Opinion
B307889
05-24-2021
In re R.P., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSICA H., Defendant and Respondent; RUDY P., Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01842) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed. Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Rudy P. (Father) appeals from two orders issued by the juvenile court in a dependency case. First, he contends the one-year restraining order issued on behalf of Jessica H. (Mother) and their three daughters is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he argues the dispositional order requiring him to complete a one-year domestic violence program exceeds the juvenile court's discretion. We disagree and affirm both orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Family
Father and Mother have four children together. R.P. was born in 2003. The oldest daughter, L.P., followed in 2007. J.P. was born in 2010, and the youngest, A.P., was born in 2011.
By March 19, 2020, Father and Mother's relationship had deteriorated. They were no longer romantically involved and did not live together, although Mother felt that Father "still thinks we are together." Mother, who was estranged from her own family, lived with the children in a property owned by Father. At the time, Father was the family's sole financial support. He regularly visited the family home to run his business, which he operated out of the front of the property.
B. Voluntary Family Maintenance Services
The family first came to the attention of the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) in March of 2019. Twelve-year-old L.P. had been observed with shallow cuts on her arm at school. During a subsequent investigation, she admitted that she had cut herself due to stress caused by Father.
L.P. reported that whenever Father came to the home, he would "terrorize" the family. If the house was not cleaned to his exacting standards, Father would yell at Mother and the children, call them names, and threaten to cause physical harm if the home was not cleaned immediately. He would make a "mess" and force Mother and the children to clean up after him. L.P. said that this happened multiple times every day. She told investigators that "sometimes she want[ed] to kill herself because she can't take it anymore." Her siblings confirmed L.P.'s reports.
When interviewed by investigators, Mother acknowledged Father's verbal abuse, but said that she "[took] Father's side." Father denied the allegations and accused L.P. of lying. Nonetheless, the parents agreed to participate in voluntary family maintenance services. The Department closed the case once Mother and Father completed parenting classes and the children were in therapy.
C. Current Allegations
On March 13, 2020, the Department received a report that Father was continuing to verbally and emotionally abuse Mother and the children.
The Department followed up with the children's therapists. J.P. and A.P.'s therapist agreed that "[F]ather has continued with his controlling behavior towards [M]other and is emotionally abusive towards the children." She said that while Father's behavior was no longer an everyday occurrence, he continued to show up at the family house and berate Mother and the children several times a month.
The therapist listed numerous examples of Father's recent conduct. For example, in November 2019, Father took R.P.'s phone from him and threw it, reportedly calling him a "faggot." Additionally, in March 2020, Father took Mother's car because it was "dirty," and told her to take the bus. The therapist expressed concern that Father's behavior was keeping J.P. and A.P. from progressing in therapy. A.P. appeared particularly distressed, becoming anxious when her mother was a few minutes late to pick her up because she "fear[ed] that [F]ather did something to [M]other."
Father denied these allegations. When social workers interviewed Mother, she cried "because I am putting my kids through this again." She acknowledged Father's ongoing verbal and emotional abuse, and provided additional examples of his controlling behavior. He would call the home and tell Mother the home had to be clean in 20 minutes, causing the children to panic. If the family was not at the home, they had to "stop what they [we]re doing and go home to clean." When Father arrived, he went through the house creating messes and telling the children to clean them up. L.P., J.P., and A.P. reported similar occurrences, which had once caused the children to miss school. A.P. also described an incident in which Father threw a plate at Mother with such force that the plate broke on impact.
Mother said that she has "learned to live like this," with Father "play[ing] mind games and mak[ing] her feel crazy." Yet she continued to make excuses for his behavior, saying that "using foul language and [being upset] . . . is just the way [F]ather communicates." She also gave several excuses for her failure to move the children out of Father's property. She said that she did not want to drag the children in and out of short-term shelters, or have them living in her car. She described past situations in which she had attempted to leave and Father had physically blocked her and the children from leaving the house.
After being told that the family home was not safe for the children, Mother admitted that she "knew this was coming sooner or later," and that she "needs help." However, due in part to complications relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, Mother was unable to find temporary shelter.
