Opinion
Case No. EDCV 13-00398-VAP (OPx) Case No. LACV 13-01960-VAP (OPx)
06-25-2014
AYLIN LA FLEUR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., etc., MICHAEL CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs v. MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC., etc., et al. Defendants.
ORDER Granting Motion for
Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement
Before the Court is an unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Plaintiffs Aylin La Fleur and Michael Campbell ("Plaintiffs"). ("Final Approval Motion") (Doc. No. 42). The matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23, 2014. After consideration of the papers filed in support of the Motion, the Court GRANTS the Final Approval Motion and APPROVES the settlement.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs were employed as "Practice Managers" at two Banfield Pet Hospitals in southern California. Banfield Pet Hospitals are operated by Defendant Medical Management International, Inc. ("MMI"). Plaintiffs filed two separate class action complaints, asserting violations of California labor law and alleging that MMI did not adequately compensate them for work done in excess of eight hours and work done on weekends, and deprived them of rest and meal breaks.
On April 24, 2013, the Court consolidated La Fleur's case with Campbell's. (See Case No. 5:13-cv-00398-VAP-OP, Doc. No. 22.) All further references to the docket are to case no. 5:13-cv-00398-VAP-OP, unless otherwise noted.
B. Procedural History
On July 11, 2013, Class Counsel for Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Settlement, requesting ninety days to complete the settlement and file a motion for preliminary approval. (Doc. No. 29.) Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement ("Preliminary Approval Motion") on October 28, 2013. (Doc. No. 33.) The Court, after a hearing on January 6, 2014, granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement with a change to the class period -- as per the agreement of the parties -- and a clarification to the Claim Form making it clear that $3,750 would be paid out of the settlement funds to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. (See Doc. Nos. 39 (Minutes), 40 ("Preliminary Approval Order").)
The Court issued a minute order preliminarily approving the class action settlement on January 10, 2014 and issued an order approving an updated class notification form and notice schedule on January 27, 2014 (Doc. No. 41).
C. Settlement Terms
The Settlement Agreement requires MMI to pay a maximum total settlement sum of $535,000. (Final Approval Motion at 1; Declaration of David Spivak in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement ("Spivak Preliminary Decl." (Doc. No. 33-2)) Ex. 1 ("Settlement Agreement") at II.P.) The total settlement sum would be used to satisfy: (i) reasonable attorney's fees, not to exceed 25% of the maximum settlement amount or $133,750.00; (ii) actual litigation costs, not to exceed $10,000; (iii) reasonable fees and expenses of the claims administrator, Simpluris, Inc., not to exceed $8,000; (iv) reasonable enhancement awards to the named plaintiffs, up to $15,000 per named plaintiff for a total of $30,000; (v) civil penalties in the amount of $3,750 payable to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"); and (vi) the remainder of $349,500 distributed to class members. (Id.)
The parties maintained that payments to each individual class member would be different, depending on length of service and other factors, and therefore proposed the following formula for determining compensation: the amount payable to each class member will be based on a percentage of the total number of work periods of the Class. (Preliminary Approval Motion at 20.) For example, if class members as a whole submit claims totaling 2000 pay periods, and an individual Class member worked for 20 of those pay periods, her or she would be entitled to 20/2000, or 1% of the Maximum Distributable Amount, provided that he or she submitted a valid Claim Form. (Id.)
For illustrative purposes, if each member of the Class participated and each had an equal number of pay periods to claim, the net payment to each member of the Class would be 349,500/107, or approximately $3,266.
D. Settlement Procedure
1. Notice to Class Members and Number of Claims Received
The parties followed the process for providing notice approved in the Preliminary Approval Order. (Final Approval Motion at 7; see also Declaration of Mary Butler ("Butler Decl." (Doc. No. 42-6)) ¶¶ 2-12).) Of the 124 identified class members, 86 valid claims were received, or 69.35% of the possible settlement class. (Butler Decl. ¶ 11.) Those 86 claims accounted for 79% of the net settlement amount. (Id. ¶ 12.) The average payout to class members is $3,065.56 and the highest payment to any individual class member is $7,402.02. (Id.) No class member has sought to be excluded from the settlement or has filed an objection. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
Butler is a Case Manager for Simpluris, Inc. ("Simpluris"), the claims administrator retained for this action. (Final Approval Motion at 1.) The Court previously approved $8,000 for claims administration. (Preliminary Approval Order at 19.)
