Opinion
101646/2002.
Decided April 19, 2011.
Simon Lesser, P.C. by Leonard F. Lesser, Esq. for petitioners.
Frankfurt, Kurnit, Klein Selz, P.C. by Ronald C. Minkoff, Esq., and Wendy Stryker, Esq. for respondent.
The parties are partners in a profitable joint venture formed a half century ago to acquire, explore, and develop natural gas and oil wells located in Wyoming. Petitioners, L R Exploration Venture (L R) and its limited partners, have filed a motion, by Order to Show Cause, for an order, pursuant to Judiciary Law 753 (A) (3), seeking: (1) to hold respondent, Jack J. Grynberg (Grynberg) and his wife, Celeste Grynberg (Celeste) in contempt for having violated the terms of a permanent injunction issued by this court on April 1, 2005 Order and (2) to fine respondent for L R's legal costs incurred in a Wyoming proceeding and in making the contempt motion. Petitioners contend that the Wyoming action was prohibited by the court's injunctive order. Grynberg opposes the motion on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over his wife.
For the reasons that follow, the motion for contempt is granted in its entirety.
Background
Grynberg is a petorphysicist with experience in the area of natural gas exploration and development. He is President and, along with his wife, is co-owner of Grynberg Petroleum Company (GPC). He also is a resident and citizen of the State of Colorado, whose address is c/o Grynberg Petroleum Company, 5299 DTC Boulevard, Suite 500, Greenwood Village, Colorado 80111. Grynberg and Celeste C. Grynberg (Celeste), his wife, are partners in a joint venture known as L R Exploration Venture that was begun on January 1, 1960. Grynberg and his wife have been married for over fifty (50) years. Originally, Grynberg owned 41.5 % of the interest of L R joint venture in the Nitchie Gulch wells. In 1994, Grynberg assigned 99% of his interest to Celeste.
Petitioners are individual investors, members of the Loeb family and several of their friends and business associates who invested in the L R Exploration Venture. The purpose of the joint venture was to locate, acquire, drill and develop natural gas wells in the Nitchie Gulch area in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. Participants in the joint venture collectively contributed the aggregate sum of $250,000 to the capital of the joint venture. Pursuant to the parties' Joint Venture Agreement, Grynberg was to manage the operations of the joint venture, make periodic accountings to it, and keep accurate and complete records. The joint venture has proven highly successful. Grynberg was able to locate and drill twenty-eight (28) natural gas wells, almost all of which are still producing four decades later.
A. New York Action
There were approximately forty (40) years of peace and calm in the relationship between the parties ( see Transcript [Tr.], dated November 3, 2010, at 19). The relationship allegedly changed dramatically between 2000 and 2001 when a new designee was assigned to oversee the Loeb family's interest in the joint venture ( Id.).
This action was commenced in 2002 when petitioners brought a motion to stay a Colorado lawsuit commenced by Grynberg, Celeste, and GPC, and to compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503 (a). Prior to both lawsuits, petitioners had alleged that Grynberg collected and retained funds in his own account that belonged to L R. In response to these allegations and requests for remittance of monies owed to the joint venture, Grynberg sought a declaratory judgment in Colorado that he had fully accounted to the joint venture. He also raised breach of contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims and sought compensation allegedly withheld by the joint venture for his services. Initially, petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing that the Colorado court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The New York court granted the motion in part, dismissing Celeste from the action on May 29, 2002. As a result, Celeste had no further involvement in this action or the subsequent arbitration. The New York court also ordered the remainder of L R's petition held in abeyance pending a hearing before a Special Master on "the issue of whether [Grynberg] had sufficient contacts with New York to give it a basis to exercise jurisdiction over his person." On July 12, 2004, the Special Master issued a Report and Recommendation determining that the New York court could exercise jurisdiction over Grynberg.
On April 1, 2005, this court granted the petition and ordered Grynberg to "arbitrate all disputes with petitioners arising from the parties' January 1, 1960 joint venture agreement (the April 1, 2005 Order)." The court also enjoined Grynberg "and anyone else acting on his behalf from initiating or prosecuting any court proceeding relating to such disputes ( id.)." Grynberg's appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, was denied, with costs to petitioners ( see 22 AD3d 221 [1st Dept 2005]). The New York Court of Appeals denied his motion for leave to appeal ( see 6 NY3d 749). Thereafter, the parties proceeded to arbitration.