On March 27, 2020, the Department obtained an emergency removal order and removed the children from Mother and Father. The children were subsequently released to Mother's care with a safety plan. After a brief period of instability, Mother and the children went to live with a maternal aunt in San Bernardino. Additionally, Mother obtained a temporary restraining order against Father.
D. The Current Petition
In a petition filed on April 1, 2020, the Department alleged that the children were subject to dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Count b-1 alleged that Mother had "placed the children in a detrimental and endangering situation and has failed to protect the children" from Father's emotional abuse, and that "[r]emedial services failed to resolve the family['s] problems." The petition included several specific allegations describing Father's abusive conduct, including that he "yelled and used foul language towards the children and [M]other," and that he had once "threw and broke a plate at [M]other in the children's home." The petition also alleged that L.P. was subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c). Count c-1 alleged that L.P. was "at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage" due to Father's emotional abuse, citing her prior self-mutilating behaviors and the therapist's comments about L.P.'s current anxiety.
Subsequent undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On May 19, 2020, social workers interviewed the family again. Mother minimized the family's issues, saying that she only got the restraining order because a social worker told her she would have to if she wanted to return to the family home. She blamed the children for some of Father's behavior, saying, "I know my kids are a disaster, they are messy, a lot of things that I see trigger him, it was mainly the mess . . . ."
Father vehemently denied all the allegations, asserting that the evidence of emotional abuse was based entirely on events that occurred in 2019. He accused L.P. and the other children of lying to social workers, and claimed the restraining order was issued because the Department wanted "to take the kids away."
E. Adjudication and Disposition Hearing
The Department submitted a last minute information on September 21, 2020. It reported that Mother had obtained employment, participated more fully with the Department, and appeared to show "tremendous growth." The children's therapists reported that they were doing well and making progress in their new environment. Father was enrolled in parenting, domestic violence, and anger management classes, and was having monitored virtual visits with the children. The Department did not recommend additional domestic violence services for either Mother or Father.
On September 22, 2020, the juvenile court conducted an adjudication and disposition hearing. Father asked for the petition to be dismissed for lack of evidence showing that he posed a current risk of harm to the children. The court rejected Father's argument and sustained the petition, determining that the parents' history of ongoing domestic violence for "a significant period of time," risked harm to the children as alleged by the Department. Accordingly, the court ordered that the children be removed from Father's custody and placed with Mother.
The juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in an extended domestic violence class to understand that "domestic violence is damaging her family." It ordered Father to participate in a 52-week domestic violence program.
Mother requested a three-year restraining order to protect her and the three younger children. Father objected, arguing that there was not a showing of current immediate harm. The court granted a modified one-year restraining order.
Mother did not include R.P. in this restraining order because R.P., who was nearly 18 years old, had asked not to be included in the order. Accordingly, our reference to the "children" is a reference to the three younger children.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Restraining Order
Section 213.5, subdivision (a), authorizes a juvenile court to issue an order "enjoining any person from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of" the child or the child's parent. Section 213.5, subdivision (d)(1), provides that after notice and a hearing, the court may issue a permanent restraining order for up to three years.
The statute does not require any showing that prospective harm is likely to occur. (In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363; In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) Rather, "evidence that the restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or battered the [protected person] is certainly sufficient." (In re B.S., supra, at p. 193, citing In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1512 [evidence of previous stalking] and In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210-213 [evidence of previous molestation].) Indeed, a court may issue a restraining order on the basis of past abuse on finding that the " 'failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the [protected person].' " (In re B.S., supra, at p. 194, second bracketed insertion added; see also Priscila N. v. Leonardo G. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1214 ["In 2012, . . . [§] 213.5 was amended so that the juvenile court could issue [domestic violence restraining orders] under the same standards provided for in the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act]"]; see Fam. Code, § 6340, subd. (a)(1) [In determining whether to issue a restraining order, "the court shall consider whether failure to make [an order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner and the children for whom the custody or visitation orders are sought"].)
We review the juvenile court's decision to grant or deny a restraining order for abuse of discretion. (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) " ' "To show abuse of discretion, the appellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice." ' " (Ibid.)
