Opinion
B312643
04-13-2022
In re V.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. VINCENT R., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 18CCJP06328A, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
LAVIN, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Vincent R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his and Monique G.'s (mother) parental rights to their son, V.R., who was removed from their custody only a couple of months after he was born. Father argues the court erred in terminating his parental rights because he had regular visitation with V.R., and the court considered inappropriate factors when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
When V.R. was born in August 2018, he tested positive for marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine, and mother tested positive for marijuana. Mother also tested positive for amphetamines, and admitted she had used amphetamines several times, throughout her pregnancy with V.R.
Shortly after being discharged from the hospital, mother avoided contact with the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) for several months. The Department obtained an arrest warrant for mother and a protective custody warrant for V.R.
In early October 2018, before locating mother and V.R., the Department filed a dependency petition, which, as later amended and sustained, alleged: (1) mother's history of substance abuse and use of drugs while pregnant with V.R. placed the child at serious risk of physical harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b); b-2 allegation); and (2) father's history of substance abuse and current use of methamphetamine placed V.R. at serious risk of physical harm (§ 300, subd. (b); b-3 allegation). At the detention hearing, the court found the petition alleged a prima facie case under section 300, subdivision (b), ordered V.R. detained from his parents' custody, and allowed the parents to have monitored visits with the child. The court later found father was V.R.'s presumed parent.
The Department filed amended petitions in November 2018 and February 2019.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The Department contacted father in mid-October 2018. He hadn't spoken to mother in a while because he had to "distance" himself from her. He wanted custody of V.R., but he didn't have permanent housing.
In late October 2018, mother gave V.R. to father, who then took the child to a paternal cousin's home. The Department allowed V.R. to remain placed with the paternal cousin.
The court held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February 2019. As of the date of the hearing, the parents' visits with V.R. were sporadic. During the previous month, father missed 10 visits with the child.
The court sustained the amended petition's b-2 and b-3 allegations, declared V.R. a dependent of the court, removed him from mother's and father's custody, and ordered the Department to provide the parents reunification services. The court allowed mother and father to continue having monitored visits with V.R. up to three times a week.
In early August 2019, the paternal cousin obtained a restraining order against father after he threatened to harm her if she took V.R. away from him. The cousin "removed" the restraining order in late August 2019. By that time, V.R. had developed a very strong bond with the cousin. He was comfortable in her home, watched her wherever she went, and looked to her for direction and affection.
Father and mother weren't complying with their case plans, and their visits with V.R. remained sporadic. Between early February and mid-June 2019, father visited V.R. only 12 times, missing 28 visits. When father did visit V.R., however, he was attentive to the child's needs and usually brought the child toys and clothing. V.R. often cried during visits with father. According to the paternal cousin, V.R. wasn't yet comfortable around father because father wasn't visiting on a consistent basis.
A social worker observed one of father's visits in September 2019. Father engaged with V.R., playing "peek-a-boo" with the child on the floor and making sure he didn't injure himself. Father ended the visit early when V.R. became "cranky and tired."
At the six-month review hearing, the court found mother and father had not made substantial progress in their case plans and terminated their reunification services. The court scheduled a selection and implementation hearing.
In January 2020, the Department reported that father was visiting V.R. only a few times a month. During his visits, father was attentive to V.R.'s needs and able to redirect the child when necessary. While V.R. had developed a bond with father, the child's "primary and strongest" attachment was to the paternal cousin and her husband. The paternal cousin and her husband wanted to adopt V.R., and they intended to allow father to continue visiting V.R. even if father's parental rights were terminated.
By the end of February 2020, father was making a more concerted effort to visit V.R., even though he cancelled or missed nine visits the previous month. Father was very protective of the child, making sure he didn't bump his head or injure himself while they played together, and father was getting better at redirecting V.R. when the child became upset. V.R. continued to show a bond with father, but his strongest attachment remained with the paternal cousin, her husband, and the paternal cousin's eldest child. The paternal cousin and her husband continued to meet all of V.R.'s medical, development, physical, and emotional needs, and they were still committed to adopting the child.
In March 2020, father's visits were suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Father had remote visits with V.R. for the next several months until his in-person visits resumed in July 2020.
In August 2020, father completed an outpatient drug treatment program. Although he later entered an aftercare program, he was discharged for missing too many sessions.
In September 2020, V.R. had "tantrums" during a visit with father. According to the paternal cousin, father became upset and left the visit early without saying goodbye to his son. Father told the paternal cousin that V.R.'s developmental issues were" 'the mom[']s fault'" and that father couldn't" 'take this[, ] it's too much[;] [he] can't see [V.R.] like this.'" When father later spoke to the social worker, he complained that V.R. is "not normal." The social worker explained to father that V.R. has special needs, to which father needed to adapt.
Mother and father started visiting V.R. together in October 2020. The visits went" 'okay, '" but the paternal cousin reported that the parents didn't know how to handle V.R.'s "fits/tantrums" and would typically make the cousin care for V.R. when he became upset. According to the paternal cousin, V.R. usually went straight to her for comfort during visits.
During one visit in October 2020, father became angry because the paternal cousin allowed V.R. to wear sandals and brought other people with her to the visit. Father left the visit early and sat in his car in the parking lot. Before taking V.R. home, the paternal cousin brought the child to father's car. Father allowed V.R. to play in the driver's seat before saying goodbye to the child.