At the request of Grynberg's counsel, a panel of three arbitrators bifurcated the proceeding. The dispute that was the subject of the arbitration involved Grynberg's accounting to petitioners with respect to (1) the proceeds of litigation brought by Grynberg against Questar Corporation, a gas pipeline company, and (2) the interpretation of aspects of the joint venture agreement, including whether the joint venture agreement ended in January 1964 and, therefore, whether the agreement's arbitration clause fell with the agreement's end.In September 2007, the arbitrators conducted an evidentiary hearing on Grynberg's argument that the broad arbitration clause in the parties' joint venture agreement was terminated and was not applicable to the claims he originally filed in the Colorado lawsuit, and repeated as counterclaims in the arbitration proceeding. On November 15, 2007, the arbitrators issued a decision which rejected Grynberg's challenge.
The arbitrators then conducted seven days of evidentiary hearings on the parties' substantive claims and counterclaims, ending on March 24, 2008. On November 5, 2008, the arbitration panel issued a unanimous 10-page Award. The panel awarded petitioners $3,067,783, plus interest, against Grynberg for his "violation of his fiduciary and accounting responsibilities" (exhibit 3, Award, at 9). The panel also rejected Grynberg's counterclaims which sought $13.7 million in compensation that he alleged his partners owed him for non-reimbursed business expenses dating back to 1960. Nonetheless, the panel awarded Grynberg $40,000 to reimburse him for what he paid to Robert Pelo, his controller, for accounting services performed on behalf of L R.
On November 25, 2008, petitioners filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award. Grynberg cross-moved to partially vacate the award. By Decision and Order, dated March 6, 2009, this court granted the motion and denied the cross-motion, Grynberg made a partial payment on the award related to the undistributed income in the joint venture's operating account, and released $1,847,319.40 to L R. By Stipulation, dated March 18, 2009, counsel for the parties agreed to use December 11, 2008 as the date that the partial payment was to be made, thereby tolling interest on that item of the award. The Stipulation also fixed the amount of pre-judgment interest to be applied to the unpaid portions of the award. Thereafter, the final judgment was entered against Grynberg.
B. Colorado Judgment Execution
Because Grynberg has not paid the final judgment, petitioners sought to domesticate the judgment in Grynberg's home state of Colorado. By Order, dated August 24, 2009, the Colorado District Court for Arapahoe County rejected Grynberg's objection to the judgment in Colorado, and granted petitioners' application to file the New York judgment in Colorado under the Uniform Judgment Act. The order was appealed by Grynberg to the Colorado Supreme Court, which was denied, en banc, on September 1, 2009. Following entry of the judgment in Colorado, petitioners served a writ of garnishment upon Grynberg. Petitioners also filed a subpoena to take Grynberg's deposition on January 14, 2010 in judgment execution proceedings. The day before the deposition, Grynberg filed a motion for a protective order, challenging the manner in which service was made upon him. On January 14, 2010, a hearing on the motion for a protective order was held. Following testimony and argument, the District Court denied the motion and ordered Grynberg to appear for deposition on the afternoon of January 14, 2010.
C. Wyoming Action
Celeste, doing business as GPC, commenced an action in the Wyoming District Court of Sweetwater County on January 13, 2010. The first three causes of action in the Wyoming action are the same as those in the Colorado action Grynberg had pursued unsuccessfully (declaratory judgment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment). The Wyoming action also contains a cause of action for conversion. More than a dozen new defendants, including L R's counsel, were added to this matter. Gyrnberg was not a plaintiff in the action. Instead, he was portrayed as Celeste's agent, acting on her behalf. The Wyoming complaint alleges, in part, that: Plaintiff, Celeste C. Grynberg, by and through its agent and employee
Jack Grynberg, has rendered to [petitioners] in a timely manner an accounting of all the fund received from settlements and/or judgments and remitted their share of said funds.
* * *
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that Jack Grynberg has completely and fully accounted and paid [petitioners] their share of the revenues obtained from the proceeds of the litigation.
(Wyoming Complaint, exhibit 6 ¶¶ 26, 27 [emphasis added]).
