Opinion
Case No. 4:05cv52-SPM/AK.
December 7, 2005
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Board of Trustees, Florida AM University ("FAMU") filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 26). The parties had the opportunity to fully brief the issues and to submit materials in accordance with Northern District of Florida Local Rules 56 and 7.1. For the reasons explained below, FAMU's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David J. Labat applied to FAMU in March 2003 for an Assistant Athletic Director position (Position #22037) within FAMU's Athletic Department. At the time Mr. Labat submitted his application, he completed and submitted an Equal Opportunity Information ("EOI") form on which he stated his race as "white."
Mr. Labat was not interviewed for the position notwithstanding the fact that he had more than 25 years experience working in the athletic departments of Florida State University and the University of Central Florida. FAMU's then-Athletic Director, Dr. J.R.E. Lee III, made the decision to hire a young African American male, Richard Matthews, with no prior experience working in athletics. Mr. Labat is suing FAMU, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for discrimination based on race.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
Dr. Lee denies that he made his hiring decision based on race and states that he was unaware of Mr. Labat's race. In explaining his hiring decision, Dr. Lee stated that he was looking for a candidate with sales and marketing experience from corporate America with contacts outside the state of Florida. Mr. Matthews had experience in marketing and sales outside the state of Florida through his positions with Pfizer in New York, New York and Dow Pharmaceuticals in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Labat's contacts, in contrast, were limited to the state of Florida. Furthermore, FAMU's Chairman of the Board of Trustees, James Corbin, called Dr. Lee to give a reference for Mr. Matthews. Although Dr. Lee stated that the call did not influence his decision, he credited Mr. Matthews with being proactive in the application process by having someone call on his behalf.
II. FAMU'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As a basis for summary judgment, FAMU argues that Mr. Labat cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination because there is no evidence to show that Dr. Lee was aware of Mr. Labat's race. As a further basis for summary judgment, FAMU argues that Dr. Lee had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring Mr. Matthews instead of Mr. Labat.
To be entitled to summary judgment, FAMU must show that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and that no reasonable jury could find in favor of Mr. Labat. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986). An evaluation of the evidence in this case reveals that although Mr. Labat has stated a prima facie case, he cannot show that the reasons not to hire him were pretextual, nor can he otherwise show that FAMU refused to hire him because of his race.
A. Prima Facie Case
Because Mr. Labat has not presented any direct evidence of discrimination, to prove a prima facie case he must rely upon the indirect method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Mr. Labat must show (1) that he is a member of a protected group, (2) he was qualified for and applied for a position that FAMU was seeking to fill, (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications, and (4) the position was filled with an individual outside his protected group. Id. at 802. Mr. Labat acknowledges that in proving a prima facie case, he must show that Dr. Lee was aware that he was white. See Dass v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 140 F.Supp. 2d 1304, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (the requirements of the prima facie case presume that the alleged discriminator was aware of the plaintiff's membership in a protected group).
FAMU argues that Mr. Labat has no proof that Dr. Lee knew that Mr. Labat was white, and notes that Dr. Lee has denied having knowledge of Mr. Labat's race at the time he hired Mr. Matthews. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence, however, from which a jury could find that Dr. Lee knew Mr. Labat was white.
In particular, attached to Mr. Labat's application was an EOI form that indicated Mr. Labat was white. Although at some point in the hiring process the EOI form is separated from the application, some evidence suggests that the forms were still attached to the applications at the time Dr. Lee reviewed them. Furthermore, Mr. Labat's application showed that Plaintiff attended Florida State University when it was segregated. Mr. Labat's race, therefore, was discernable from the materials available to Dr. Lee. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Labat, a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Lee was aware of Mr. Labat's race. Accordingly, summary judgment as to this ground will be denied.
II. LEGITIMATE NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON
Because Mr. Labat has satisfied the elements of a prima facie case, a legal presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to FAMU to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25. Once FAMU articulates a legitmate non-discriminatory reason, the legal presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. Mr. Labat must then present evidence sufficient to show that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether FAMU's proffered reasons are pretextual and whether FAMU's decision was actually based on race. Id.