2. Claim Administration
According to the Claim Form and Notice of Settlement approved by the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order, in order to receive payment a Class member was required to complete and submit a Claim Form to the settlement administrator by a April 22, 2014. The Notice of Settlement also provided Class members the opportunity to opt out, object, or do nothing.
The parties proposed that within twenty business days of entry of preliminary approval, MMI would provide the Simpluris with a database "containing the name, last known address, telephone number, encrypted social security number, Individual Pay Periods Worked of each Settlement Class member, and Total Pay Periods Worked of all Settlement Class members." (Settlement Agreement at V.A.) Upon receipt of this information, Simpluris was to obtain updated forwarding addresses from the U.S. Postal Service, and within ten business days of receipt of this updated information, Simpluris was to mail the Notice of Settlement to proposed class members. (Id. at V.B)
After Notices of Settlement were mailed, the settlement class had sixty calendar days to respond and mail Claim Forms or opt-out requests. (Id. at II.I.) Should any mail be returned as undeliverable, Simpluris was required to make a second mailing, and the deadline to respond and submit a Claim Form would be extended for fifteen days or seventy-five days total from the date of the first mailing. (Id.)
The parties followed this schedule and Simpluris mailed these notices in compliance with the Preliminary Approval Order. (See generally, Butler Decl.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Parties seeking class certification for settlement purposes must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"). Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). A court considering such a request should give the Rule 23 certification factors "undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context." Id.
Under Rule 23(a), in order to bring a class action, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable ["numerosity"], (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class ["commonality"], (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class ["typicality"], and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class ["adequacy of representation"].
In addition to these requirements, a plaintiff must satisfy one of the Rule 23(b) prongs to maintain a class action. Where a plaintiff moves for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiff must prove:
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The
matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.
The Court need not consider a fourth factor - the likely difficulties in managing a class action - in the context of a class action settlement.
Where "the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the settlement." Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Class Certification
Based on the showing made by the Plaintiffs in support of the Motion for Preliminary Approval and the Motion for Final Approval, and as discussed more fully in the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court finds the parties have met their burden as to the prerequisites for class certification set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b)(3).
Specifically, the Class includes 124 current and former employees and is therefore so numerous that joinder is impracticable. (Final Approval Motion at 7; Preliminary Approval Order at 6.) As to commonality, the Class is defined as Practice Managers employed at Banfield Hospitals from November 27, 2008 through October 5, 2013. (Preliminary Approval Motion at 10-11; Preliminary Approval Order at 7; Settlement Agreement at II.M, II.U.) Questions about whether MMI required its Practice Managers to work without proper compensation for overtime, weekend pay, or if they were deprived of breaks would be common to every member of the Class. As to typicality, the facts common to the proposed class create liability for claims that are typical to the Class -- violations of the California Labor Code and related laws and regulations. (Preliminary Approval Motion at 11; Preliminary Approval Order at 8-9.)
The Preliminary Approval Order estimated that there would be 107 members of the Class. (Preliminary Approval Order at 7.)
As to adequacy of representation, Class Counsel is experienced and capable of fairly and competently representing the interests of the Class. (See Preliminary Approval Order at 9-10 (discussing qualifications of Class Counsel and previous work done on this case).) The Settlement Agreement notes that the Plaintiffs and MMI believe the settlement to be "fair, adequate, and reasonable, and that it is in the best interests of the members of the settlement class." (See Butler Decl., Ex A. at 2.)
B. Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of the Settlement
1. The Settlement Agreement
In determining whether or not the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts balance several factors, including: (1) whether the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations; (2) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (4) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (5) the amount offered in settlement; (6) the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; (7) the experience and views of counsel; (8) the presence of a governmental participant; and (9) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d at 1291 (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)); In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (citing Manual for Complex Litigation, § 30.44 (2d ed. 1985)). The court need not consider all of these factors; rather, it must only consider those factors that are designed to protect absentees. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010).
As this factor is not present, the Court need not address it.
