Opinion
Civil No. 00-2339 ADM/JMM
July 30, 2001
Andrew E. Kline, Esq., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Roylene Ann Champeaux, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, Minneapolis, MN on behalf Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On October 19, 2000, Plaintiff Terrance D. LaCanne ("Plaintiff") filed an action seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the CSS") [Doc. No. 1]. This matter now is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. No. 14] to the May 23, 2001, Report and Recommendation ("RR") of Magistrate Judge John M. Mason [Doc. No. 13]. In the RR, Judge Mason recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 8] be denied and Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10] be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the RR is adopted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that a back injury rendered him disabled since October 24, 1995. The CSS disapproved his application. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff. After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the CSS. Further factual background for this matter is adequately set forth in the RR and is incorporated by reference for the purposes of Plaintiff's present objections.
DISCUSSION
A district court must make an independent, de novo evaluation of those portions of an RR to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
When reviewing a denial of benefits, the CSS's final decision must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999); Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the CSS's conclusion. Whitehouse, 949 F.2d at 1006 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, a court must consider evidence that detracts from the CSS's decision as well as evidence that supports it. Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992); Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984). This standard "allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [CSS] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Bland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 1988)). A court may not reverse the CSS's decision "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Baker, 730 F.2d at 1150.
The ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity and found Plaintiff could perform a range of work between the sedentary and light exertional levels, involving occasional lifting and carrying up to ten pounds, with more frequent lifting and carrying up to five pounds, occasional stooping, and a sit/stand option at fifteen to thirty minute intervals. The ALJ relied on medical and vocational expert testimony and determined Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding his condition did not equal the criteria for any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. Dr. Laney, Plaintiff's treating physician, did not indicate Plaintiff's condition was medically equivalent to the severity of conditions listed in the Listing of impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Tr. 253. The ALJ asked Dr. Henderson, the medical expert, if "the impairments meet or equal the listings, in your opinion?" Tr. 69-70. He responded, "He doesn't have [inaudible]." Id. That the transcriber did not hear all of Dr. Henderson's response does not mean the ALJ did not. The ALJ reported that the medical expert's "professional opinion [was that Plaintiff's] spinal stenosis at multiple levels was not of sufficient severity to either meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1." Tr. 35.
Dr. Henderson testified Plaintiff could lift about ten pounds and needed to change position between sitting and standing every once in a while. Tr. 70, 72-73. He specifically stated that with a sit/stand option Plaintiff was able to work an eight-hour day. Id. The medical expert's testimony was corroborated by other doctors. Dr. Hadden and Dr. Hammerstrom reviewed the record and determined Plaintiff could perform a range of light work. Tr. 239-46.
Based upon the medical experts' testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform occasional lifting and carrying up to ten pounds, with more frequent lifting and carrying up to five pounds, occasional stooping, and a sit/stand option at fifteen to thirty minute intervals. In response to a hypothetical question to the ALJ, Frank Samlaska, the vocational expert, testified that such an individual could perform jobs in the sedentary/light exertional level category. Tr. 75-76. Considering the ALJ's findings on Plaintiff's residual function capacity, the vocational expert's testimony supports the ALJ's conclusion.
Plaintiff's conservative course of treatment further supports the ALJ's finding that he could perform a range of sedentary and light work. Plaintiff is able to manage his pain without prescription medication, he has elected to forego surgery despite recommendations from Dr. Reiser and Dr. Laney, and he did not participate in physical therapy or a pain program at the time of the hearing. See Tr. 58-59, 180, 185, 229-30. Viewing the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the RR of Judge Mason, all of the files, records proceedings herein, and for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) The RR [Doc. No. 13] is ADOPTED;
(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 8] is DENIED;
(3) Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10] is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.