Initially, defendants in that action filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. In May 2010, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In that motion, defendants asserted that the doctrine of res judicata precluded plaintiff's case, arguing that the allegations in this case follow the same facts, claims and parties in privity that were previously resolved by a Colorado court and a New York arbitration panel. In a decision, dated August 13, 2010, the Wyoming court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, finding Celeste was in privity with Grynberg, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
D. The Present Action
One month after the Wyoming decision was issued, on September 10, 2010, L R initiated this contempt proceeding in New York. Petitioners seek to have the court hold Grynberg in contempt pursuant to section 753 (A) (3) of the Judiciary Law. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 2010.
Grynberg contends that the contempt motion is a thinly-disguised motion for sanctions based on actions in the Wyoming action where he was not even a party. He further argues there is no contempt for three reasons: (1) L R waived any claim of contempt by litigating for months on end on the merits in Wyoming without seeking to compel arbitration; (2) L R suffered no harm from the alleged contempt since it would have had to incur the same legal fees whether the claims were litigated in court or in arbitration; and (3) the April 1, 2005 Order did not clearly and unambiguously require arbitration of claims brought by Celeste or GPC. In fact, respondent argues that not only had this court ruled two years before the order was entered that it had no personal jurisdiction over Celeste and GPC, but Celeste is the true owner of GPC, and Jack Grynberg acted on her behalf.
Petitioners contend that Grynberg violated the court's April 1, 2005 Order by filing the Wyoming complaint which asserted the same exact claims for relief that the New York arbitration panel rejected. Additionally, petitioners insist that Grynberg cannot avoid sanction by using his wife's name to disobey the court's prior order. Petitioners point out that the court's injunction expressly prohibited Grynberg "and all others acting on his behalf from initiating or prosecuting any court proceeding" regarding the parties' joint venture dispute. As well, petitioners argue that they have been prejudiced as their "right of remedy" under the arbitration award has been impaired. Lastly, petitioners argue that they have lost money in legal fees and costs attributable to defending the action in Wyoming and proving the contempt in this action.
Discussion
A. Jurisdictional Issues and the Court's Contempt Powers
Before turning to the merits of the motion for a contempt order, the court will first address whether it has jurisdiction over the matter and also will examine the court's contempt powers.
The motion was brought as a special proceeding under this index number pursuant to CPLR 7502 (a) which provides that "A special proceeding shall be used to bring before a court the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion in a pending action." CPLR 7502 (a) (iii) further provides: "Notwithstanding the entry of judgment, all subsequent applications shall be made by motion in the special proceeding or action in which the first application was made." Accordingly, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to determine the contempt motion.
The court has authority to punish a litigant that disobeys a lawful mandate. (Judiciary Law § 753[A][3]; see also CPLR 5104 [enforcing a judgment or order by contempt]). The purpose of civil contempt is to coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate a party who is injured as a result of disobedience of a court order ( see State of New York v Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345; Department of Housing Preservation and Development v. Deka Realty, 208 AD2d 37 [2d Dept 1995]). Actual costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, are a legitimate category of recovery for a contempt citation ( see Dorio v Peekskill Common Counsel, 13 AD3d 523 [2d Dept 2004]; Alpert v Alpert, 261 AD2d 247 [1st Dept 1999]).
Section 753 (A)(3) of the Judiciary Law, provides, in relevant part:
A court of record has power to punish, by fine and imprisonment, or either, a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced, in any of the following cases: . . . 3. A party to the action or special proceeding . . . for any other disobedience to a lawful mandate of the court."
Nonetheless, contempt is a drastic remedy, which should not issue absent a clear right to such relief ( Coronet Capital Co. v Spodek, 202 AD2d 20 [1st Dept 1994]; Usina Costa Pinto, S.A. v Sanco Sav. Co. Ltd., 174 AD2d 487 [1st Dept 1991]). To establish civil contempt based on an alleged violation of a court order, the movant must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawful order of the court expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect, and that the order was disobeyed to a reasonable certainty ( see In re Department of Envtl. Protection of City of NY v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of NY, 70 NY2d 233; McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, amended 60 NY2d 652; Vujovic v Vujovic , 16 AD3d 490 [2d Dept 2005]). The party to be held in contempt must be shown to have had knowledge of the order, and the disobedience must have prejudiced the rights of another party ( see McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216; In re McCormack v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574; Garcia v Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co., 231 AD2d 401 [1st Dept 1996]). A party can be found to be in civil contempt even if the disobedience is not willful or deliberate ( see Yalkowsky v Yalkowsky, 93 AD2d 834, 835 [2nd Dept 1983]["intent or willfulness is not required to hold a party in contempt for disobeying a court order or subpoena"]). The burden of proof is on the party seeking a civil contempt order ( see McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 227).