This is "by no means an exhaustive list of relevant considerations," though, and "[t]he relative degree of importance to be attached to any particular factor will depend on the unique circumstances of each case." Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Com., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the Court only addresses those factors it feels is relevant to ensure the Settlement Agreement and its administration are fair, reasonable, and adequate.
In evaluating a proposed settlement, "[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court "does not have the ability to delete, modify, or substitute certain provisions," and "[t]he settlement must stand or fall in its entirety." Id. The question is not whether the settlement "could be prettier, smarter, or snazzier," but solely "whether it is fair, adequate, and free from collusion." Id. at 1027.
a. The Settlement Negotiations
As discussed in the Preliminary Approval Order, the Settlement Agreement was reached with the help of Lisa Klerman, a private mediator with experience in wage and hour class actions. (Preliminary Approval Order at 14.) Settlements reached with the help of a mediator are likely non-collusive. Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp., 2007 WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007) ("The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive."). The parties have presented no reason for the Court to reconsider its previous finding that this settlement was the product of arm's-length negotiations, and accordingly, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.
b. Strength of Plaintiffs' Case
In the Preliminary Approval Motion, Plaintiffs pointed out a number of possible factors that could complicate their theory of liability:
(1) MMI may be able to produce written policies concerning rest and meal breaks in compliance with California law; (2) the inability of Plaintiffs to prove that MMI acted with the requisite scienter to justify statutory penalties; (3) the possibility of judicial(Preliminary Approval Order at 14-15.) Plaintiffs again reiterate these concerns in the Final Approval Motion, noting that "Plaintiffs can hope to recover no more than $1,765,558.04 in unpaid wages for the class. The settlement they achieved is about 30% of that amount. The settlement amount, thus, represents a substantial recovery for Settlement Class members in light of the considerable risks that continued litigation would have entailed." (Final Approval Motion at 12 (internal citation omitted).)
reduction of PAGA penalties; (4) the collective diminished effect on the class's recovery if no civil penalties were levied; (5) the risk that MMI would be able to defeat class certification based on "variations in the experiences of absent class members;" and (6) the risk that MMI would seek smaller individual settlements and releases before trial.
The Private Attorney General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698-2699.
As Plaintiffs reached a favorable settlement in light of these risks to their case, this factor weighs in favor of approval.
c. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation
In light of the possible issues with the strength of Plaintiffs' case as discussed above, there was considerable risk in maintaining this action. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that during mediation MMI disclosed "it had always paid overtime wages on bonuses to putative class members, though this may not have been evident from the wage statements," and that many of their statutory claims may be adversely affected should MMI pay those benefits prior to trial. (Final Approval Motion at 13.)
La Fleur and Campbell also previously indicated their unease with the possibility of having to pay fees and costs should they not prevail at trial and those fears have not diminished. (Declaration of Aylin La Fleur ("La Fleur Decl." (Doc. No. 42-4)) at ¶ 13; Declaration of Michael Campbell ("Campbell Decl." (Doc. No. 42-5)) at ¶ 13.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk and expense of this litigation to the parties favors approval of the settlement.
d. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial
The Court may revisit the certification of the class at any time before entry of final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C). Where there is a risk that class certification might not be maintained before entry of final judgment, this factor favors approving the proposed settlement.
Here, MMI only stipulated to certification of the Class for purposes of settlement; should settlement not be approved, MMI may well oppose class certification. (See Settlement Agreement at III ("Should this Settlement not become effective for any reason, the fact that the Parties stipulated to certification of a Settlement Class in this Agreement shall have no bearing on and not be admissible on the question of whether a class should be certified in a non-settlement context and as to Defendant's liability for the claims alleged by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Settlement Class, which liability Defendant expressly denies.").) Given the uncertainty regarding Plaintiffs' ability to maintain class certification throughout the case, this factor also favors approving the proposed settlement.