We apply the substantial evidence standard to assess the juvenile court's factual findings. (In re C.Q., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.) That is, " 'we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court's determination. If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court's issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Applying these standards here, we conclude the record contains substantial evidence supporting the issuance of the restraining order, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
The record demonstrates an ongoing pattern wherein Father isolated and verbally and emotionally abused Mother and the children for years. This pattern had, in 2019, led L.P. to harbor suicidal ideations and engage in self-mutilating behaviors, and caused all three daughters to be afraid in their own home. Mother repeatedly failed to protect the children from Father's abuse, minimizing Father's behavior and partially blaming the children for his outbursts as late as May 2020.
Once Mother and the children were removed from Father's home and protected by a temporary restraining order, the therapists reported that the children began to show psychological improvement. Not only that, Mother began to make significant progress toward independently supporting herself and the children, and more deeply understanding the issues that had plagued the family. The juvenile court recognized this was a relatively recent development in a family with a long history of abuse and enabling, and that Mother and the children's independence from Father was integral to breaking the cycle of abuse. Under these circumstances, we find that it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that a restraining order was necessary to prevent the family from returning to its old habits and further jeopardizing the children's safety.
Father admits that his verbally abusive behavior precipitated the Department's involvement, but argues no evidence shows that he posed a risk to the children's safety at the time of the hearing. He points to evidence that conflicts with the trial court's assessment of risk, including that, by September 2020, he was participating in voluntary services, and the children were no longer explicitly expressing fear of him. These arguments ignore the wealth of evidence showing that Father's unfettered proximity to the family had consistently resulted in Father emotionally and verbally abusing the children, even after Father had completed one round of voluntary services. In view of this evidence, we must accept the juvenile court's resolution of the conflicting evidence identified by Father. (Tedder v. Johnson (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 734, 737 ["It [is] the province of the trial court to resolve conflicting evidence and conflicting inferences which might be drawn therefrom, and its conclusion will not be disturbed on appeal if some substantial evidence or reasonable inference lends support thereto"].)
Father also argues that Mother did not seek the restraining order out of a genuine concern for the children's safety, but under pressure from the Department. However, he does not provide any legal authority supporting the proposition that Mother's intent is relevant to the issuance of the restraining order. (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546 [" '[A]n appellate brief "should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration." [Citation.] . . . This court is not inclined to act as counsel for . . . appellant and furnish a legal argument as to how the trial court's rulings . . . constituted an abuse of discretion.' [Citation.]"].)
B. Dispositional Order
The juvenile court has " 'broad discretion' " to fashion dispositional orders that " 'serve and protect the child[ren]'s interests,' " not just those interests that one parent considers important. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071.) "The order[s] may include 'a direction to participate in a counseling or education program,' " provided that the program is " 'designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by [s]ection 300.' " (Ibid., quoting § 362, subd. (d).)
Father contends he should not have been ordered to complete a domestic violence program, because there was "no evidence of any physical violence" between him and Mother or him and the children. This argument reveals a lack of understanding of the scope of the term "domestic violence."
Section 213.5 is construed to be consistent with the provisions under the Family Code for the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order. (Priscila N., supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1214.) Under the Family Code, " '[d]omestic violence' " is defined as "abuse perpetrated against" "[a] person with whom the respondent has had a child," or "[a] child of [either party]." (Fam. Code, § 6211, subds. (d)-(e).) "Abuse," in turn, "is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault." (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (b).) It includes conduct which "harass[es] . . . or disturb[s] the peace of the other party." (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a); see also Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(4).) This can include emotional or verbal abuse which "destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party," including behavior that "[i]solate[s] the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support," "[c]ontrol[s] . . . the other party's movements," and "[c]ompel[s] the other party by . . . intimidation . . . to engage in conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage." (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c); In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) Father's behavior in this case, including preventing Mother and the children from leaving the home or going to school if their house was not satisfactorily clean, and frequently engaging in angry tirades and name calling, satisfies this definition.
Given Father's consistent failure to acknowledge his perpetration of domestic violence, despite receiving voluntary services in the past, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering him to complete extended domestic violence programming in order to alleviate the risk of a recurrence of the abuse. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 ["One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge"].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's September 22, 2020, restraining order and dispositional order are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
CHANEY, J.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.