Opinion
B296464
03-11-2020
In re JOSHUA B. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMBER P., Defendant and Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06794) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Amber P. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings that her children were persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). She contends the findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. Because the juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction with an order granting Mother custody of the children, we dismiss the appeal as moot. Since we dispose of the appeal on procedural grounds, we do not review the court's ruling for substantial evidence.
Unless indicated otherwise, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
Mother has a history of violent relationships. She most recently came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) following a violent altercation with her live-in boyfriend. During the ensuing DCFS investigation, Mother reported that she consumed marijuana daily. Mother also tested positive for marijuana.
On October 22, 2018, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), alleging there was a substantial risk that the children would suffer serious physical harm inflicted non-accidentally by Mother, and she had failed adequately to protect the children from domestic violence. The petition alleged Mother was incapable of providing regular care and supervision for the children due to her substance abuse and her mental and emotional condition.
On March 14, 2019, the court sustained the petition and continued the children's placement with Mother subject to several conditions.
Mother timely appealed.
While Mother's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and awarded Mother custody of the children. We requested supplemental briefing on whether the juvenile court's termination order rendered the appeal moot. Only Mother submitted a brief.
We take judicial notice of the juvenile court's orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); In re A.S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1339.)
DISCUSSION
Courts "ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question . . . ." (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328.) Thus, we may dismiss an appeal if it fails to present a justiciable claim, that is, a present, concrete, and genuine dispute as to which the court can grant effective relief. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)
"As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. [Citation.] However, dismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, but 'must be decided on a case-by-case basis.' [Citations.]" (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) We have discretion to consider the adequacy of a juvenile court's jurisdictional finding despite mootness, for example, when the challenged finding "(1) serves as the basis for [the juvenile court's] dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) 'could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.' " (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.) We also have discretion "to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet evading review." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.)
The party seeking discretionary merits review must identify specific legal or practical negative consequences arising from a dependency court's jurisdictional findings that might justify such a review. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.)
In her opening brief, Mother argued that no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings. Nonetheless, the court's subsequent orders terminating dependency jurisdiction over the children and returning them to Mother's custody renders her appeal moot. We find no basis for reaching the merits of Mother's appeal.
Mother contends the jurisdictional findings might impact unspecified future dependency proceedings, but points to nothing in the record suggesting she is currently or may in the future be involved in any other dependency proceeding regarding the children. Her speculation that the jurisdictional findings would be especially prejudicial given her history with DCFS, is insufficient to justify discretionary merits review. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1494-1495.)
Mother contends she will likely be required to reimburse the government for the legal and other costs of the dependency proceedings pursuant to sections 332, 903.1, and 903.2. But Mother does not claim that her ability to pay legal fees and supervision costs was evaluated in the manner required by section 903.45, much less that the juvenile court consequently ordered her to pay any amount in reimbursement. Speculation that Mother might become liable at some unspecified point in the future does not justify merits review.
Mother contends her appeal presents an important question of public interest. She does not so much seek clarification of an unsettled legal standard that will likely apply to similar litigants in the future, but rather confirmation that extent of daily marijuana use in her particular case was insufficient to support dependency jurisdiction.
Mother contends she could be reported to the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI), subjecting her to "the stigma of being labeled a child abuser." There is no indication Mother was ever reported to the CACI or that she might be at some point in the future. (Cf. In re C.F. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 454, 462 [reporting agency must notify a known or suspected child abuser when he or she has been reported to the CACI].) To the contrary, the record contains a CACI Inquiry Results Summary showing "no match" for Mother.
Since Mother has identified no specific legal or practical adverse impact the challenged jurisdictional findings might have on any future proceeding, we find the appeal to be moot, and dismiss it without reaching the merits.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.