e. Amount Offered in Settlement
The Settlement Agreement requires MMI to pay a total settlement sum not to exceed $535,000. (Settlement Agreement at III.P, IX.A.) As noted above, of the 124 identified class members, 86 valid claims were received, or 69.35% of the possible settlement class. (Butler Decl. ¶ 11.) Those 86 claims accounted for 79% of the net settlement amount. (Id. ¶ 12.) The average payout to class members is $3,065.56 and the highest payment to any individual class member is $7,402.02. Given the risks and uncertainty attendant to this litigation as previously discussed, the Court finds that the amount of the settlement payments and the rate at which prospective Class Members responded weighs in favor of the Settlement Agreement's overall reasonableness.
f. Experience and Views of Counsel
As noted above, the parties in this case believe this settlement to be "fair, adequate, and reasonable, and that it is in the best interests of the members of the settlement class." (See Butler Decl., Ex A. at 2.) This, in conjunction with Class Counsel's experience litigating wage and hour claims (see Spivak Preliminary Decl. at ¶¶ 19-30; Declaration of Walter Haines in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval (Doc. No. 33-4) at ¶¶ 1-3) persuades the Court that Class Counsel believes the Settlement Agreement and subsequent payout to be fair, reasonable, and adequate in this case.
g. The Reaction of Class Members to the Proposed Settlement
Again, as noted above, Class Counsel received no objections or exclusion requests as to the proposed Settlement Agreement, and 69.35% of the Class claimed 79% of the net settlement amount for a total distribution of $263.637.81. (Final Approval Motion at 7; Butler Decl. ¶¶ 11-14.) Thus, this factor weighs in favor of settlement.
As all of the above factors weigh in favor of final approval, the Court finds the Settlement Agreement to be fair, reasonable and adequate.
2. Attorney Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards
The Preliminary Approval Order approved allocation of settlement funds for attorney's fees and actual litigation costs, and incentive award payments. (Preliminary Approval Order at 16-18 (citing Staton, 327 F.3d at 963 ("[T]o avoid abdicating its responsibility to review the agreement for the protection of the class, a district court must carefully assess the reasonableness of a fee amount spelled out in a class action settlement agreement.").)
a. Attorney's Fees and Costs
The Settlement Agreement sets aside $133,750.00, or 25% of the settlement proceeds as attorney's fees. (Final Approval Motion at 17-19; Settlement Agreement at XI.A.1.) To calculate the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees, the Court may use either the percentage-of-the-fund method or the lodestar/multiplier method. In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he district court has discretion to use either method in common fund cases."). Regardless of the method used, "the district court should be guided by the fundamental principle that fee awards out of common funds be "reasonable under the circumstances." In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d at 1296 (quoting State of Florida v. Dunne, 915 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Under the percentage-of-the-fund method, the court calculates the fee award by designating a percentage of the total common fund. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).
Under the lodestar method, the court calculates the fee award by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate and then enhancing that figure, if necessary to account for the risks associated with representation. Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Twenty-five percent, the amount requested by Plaintiffs' counsel here, is the "'benchmark' award that should be given in common fund cases." Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1311. "The benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar calculation, when special circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the case or other relevant factors." Id.
The Court elects to use the percentage-of-the-fund method to determine if the proposed attorney's fees are reasonable. As Class Counsel agree that 25% is reasonable here, and there is no evidence that an award of 25% would be a windfall to Plaintiffs' counsel (see Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)), the Court agrees that the Settlement Agreement's attorney's fees request is reasonable.
Moreover, assuming the Court used the lodestar method, a review of the billing records submitted by Class Counsel (see Declaration of David Spivak in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement ("Final Spivak Decl." (Doc. No. 42-9) Ex. 19; Declaration of Caroline Tahmassian (Doc. No. 42-3) Ex. A; Declaration of Walter Haines (Doc. No. 42-2), Ex. A), shows that the fees as calculated by the lodestar approach would also be reasonable.