The court now turns to petitioners' application.
B. Should the Court Issue a Contempt Order?
1. Was the April 1, 2005 Order Clear and Lawful?
The April 1, 2005 Order could not be clearer or more definite. The court directed Grynberg to arbitrate all disputes related to the 1960 Venture Agreement, including whether there was a binding arbitration clause between the parties. The court also enjoined Grynberg "and anyone else acting on his behalf from initiating or prosecuting any court proceeding relating to such disputes." Thus, the court specified precisely what action or actions were being enjoined and specifically prohibited the performance of certain acts, namely, initiating any lawsuit related to the parties' Joint Venture Agreement. At no point did Grynberg seek clarification of the April 1, 2005 Order or make any application to stay the injunction or otherwise affect the obligations imposed upon him and those in privity with him.
2. Was There Knowledge of the April 1, 2005 Order?
Grynberg was aware of the court's order granting injunctive relief. Copies of the April 1, 2005 Order were provided to the parties' attorneys. That order is still in effect. In his response to the motion for contempt, Grynberg contends that the April 1 Order which was issued to enjoin his conduct, violates his wife's rights because the court had no jurisdiction over her, a non-party. This position is untenable ( see People ex rel Stearns v Marr, 181 NY 863). The court further finds that Celeste had sufficient knowledge, actual or imputed, of the April 1 Order.
Grynberg may not nullify an order by carrying out forbidden acts through his wife. "The violation or disobedience of an injunction issued by a court having the requisite jurisdiction is punishable as a contempt of court . . . In addition to the parties themselves, other persons who have notice or knowledge of it may be proceeded against in contempt for violating it." (17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 11). Thus, non-parties to the litigation may be found in contempt for violation of a court order, when certain requirements are met ( see id. at § 27; see also 67A NY Jur 2d, Injunctions § 218).
A party who assists another in violation of judicial mandate can be equally as guilty of contempt as the primary contemptor ( see McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, amended 60 NY2d 652 [court's clear mandate was violated by Department of Health personnel when they facilitated the discharge and transfer of petitioners from one nursing home to other nursing homes]). The requirements are that the non-party have knowledge or notice of the court order and either acted in concert or privity with the party to whom the court's order was directed ( see e.g. State University of New York v Denton, 35 AD2d 176 [4th Dept 1970]) and that the non-party acted affirmatively to cause or facilitate a violation of that order ( see e.g. In re Stebbins, 293 BR 113 [Bank Ct, WD NY 2003]).
Our courts also have upheld contempt orders in situations where the contemptor uses his "alter ego" or agent as his vehicle to evade the court's order ( see Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v Kenston Warehousing Corp., 166 AD2d 386 [1st Dept 1990]; General Electric Company v Babitz, 33 Misc 2d 782 [Sup Ct, NY County 1956]). In Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Storm LLC ( 587 F Supp 2d 594 [SD NY 2008], affirmed 351 Fed Appx 467 [2d Cir 2009]), a Norwegian telecommunications company and corporate shareholder (Storm LLC), another corporate shareholder and a Ukranian corporation, had a dispute over the validity of a shareholders' agreement related to the corporate governance and management of a Ukrainian mobile telecommunications company. That dispute was settled by an arbitration award granting relief to Telenor. Telenor sought to confirm the arbitration award mandating cooperation in the management of the Ukranian telecommunications company and divestiture of shares. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order confirming the arbitration award that directed respondent Storm LLC, Altimo Holdings Investments Limited (Storm's corporate parents), Alpren Limited and Hardlake Limited, Storm's affiliates (collectively, the "Altimo Entities"), to comply with certain corporate governance provisions contained in the shareholder agreement and to divest their holdings in competing businesses. A few months later, Telenor moved for contempt sanctions against Storm LLC and the Altimo Entities for failing to comply with the court's order confirming the award. Defendants conceded that they had not complied with the court's order but claimed that their non-compliance was excused by two Ukranian court orders that allegedly prohibited them from complying.