To show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action such that a reasonable factfinder could find the reasons unworthy of credence. Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004). In assessing the evidence, the Court should not involve itself in the issue of whether the proffered reasons are prudent or fair. Id. Furthermore, due deference should be given to subjective evaluations, which "are often critical to the decisionmaking process." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033. The sole issue is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the employment decision. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, a plaintiff may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer. Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d. 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, "disparities in qualifications are not enough in and of themselves to demonstrate discriminatory intent unless those disparities are so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face." Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Deines v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999)). Reviewing the evidence with these standards in mind, there is simply not enough for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Dr. Lee's reasons for hiring Mr. Matthews over Plaintiff were pretextual and that the decision was in fact based on race.
The main reasons Dr. Lee articulated for hiring Mr. Matthews over Mr. Labat were (1) Mr. Matthews' contacts outside the state of Florida and (2) Mr. Matthews' corporate experience. (Lee depo. at 50-53). Dr. Lee explained that these qualities were important to him because he expected Mr. Matthews and another member of the Athletic Department staff, Ms. Parks, to ultimately be responsible for fundraising activities that would be necessary to raise the level of athletics at FAMU to the Division 1A level. (Lee depo. at. 52, Matthews depo at 25).
With regard to out of state contacts, Mr. Labat argues that Mr. Matthews never actually used his contacts outside the state of Florida to perform his job and that therefore this reason is pretextual. A disparity, however, in what Dr. Lee envisioned for the position and the role Mr. Matthews actually played is of limited probative value since Dr. Lee only stayed in the position of interim director of the Athletic Department for 13 or 14 months, with only 6 or 7 months after Mr. Matthews was hired. (Lee depo. at 4, 51). Dr. Lee explained that he intended to gradually transition Mr. Matthews' duties over to share more fundraising and marketing responsibilities with Ms. Parks. (Lee depo. at 51-2). According to Dr. Lee, the transition was "very limited" at the time Dr. Lee left. (Lee depo. at 51-2). Because Mr. Matthews' out of state contacts is a factor a reasonable employer could consider in hiring for the position, no pretext is apparent.
As for corporate experience, Mr. Labat notes that Mr. Matthews' experience was limited. Mr. Matthews worked for Dow Chemical for less than two years and Mr. Matthews' other corporate experience consisted only of internships, including an internship with Pfizer in New York, for which he received school credit. Although Mr. Matthews' corporate work experience was somewhat limited, he did have a Masters Degree in Business Administration and thus appeared to be knowledgeable in corporate culture. According to Mr. Matthews, he was making approximately $80,000.00 a year at Dow Chemical when he left his position to become the assistant athletic director at FAMU. (Matthews depo at 47). Mr. Matthews' corporate experience is a factor a reasonable employer could consider in hiring for the position. No pretext is apparent.
Finally, Mr. Labat relies on his superior qualifications to argue that there was no legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring him. The reasons given by Dr. Lee, however, are ones that a reasonable employer could consider and the reasons have not been shown to be pretextual. Furthermore, while Mr. Labat's past work experience indicates that he was well-qualified for the position, they fall short of sustaining an inference of pretext.
To sustain a Title VII claim for failure to hire based on race, a plaintiff must have some evidence to show "not merely that the defendant's employment decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by race." Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1339. Courts are "not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair." Damon, 196 F.3d at 1361. Nor should a court "act as a `super personnel department' that second-guesses employers' business judgments." Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1340 (citations omitted). The "sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision." Id.
In this case, there is no evidence of racial bias. FAMU has articulated reasons that might motivate a reasonable employer to hire Mr. Matthews over Mr. Labat. Mr. Labat's qualifications are not so superior as to create an inference that the decision not to hire him was motivated by race. Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. FAMU's motion for summary judgment (doc. 26) is granted.
2. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant FAMU.
3. All pending motions are denied as moot.
DONE AND ORDERED.