With respect to actual litigation costs, the Settlement Agreement requests no more than $8,170.36 in costs. (Final Approval Motion at 19.) Rule 23(h) provides that the Court may award reasonable costs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The Court previously found that an award of up to $10,000 in costs would be reasonable. (Preliminary Approval Order at 17-18.) Class Counsel has provided an accounting of those costs. (See Final Spivak Decl. Ex. 20.) The Court finds these costs to be reasonable.
b. Incentive Awards
"[N]amed plaintiffs, as opposed to designated class members who are not named plaintiffs, are eligible for reasonable incentive payments." Staton, 327 F.3d at 977. Factors the court should consider when assessing whether individual incentive payments are reasonable include: (1) the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class; (2) the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions; (3) the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation; and (4) and reasonable fears of workplace retaliation. Id. Courts may also consider: the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; the duration of the litigation; and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995). "Courts have generally found that $5,000 incentive payments are reasonable." Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
At the hearing on the Preliminary Approval Motion, the Court expressed its skepticism at the prospect of awarding $15,000 to both of the named plaintiffs, Aylin La Fleur and Michael Campbell for their participation. The Court gave preliminary approval to the Settlement Agreement with those incentive awards, though it noted those awards might be lowered in the order giving final approval to the settlement. (Preliminary Approval Order at 18.)
Class Counsel dedicated no less than five pages of the Final Approval Motion to this issue, explaining that a $15,000 incentive award for each named plaintiff is warranted in this instance for the following reasons: (1) the named plaintiffs have released all claims against MMI, unlike the remainder of the Class; (2) the individual fiduciary responsibility that La Fleur and Campbell took on behalf of other members of the Class; (3) other class members may recover more than the named plaintiffs; (4) La Fleur and Campbell alone assumed the risk of an adverse judgment against them; (5) Class Counsel relied heavily on the input of the named plaintiffs, including their presence at the mediation session that ultimately led to the terms of the Settlement Agreement; (6) the named plaintiffs have forfeited the right to receive all civil penalties under PAGA by agreeing to this settlement; (7) the small impact on each individual class member's recovery in order to set aside the incentive awards for the named plaintiffs. (Final Approval Motion at 19-26.)
In addition to the arguments in the Motion, La Fleur and Campbell also submitted new declarations in support of their $15,000 incentive payments. (See La Fleur Decl. at ¶¶ 3-9; Campbell Decl. at ¶¶ 3-14.) In the declarations, La Fleur and Campbell mention that they fear their future job prospects in the veterinary industry may be harmed after being named as plaintiffs in this action. (See La Fleur Decl. at ¶ 15; Campbell Decl. at ¶ 15.) Taking the arguments by Class Counsel and the supplemental declarations of the named plaintiffs into consideration, the Court agrees that the $15,000 incentive payments in the Settlement Agreement are reasonable under the circumstances.
C. Adequacy of the Notice Procedure
Rule 23 requires the court to direct to Class Members "the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). In addition, Rule 23(e)(1) requires the court to "direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal." The notice must explain in easily understood language the nature of the action, definition of the class, class claims, issues and defenses, ability to appear through individual counsel, procedure to request exclusion, and binding nature of a class judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Plaintiff must provide notice to potential opt-in class members that is "timely, accurate, and informative." See Hoffmann-La Rouche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989). Likewise, claim forms must be informative and accurate. Id. at 172; Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (notice is satisfactory if it "generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard").
On January 27, 2014, the Court approved the proposed Notice for the Class. (See Doc. No. 41.) In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court determined that the proposed Notice and manner of class notice were adequate, and the Court now evaluates whether the parties executed class notice in accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order.
Class Counsel provided notice to the Class using the form and process the Court preliminarily approved. (See Final Approval Motion at 7; Butler Decl. at ¶¶ 5-12.) On February 21, 2014, the Claims Administrator provided the Class Notice and the Claim Form to the Class via first-class mail. (Butler Decl. at ¶ 8.) No requests for exclusion or objections were received, and 69.35% of the Class claimed 79% of the net settlement amount for a total distribution of $263.637.81. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.)
Class Counsel complied with the notice requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order. The notice sent to Class Members pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order was the best notice practicable under the circumstances and provided sufficient notice to Class Members through Class Counsel's reasonable effort.
The Court finds the Class Notice procedure was reasonable as to the content and the method of communication. As the Court has found the settlement terms to be fair, adequate, and reasonable, and because the notice procedures were the best notice practicable under the circumstances, the Court APPROVES the Settlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
After considering the foregoing factors, the Court finds the Settlement Agreement is fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Motion for Final Approval;
(2) DISMISSES the action WITH PREJUDICE. All Class Members shall be bound by this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
United States District Judge