The court found that Storm LLC and the Altimo Entities acted as alter egos of one another in a number of ways and thus were subject to civil contempt based on the corporate shareholder's failure to comply with the governance provisions. The court observed that Altimo exercised complete control over Alpren, Hardlake and Storm LLC, and that Alpren and Hardlake were shell companies. The court further found that Storm LLC and its affiliates existed entirely for the purpose of holding shares for their parents, with no independent operations. Storm LLC exercised no meaningful discretion in its operations, but was instead wholly owned, dominated, and controlled by its corporate parents, and there was intermingling of financial obligations and funds, with shareholder's assets used to secure loans to its corporate parents. As well, the court found that the shareholder had its legal bills paid by its parent, respondents made repeated attempts at conducting collusive litigation, and their efforts prevented Telenor from taking part in corporate decision-making or from collecting dividends. The court granted Telenor's motion to hold respondents in contempt of the court's earlier orders. Specifically, the court ruled that respondents were in contempt of the court's orders with respect to the corporate governance provisions, because they had willfully failed to comply with those orders. Finally, because Storm's and the Altimo Entities' non-compliance with the court's order has been willful, the court directed that "Telenor shall recover the attorneys' fees and disbursements it has incurred in this contempt proceeding" ( Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Storm LLC, 587 F Supp 2d at 621).
Based on these guiding principles, the court finds that the April 1, 2005 Order that was issued against Grynberg is broad enough to encompass his wife. The language of the April 1, 2005 Order explicitly states "[that] anyone else acting on [Grynberg's behalf] [was prohibited] from initiating or prosecuting any court proceeding relating to such disputes." The relationship between Grynberg and Celeste strongly suggests that she was in privity with Grynberg and was aware of the court's order. The record before the court reflects that Celeste is Grynberg's wife, that she was initially named as a co-defendant in the New York action to compel arbitration, and that she is a joint interest holder in the L R joint venture. Celeste holds herself out as the controlling interest holder of GPC. Her actions relating to GPC are indistinguishable from those of her husband. In this regard, the court notes that the 2010 Wyoming complaint was brought in the name of "Celeste C. Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum Company." In that action, Celeste alleged that she acted "by and through" her agent, Grynberg. While Celeste alleges that she has a 99% interest in GPC, Grynberg and his agents have repeatedly admitted in affidavits, pleadings and deposition testimony in this special proceeding and in his sworn testimony to the arbitration panel that GPC is, in fact, his own d/b/a which he owns and controls. He has also admitted to other courts in New York and Colorado that GPC is his d//b/a and alias. In addition to these sworn admissions, Grynberg has filed "sole proprietorship" tax returns confirming to the United States Internal Revenue Services (IRS) that GPC is his d/b/a. In the course of discovery in the arbitration proceedings, Grynberg produced copies of his filed tax returns for the years 2000 through 2005. Each of these tax returns included a Schedule C form listing GPC as Grynberg's d/b/a. Significantly, Grynberg also wields great influence over GPC's strategic decisions. Thus, the court concludes GPC and Grynberg are one and the same and GPC has no legal existence apart from Grynberg himself.
For example, during Grynberg's sworn Traverse Hearing testimony before a Special Referee on May 25, 2004 in this special proceeding, Grynberg admitted that GPC was a d/b/a for himself and his wife (Pet. Order to Show Cause, Lesser affidavit, exhibit 22, Traverse Hearing Tr., May 25, 2004, at 71. In his affidavit, sworn to on October 28, 2004, Grynberg stated "I am the President and co-owner of Grynberg Petroleum Company, a respondent in this action" (Pet. Order to Show Cause, Lesser affidavit, exhibit 25, at 1). Similarly, Robert Pelo, Grynberg's accountant and comptroller, during his sworn testimony before the arbitration panel on December 12, 2007 admitted that GPC is a "d/b/a of Jack Grynberg operating as Grynberg Petroleum Company" ( Id., exhibit 24, Arbitration Hearing Tr., at 43-44).
