Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-2799 SECTION "C" (1).
October 3, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) by Defendants Jerome Barbera, III and John LeBlanc. (Rec. Doc. 4). Defendants, both judges in the 17th Judicial District of Lafourche Parish, assert judicial immunity in response to Plaintiff Keith Labat's Complaint alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Rec. Doc. 1). Because none of Defendants' actions falls into the exceptions to judicial immunity, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
I. Background
In his Complaint, Mr. Labat alleges that Defendants deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, specifically when they "knowingly, maliciously and illegally manipulated proceedings . . . in disregard of plaintiff's rights to fair and impartial justice." (Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57, 70). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were at all material times judges in the 17th Judicial District of Lafourche Parish. Plaintiff makes a series of factual allegations to support his constitutional claims, which concern the following events:
1) Judge Barbera was the presiding judge over Plaintiff's divorce and custody proceedings after May 2003, Jan L. Labat v. Keith J. Labat, No. 96159, 17th Judicial District of Lafourche Parish. (Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 9). In this context, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Barbera had a variety of ex parte conversations with Plaintiff's former spouse which allegedly led to "fabrications" of substance abuse. Plaintiff further asserts that Judge Barbera ordered drug and alcohol testing for the Plaintiff despite these suspect grounds, executed ex parte orders on issues of community and separate property to the spouse's alleged benefit, set hearing dates favorable to the spouse, made evidentiary rulings favorable to the spouse, denied Plaintiff access to documents that purportedly would have revealed the spouse's sexual misconduct, and finally recused himself from the proceeding. ( See id. at ¶¶ 10-19).
2) Plaintiff appeared before Judge LeBlanc as an attorney representing a client in a personal injury case, Keith Manning and Susan Manning v. T.H.E. Insurance Co., et al, No. 75049, 17th Judicial District of Lafourche Parish (" Manning I"). Although the details are unclear, Plaintiff asserts that an issue before Judge LeBlanc was an award of attorney fees to the Mannings' first counsel, who had purportedly intervened in the matter. Plaintiff alleges that this counsel was the same individual who "conspired" with Judge Barbera in the divorce proceeding. In any event, Judge LeBlanc allegedly awarded $40,000 to this attorney and "cast judgment [on the Plaintiff] . . . although he was not a party to the litigation." Plaintiff further alleges that Judge LeBlanc denied Plaintiff's petition to recover these monies paid in the intervention judgment by ruling that Plaintiff lacked standing. ( See generally Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 20-26).
3) Judge LeBlanc also presided over a Petition for Damages against the Plaintiff apparently arising out of Manning I, which was entitled Keith Manning and Susan Manning v. T.H.E. Insurance Co., et al, No. 98009, 17th Judicial District of Lafourche Parish (" Manning II"). While the basis of the suit is not stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Judge LeBlanc improperly signed preliminary default judgments in the matter. Judge LeBlanc then allegedly allowed a confirmation hearing to proceed, which resulted in a judgment of $500,000 in favor of the same attorney who "conspired" in the divorce proceeding. Judge LeBlanc also allegedly denied Plaintiff's request for a new trial, granted a writ for the seizure of Plaintiff's property, ordered Plaintiff to appear under the judgment debtor rule, and denied Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the judgment against Plaintiff (allegedly defective due to improper service). In the course of these rulings, Plaintiff alleges that Judge LeBlanc misapplied state law and assumed jurisdiction over judgment matter as "in rem," though, according to Plaintiff, no such jurisdiction existed. ( See generally Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 27-42).
4) Apparently due to the enforcement of this judgement against the Plaintiff, a foreclosure proceeding against his home ensued, which also came before Judge LeBlanc, entitled US Bank National Asso. v. Keith James Labat and Jan L. Labat, No. 98159, Judicial District of Lafourche Parish. In the course of this litigation, Judge LeBlanc ordered the writ of seizure and sale executed against Plaintiff's house, allegedly without review of the underlying documentation, which was defective according to Plaintiff. ( See generally Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43-47).
Defendants argue that all the actions taken during these events are protected under judicial immunity such that relief on Plaintiff's claims cannot be granted.
II. Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve all ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). All of the plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true, and the dismissal will be affirmed "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations." Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not defeat a motion to dismiss. See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284).
