Opinion
B302243
02-22-2021
In re B.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.B., Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP01166C) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Dismissed. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
B.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order finding jurisdiction over B.J. (child) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). Because the court terminated jurisdiction over the child during the pendency of the appeal, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
II. BACKGROUND
Because we dismiss mother's appeal on a ground not dependent on the underlying facts, we provide a limited background for context.
A. Prior Dependency History
On August 21, 2015, the juvenile court sustained an allegation pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that mother failed to provide the child's half sibling Dar.T., who has cerebral palsy, with proper food, resulting in Dar.T.'s repeated hospitalizations.
On February 9, 2017, the juvenile court sustained allegations that mother endangered the child's other half-sibling Dav.T.'s physical health and safety because, among other things, mother's mental and emotional problems and her failure to take prescribed medication placed the child at risk. B. Dependency Petition
On June 14, 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Child and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) alleging the child was subject to jurisdiction because, among other things:
"b-2 [and j-2]
"[M]other . . . has a history of mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of Mood Disorder NOS, Depression and Oppositional Defiant Disorder which render [ ] mother unable to provide regular care of the child. The child's siblings [Dar.T.] and [Dav.T.] are current dependents of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt due to [ ] mother's mental and emotional problems. Such mental and emotional problems on the part of [ ] mother endanger the child's physical health and safety, and place the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger."
On June 17, 2019, the juvenile court found that the Department had made a prima facie case that the child was described by section 300 and ordered the child be released to the parents. C. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
On November 12, 2019, the juvenile court held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing for the child. Following argument, the juvenile court sustained counts b-2 and j-2 and dismissed the remaining counts. The court ordered the child released to mother and granted mother family maintenance services. The court ordered a case plan of drug testing, parenting education program, and individual counseling. Mother filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 2019. D. Judicial Review Hearing
The court also held a judicial review hearing regarding the half-siblings and concluded that continued jurisdiction over them was necessary.
On September 14, 2020, the juvenile court found, and the parties stipulated, that mother was in compliance with her case plan. The court found that the conditions justifying jurisdiction over the child were no longer present and terminated jurisdiction over the child. On that same date, the court also terminated jurisdiction over the child's half-siblings.
On May 29, 2020, we took judicial notice of the superior court files for the half-siblings. We also take judicial notice of the subsequent September 14, 2020, minute orders.
III. DISCUSSION
The Department moves to dismiss this appeal, asserting it is moot because jurisdiction over the child has been terminated. "As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.'" (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) "[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error." (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.)
A court ordinarily will dismiss an appeal when it cannot grant effective relief, but may "exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue when there remain 'material questions for the court's determination' [citation], where a 'pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur' [citation], or where 'there is a likelihood of recurrence of the controversy between the same parties or others.'" (In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) The party seeking such discretionary review, however, must demonstrate the specific legal or practical negative consequences that will result from the jurisdictional findings they seek to reverse. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493.)
Mother argues the appeal is not moot because the jurisdictional findings here could potentially impact the pending or future dependency proceedings with the child's half-siblings. We disagree. As we note above, the dependency proceedings over the child's half-siblings have terminated. Any other potential adverse effect to mother is speculative at best.
This court cannot provide mother relief more favorable than the relief she has received. We decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of mother's appeal. The motion to dismiss is granted.
IV. DISPOSITION
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KIM, J. We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.