Opinion
No. 19-1382 (L) 8:18-cv-01570-GJH No. 19-1387 8:18-cv-01041-GJH No. 19-1425
06-25-2019
ORDER
Upon consideration of submissions relative to the plaintiffs' motion for remand, this Court hereby grants the motion. More specifically, we remand for further proceedings on the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim and the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, so that the district court may address and resolve the matters identified in its Indicative Ruling of June 19, 2019, and its related Memorandum Opinion of June 24, 2019. Pursuant to Rule 12.1(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will retain jurisdiction during the pendency of the remand proceedings. After the district court's entry of a final ruling on the plaintiffs' pending motion for relief from final judgment, the parties must comply with the notification requirement of Rule 12.1(b).
Entered at the direction of Judge King with the concurrence of Judge Wynn. Judge Wynn filed a separate concurring statement. Judge Agee voted to deny the motion for remand for the reasons well stated by the Government.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk WYNN, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's decision to remand this case for further proceedings on the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim and the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, so that the district court may address and resolve matters identified in its Indicative Ruling and related Memorandum Opinion.
In addressing and resolving those matters, the district court should keep in mind that "discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence." Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (emphasis added). Instead, when deciding whether discriminatory intent motivates a facially neutral law, courts undertake a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (emphasis added). Therefore, "necessarily," an "invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (emphasis added). To that end, even in the absence of direct evidence of invidious discriminatory intent, this Court and other courts have found such intent when, for example, a governmental decisionmaker was aware that an action was likely to disproportionately impact a minority group, the decisionmaker declined to impose ameliorative measures to minimize the likely disproportionate impact, the decisionmaker's process for deciding to take the action deviated from standard practice, and the decisionmaker provided pretextual reasons for taking the action. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 221 (4th Cir. 2016); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 235 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 837 F.2d 1181, 1229-30 (2d Cir. 1987).
It may be prudent upon remand, for the district court to consider whether it is appropriate for the district court to preliminarily enjoin the Government from placing the citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire pending the district court's and this Court's final review of Plaintiffs' equal protection and Section 1985 claims. Although U.S. Census Bureau Chief Scientist Dr. John Abowd testified that "the final date for locking down the content of the census questionnaire is October 31, 2019," J.A. 771, the Government's briefing has repeatedly represented to this Court and the Supreme Court that the 2020 Census questionnaire must be finalized by this Sunday, June 30, 2019. Thus, if the district court does not anticipate deciding this case until after June 30, 2019 (which appears highly likely, given that the district court has indicated it plans to reopen discovery and order an evidentiary hearing), a preliminary injunction may be necessary to prevent the printing of the Census questionnaire from, at least from the Government's perspective, rendering the case moot.
In any event, I believe that the district court should expeditiously address Plaintiffs' equal protection and Section 1985 claims to prevent unduly interfering with the preparation of the Census questionnaire and interfering with appellate review of its ultimate determination as to those claims.