In his February 25, 2008 Complaint in the matter captioned Grynberg v Fridman, 06 Civ 11512 (SD NY 2006), Grynberg made it clear that he was bringing the action "individually and as Jack J. Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum Company" ( Id., exhibit 29, Third Amended Complaint, at 1). As well, in his July 20, 2007 Complaint in Jack J. Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum Company v Grey Wolf, Inc., before the Colorado 17th Judicial District Court of Adams County, he asserted that he was the "President and Co-owner of Grynberg Petroleum Company" ( Id., exhibit 30, Verified Class Action Complaint, at 1).
The permanent restraining order issued by the court was designed to foreclose further litigation between the parties over the joint venture agreement, and the actions of Celeste were violative of that order. Her decision to step into Grynberg's shoes and commence an action in Wyoming was an affirmative act of resistance to the court's restraining order.
3. Was There a Violation of the April 1, 2005 Order?
The April 1, 2005 Order was unequivocal as to the requirements imposed on Grynberg and those in privity with him. Specifically, the April 1, 2005 Order commanded Grynberg to do two things: (1) to proceed to arbitration, and (2) to permanently refrain from further litigation with petitioners relating to the subject matter of the arbitration. Nonetheless, as evidenced by the 2010 Wyoming pleadings, Grynberg, with the assistance of his wife, ignored the court's injunction. In the Wyoming action, Grynberg is identified as his wife's agent. The Wyoming complaint, however, asserts claims on behalf of Grynberg against petitioners and is in violation of the court's April 1, 2005 Order. As well, the allegations and arguments in the Wyoming action mirror those in the enjoined Colorado action. Both complaints sought a declaration that Grynberg fully complied with his accounting obligations to petitioners. These circumstances give rise to an inference that Grynberg and his wife are colluding in the Wyoming action. Accordingly, the court finds that Grynberg violated the court's April 1 order.
4. Have Petitioners' Rights Been Impaired or Prejudiced?
In cases of civil contempt the objective is enforcement of the rights of private parties to litigation. Here, Grynberg and his wife's actions continue to impair and prejudice petitioners' rights. The history of this proceeding reveals that Grynberg is engaged in a consistent pattern of delaying tactics that has impeded petitioners' efforts to proceed to arbitration and to secure the fruits of the arbitration award. These tactics prejudiced petitioners by causing it additional expenses for the action to compel arbitration, appeals and litigation in New York, Colorado and Wyoming.
As well, petitioners have accrued additional legal expenses in connection with enforcement of the terms of an order that Grynberg has chosen to disregard. Under these circumstances, the court finds that petitioners have met their burden of proof.
Remedy
The sanction imposed upon the contemnor is designed not to punish, but to compensate petitioners for loss of or interference with the benefits of the court's earlier order ( see MaCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, supra). Where as here, petitioners have demonstrated that their rights have been prejudiced, but fail to demonstrate any actual loss, the fine available is $250, plus attorneys' fees in seeking the contempt order and for their work before the Wyoming court ( see Judiciary Law § 773; State of New York v Unique Ideas, Inc., 44 NY2d 345; Hoskin v 22 Prince Street Assocs., 178 AD2d 347 [1st Dept 1991]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that petitioners' motion for an order of contempt is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the refusal of respondent to abide by the court's order dated April 1, 2005 was calculated to, and did impede, impair and prejudice the remedies of petitioners, and constituted a civil contempt of this court; and it is further
ORDERED that a fine of $250 is imposed upon respondent within ten (10) days of service of a copy of this order; and it is further
ORDERED that the matter of expenses and attorneys' fees is referred to a Special Referee to hear and report on the amount of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioners' counsel is directed to submit detailed affidavits regarding the amount of their costs and attorneys' fees in seeking the contempt order and in appearing before the Wyoming court to the Special Referee; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioner's counsel shall, within 30 days from the date of this order, serve a copy of this order with notice of entry, together with a completed Information Sheet, upon the Special Referee Clerk in the Motion Support Office, Room 119, at the courthouse located at 60 Centre Street, who is directed to place this matter on the calendar of the Special Referee's Part (Part 50 R) for the earliest convenient date.
Copies are available in Room 119M at 60 Centre Street and on the Court's website at www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh under the "References" section of the "Courthouse Procedures" link.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.