Opinion
B295444
01-21-2020
In re KAYLA B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.L., Defendant and Appellant.
Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP07622) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Martha Matthews, Judge. Dismissed. Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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B.L. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order declaring then seven-month-old Kayla B. a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j). Mother contends the juvenile court erred because it only found Mother had abused or neglected Kayla's siblings, not that the abuse or neglect placed Kayla at a substantial risk of harm. While Mother's appeal was pending, the juvenile court released Kayla to Mother and Curtis B. (Father), who were living together, and terminated jurisdiction. Because we cannot grant Mother effective relief, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Referral, Investigation, and Petition
On September 28, 2018 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral that Mother and Father were shoplifting at a drug store with then three-month-old Kayla, leading to Father's arrest. Mother explained to the social worker she and Father had purchased other items but accidentally failed to pay for baby items in her cart. Mother admitted she previously used heroin but asserted she had been sober for over a year. Mother was in a drug treatment (methadone) program and attended counseling. The drug treatment program confirmed Mother was doing well and her drug tests were all negative.
Mother had previous referrals starting in 2012 relating to her two older children, Layla and Angel, who had a different father. In 2017 the dependency court sustained a petition alleging neglect resulting from Mother's substance abuse, being under the influence while caring for her children, and suffering prior convictions of driving under the influence. The children's father was granted sole custody with monitored visitation for Mother, and jurisdiction was terminated.
The social worker was concerned that in 2017 Mother had relapsed in her drug treatment program, causing her to lose custody of her children in her prior dependency case. On November 29, 2018 the Department filed a petition, which alleged as amended that Kayla came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged Mother and Father endangered Kayla by committing a theft in her presence; Mother had a history of heroin and alcohol abuse, which had resulted in Kayla's siblings becoming dependents of the juvenile court; and Father had a history of heroin abuse. B. The Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearings
On January 22, 2019, after hearing argument of counsel, the juvenile court sustained the petition as to the allegations under section 300, subdivision (j), but dismissed the allegations under subdivision (b) and all allegations against Father. The court declared Kayla a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (j), and released her to the home of Mother and Father with family maintenance services. The court ordered Mother and Father to continue participating in their drug treatment programs and to submit to random drug testing. On January 30, 2019 Mother appealed from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. C. The Juvenile Court's Termination of Jurisdiction
On July 23, 2019 the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and found there was no need for a juvenile custody order because Mother and Father resided together.
We grant Mother's request to take judicial notice of the July 23, 2019 minute order. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Consideration of postjudgment evidence is appropriate when the later orders are relevant to a motion to dismiss an appeal or to determine whether the evidence renders the appeal moot. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676 ["appellate courts routinely consider limited postjudgment evidence" for motions to dismiss]; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58 [appellate court may consider postappeal rulings that affect its ability to grant effective relief].)
DISCUSSION
The Department contends Mother's appeal is moot because Mother retained custody of Kayla and the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. Mother argues her appeal is not moot because the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings could affect the outcome of a future dependency proceeding. She also contends a determination of the circumstances under which jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j), is appropriate is an issue of broad public interest we should address. We agree with the Department that Mother's appeal is moot.
We have a duty to decide actual controversies and not to give opinions upon moot questions. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541; In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.) A dependency appeal "'"becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief."'" (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 623; accord, In re David B., at p. 644 [appeal moot where minor was over 18 at time of appeal]; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61 (N.S.) [mother's appeal moot where juvenile court awarded her custody of minor and dismissed dependency proceedings].)
Termination of jurisdiction will not render an appeal moot where an erroneous jurisdictional finding results in an order that continues to affect the parent adversely. (See In re J.P., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 623 [father's appeal not moot where he lost legal and physical custody of his children with only monitored visitation]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547-1548 [father's appeal not rendered moot by termination of jurisdiction where juvenile court awarded sole physical and legal custody to mother and restricted father's visitation].)
The procedural posture here is similar to N.S., in which the court concluded the mother's appeal was moot because she was awarded custody of her child and "the jurisdictional findings [were] not the basis of any current order that [was] adverse to her." (N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) Kayla has remained in Mother's custody, and there is no exit order that adversely affects Mother. Mother raises a concern about the impact the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings would have in a future dependency case, but the court's findings are based on the facts that were the subject of Mother's prior sustained petition as to Kayla's siblings. Regardless of whether we reach the merits, "[t]hose facts would almost certainly be available in any future dependency proceedings . . . ." (Id. at p. 62.) Further, a determination of any future dependency case would need to be based on conditions that exist at the time. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494-1495 [rejecting father's contention court should consider appeal of jurisdictional finding based on a five-year-old act of domestic violence in light of impact finding would have on future dependency proceeding].)
We likewise conclude the facts presented here do not present "an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur." (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23; accord, People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1150.) The Supreme Court and multiple Courts of Appeal have addressed the scope of section 300, subdivision (j). (See, e.g., In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 778, 780 [affirming dependency court finding of substantial risk of abuse posed to male siblings where father sexually abused sister]; In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 330-331 [affirming finding of substantial risk of serious physical harm to minor where mother routinely disciplined brother with a belt]; In re Francisco D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 73, 81-82 [affirming finding of substantial risk of harm to minor where mother physically and verbally abused sibling].)
Because Mother has not shown any prejudice from the jurisdictional findings or dispositional order for which we can grant effective relief, we dismiss her appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
FEUER, J. WE CONCUR:
ZELON, Acting P. J.
SEGAL, J.