III. Law and Analysis
"Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). "Judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial." Id. at 11 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554 ("Immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly") (emphasis added). "The alleged magnitude of the judge's errors or the mendacity of his acts is irrelevant." Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991). "It is the judge's actions alone, not intent, that we must consider." Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). Notwithstanding the stringency of this standard, judicial immunity can be overcome in two sets of circumstances: (1) "a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity"; and (2) "a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
Under Mireles, the Fifth Circuit has adopted several factors a district court is required to consider four factors when discerning whether a judge's actions are in fact "judicial in nature":
(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judges chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124 (citation omitted). These factors are broadly construed in favor of immunity. Id.
A. Immunity Defense of Judge Barbera
It is evident from Plaintiff's allegations that all of Judge Barbera's actions were judicial in nature, and that these actions were taken in matters over which he had jurisdiction. First, it is undisputed that Judge Barbera had jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's divorce proceeding. More important, all the actions were judicial orders, issued in court by the judge in his official capacity: scheduling hearings, evidentiary rulings, decisions about access to documents, and an order that Plaintiff undergo drug and alcohol testing. Plaintiff may contest the basis of the testing and decry the alleged ex parte communications with Judge Barbera that purportedly led to the "fabricated" necessity for such testing. Any implication of a corrupt motive or malice to Judge Barbera, however, is irrelevant to the Court's determination. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 ("Immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"). At most, these allegations raise concerns of ethical violations and of actions taken in excess of authority. They do not defeat the fact that the action to order testing was judicial and that its import "centered around a case pending before the court," i.e., the divorce proceeding. Id. See also Ballard v. Wall, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11565, *15-16 (Jun. 17, 2005) ("Where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes. If [a judge] merely acted in excess of [her] authority, she is still protected by judicial immunity") (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Accordingly, Judge Barbera is entitled to immunity from the § 1983 suit by Plaintiff.
B. Immunity Defense of Judge LeBlanc
All of the actions taken by Judge LeBlanc were similarly judicial in nature. In Manning I, it is clear that Plaintiff, this time evidently appearing as an attorney, faced adverse rulings in litigating the Mannings' personal injury claim. Despite the murky allegation that the Mannings' first unnamed counsel of record was improperly allowed to intervene, the award of $40,000 attorney fees to this unnamed lawyer (at Plaintiff's expense) was within Judge LeBlanc's province in presiding over the matter. Assuming the veracity of the Complaint, a Louisiana appeals court may well have later "chastised" Judge LeBlanc because he allegedly "cast judgment against an individual . . . not a party to the litigation." ( See Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶ 25). Again, however, this alleged error and/or abuse of discretion occurred where the court had "some subject matter jurisdiction." Wall, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11565 at *16. Thus Judge LeBlanc's "acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity." Malina, 994 F.2d at 1124. Absent an action "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction," Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, there is no exception to judicial immunity.
In Malina, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit found that the exception to immunity applied when irritated judge stopped motorist on the highway, brandished his court identification, demanded a driver's license and threatened arrest. Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1123, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Peace officers, not judges, stop motorists on the highway, and prosecutors, not judges, set the judicial machinery in motion by charging someone with a crime. It is well settled that charging a defendant is a prosecutorial function, not a judicial function").
As to Manning II, Plaintiff complains of a series of adverse rulings by Judge LeBlanc including the following: the judge mistakenly assumed "in rem" jurisdiction over the matter, signed a preliminary order of default judgment against Plaintiff (apparently for the judgment from Manning I), failed to verify the propriety of service, denied Plaintiff's request for an injunction from the judgment's execution, and required his presence in court under the judgment debtor rule. These actions were likewise judicial in nature. First, despite the accusation that these rulings were made to benefit the same unnamed "person who conspired with . . . Judge Barbera to fix the custody proceeding" (Rec. Doc. at ¶ 31), the decisions were nevertheless taken in Judge LeBlanc's official capacity at the court house, even if done in bad faith as alleged. See Malina, 994 F.2d at 1125 ("It is the Judges actions alone, not intent, that we must consider"). Second, allegations of judicial error (even purposeful or egregious error) are not actionable in the face of judicial immunity. See Biggers, 938 F.2d at 569 n. 5 ("The alleged magnitude of the judge's errors or the mendacity of his acts is irrelevant").
As to Judge LeBlanc's actions in foreclosure proceeding against Plaintiff's house, these were no less judicial in nature under the Malina criteria.
Accordingly, Judge Barbera is also entitled to judicial immunity from the § 1983 suit by Plaintiff.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) be hereby GRANTED. Accepting all Plaintiff's allegations as true, Mr. Labat has still failed to state a cognizable claim because the Defendants' judicial immunity shields them from actions taken in the course of the litigation over which they each respectively had jurisdiction. Accordingly, claims against the Defendants asserted in the above-captioned matter are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.