacy's Br. in Supp. of her Mot. for Summ. J. at 23.) This is not the case. Dr. Chiampi's evaluations took account of both Plaintiff's "Affective Disorders" as well as her "Substance Abuse Disorders." (Tr. at 165, 169.)
Finally, Plaintiff argues that it was improper for the ALJ to base her decision on her personal observations of Plaintiff at the hearing. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ has taken "isolated `bits and pieces' from the evidence and her subjective impressions to create her own, contrary lay `psychological' conclusions. (Pl. Lynn Lacy's Br. in Supp. of Her Mot. for Summ. J. at 25.) Plaintiff cites numerous cases for the proposition that an ALJ's decision is erroneous where it is based on personal observations in lieu of contrary medical opinions. See, e.g. Morales, 225 F.3d at 319 (applying the principal that an ALJ's personal observations of the claimant "carry little weight in cases . . . involving medically substantiated psychiatric disability") (quoting Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation omitted); Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The ALJ could only have reached his conclusion by relying solely on his own non-expert observations at the hearing — in other words, by relying on the roundly condemned "sit and squirm" method of deciding disability cases."); ( Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 494 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that "[a]n administrative law judge may not reject professional medical evidence on the basis of his own observation."); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that "an ALJ is not free to set his own expertise against that of physicians who present competent medical evidence"). While we agree with Plaintiff that Third Circuit case law supports the argument that such analysis is improper, we have found no evidence in the record that supports Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ acted erroneously. The ALJ observed that Plaintiff did not appear to be suffering any symptoms on the day of her hearing, despite the fact she had taken her hepatitis shot earlier that day. While this observation cast some doubt on Plaintiff's testimony that she suffers flu-like symptoms after taking her hepatitis medication, this finding in no way contradicts any of the medical records in this case nor could it be viewed as a "contrary lay psychological conclusion."
No medical records exist in this case that support Plaintiff's conclusion that she is unable to perform her past employment or is unable to perform any job that is found in the national economy. Rather, both the assessment of Plaintiff's RFC due to the hepatitis C, and the assessment of Plaintiff's psychological condition due to depression suggest that Plaintiff was able to do "simple" work. Thus, the ALJ's conclusion that the "[Plaintiff] has the following residual functional capacity: simple repetitive 1-2 step, light and sedentary work," was supported by the record in this case. (Tr. at 7.) Moreover, by presenting the VE with a hypothetical question regarding an individual with Plaintiff's age, education, and vocational background; who was limited to performing light and sedentary jobs; and who was limited to simple, repetitive, one (1) to two (2) step work, the ALJ accounted for all of Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations.
VI. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we are satisfied that the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we will overrule Plaintiff's objections, deny Plaintiff's motion and grant Defendant's motion for summary judgement.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 2004, upon consideration of the cross Motions for Summary Judgment, (Doc. Nos. 9, 10), the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scudieri, (Doc. No. 13), Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. Nos 14, 15), and all papers filed in support thereof and opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED;
2. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 9), is DENIED; and
4. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 10), is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.