During another visit in October, father interacted well with V.R., but he threatened to sue the Department "for what they did to him." A couple of days later, father left a visit early because "he couldn't take it." Father was angry that V.R. had a bruise on his head and would frequently bump his head against objects when he became upset.
As of November 2020, V.R. was still "very attached" to his prospective adoptive family. V.R. looked to the paternal cousin for "support and love," and he often played with the paternal cousin's daughter. Representatives at the regional center were concerned that V.R. was showing early signs of Autism, but the prospective adoptive parents continued to attend to all the child's developmental and medical needs.
V.R. was later diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder.
In early January 2021, the parents each filed section 388 petitions seeking custody of V.R. or, in the alternative, reinstatement of their reunifications services. Father claimed he had completed his case plan, including a drug treatment program, and was visiting V.R. on a consistent basis. According to father, providing him custody of V.R. or reinstating his reunification services would be in the child's best interest because he and V.R. were closely bonded.
In late January 2021, father had a positive visit with V.R. Father went to Walmart with V.R. and the paternal cousin. Father bought V.R. toys, food, and toilet training items. The family then went to a park for the rest of the visit.
In early February 2021, father met V.R. and the paternal cousin for a visit. Because there was an event at the park, they decided to move to another location. Although father went with the cousin to pick up food, he didn't show up at the new location. Father called the cousin an hour later to explain that he left the visit early because he had to pay his motel bill.
Father didn't attend any visits with V.R. during the first half of March 2021. According to the paternal cousin, father's visits had been going "alright." While V.R. and father shared a bond, father continued to show little patience with V.R.'s emotional outbursts.
At a visit in early April 2021, father left after only 30 minutes. V.R. had a tantrum near the beginning of the visit, so father picked the child up, took him to the paternal cousin, and said," 'He needs to go home … I can't take this.'" Father called V.R." 'retarded'" and blamed the child's behavior on mother's use of drugs during her pregnancy.
The Department observed two of father's visits with V.R. in April and May 2021. Father was "very good" with, and protective of, V.R. and able to redirect the child's behavior. V.R. appeared to be comfortable around father during the visits.
In May 2021, the court held a hearing on the parents' section 388 petitions and selection and implementation of V.R.'s permanent plan. Father testified about his sobriety and participation in drug treatment programs, his current living situation, and his visits with V.R.
Father claimed he attends about "85 percent" of his visits with V.R. If he misses visits, it's because of work. Father shares a close bond with V.R., and they've known each other since the child was two months old. During a recent visit, V.R. chose to stay around father instead of playing on a slide. When asked about the quality of his visits with V.R., father replied, "I not only visit with my son, I study him, and I educate myself, and I talk to him. I have him look at me, which he [knew] he had a problem with looking at somebody when we're talking to them. That's one of the issues I'm working on is to get him to look directly at me when I'm talking to him. [¶] He's such a beautiful baby. He does everything I ask. And our bond is so strong. ... I don't just go there to visit my son. I go there to help him. That's all that I do. I want to help him."
The court denied the parents' section 388 petitions. As to father, it found he and V.R. shared a closer bond than the child did with mother. Nevertheless, it found father's testimony about his participation in drug treatment programs and missed drug tests lacked credibility. In the end, the court found neither parent demonstrated a sufficient change in circumstances or that it would be in V.R.'s best interests to return the child to their custody or to reinstate their reunification services.
After denying the parents' petition, the court addressed selection and implementation of V.R.'s permanent plan. The court found father failed to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied. The court explained, "The father's bond is stronger [than mother's], but it's not outside the norm that we often see between a parent and child. There is usually some type of bond between the parents and child when we come to this decision. [¶] So the father has the burden of proof to show that the bond is beyond the friendly/nice relationship between the father and son. And evidence that he operates a parental role, does significant things in helping to educate the child or deal with the child [on] a more frequent basis, the father has never gotten to unmonitored visits, and he only sees the child twice a week. That's not the type of evidence in support of a-to prove a parental bond exception."
The court found V.R. was adoptable and that no exceptions to adoption applied. It then terminated mother's and father's parental rights and set adoption as V.R.'s permanent plan. Father appeals.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the court erred when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply. He argues he established the first element of the exception, regular visitation. Father also argues he established the second element, existence of a strong bond between the child and the parent, and the court relied on improper factors when it found he could not meet the second element of the exception. As we explain, the court did not err when it terminated father's parental rights.
Once the juvenile court terminates a parent's reunification services," 'the focus [of the proceedings] shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.'" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52.) At that point, adoption becomes the preferred permanent plan for the child, and the court should order it "unless exceptional circumstances exist." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)
Section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) A parent may avoid termination of parental rights, however, if he can show certain circumstances exist that support an exception to adoption. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 617 (Caden C.).)
One exception exists where there is a beneficial relationship between the parent and his child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 617.) To establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the parent must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) he has "maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship" and (2) the court finds that the relationship provides a "compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
In Caden C., the California Supreme Court clarified how this exception works. "The language of [the beneficial parent-child relationship] exception, along with its history and place in the larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a parent's custody but where severing the child's relationship with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.)
In determining if the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, "the court acts in the child's best interest in a specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs 'the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.' [Citation.] 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,' even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would 'harm[ ]' the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.] That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh 'the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]' [Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn't outweigh its loss, termination would be 'detrimental to the child due to' the child's beneficial relationship with a parent." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.)
The Supreme Court also clarified that a parent's failure to make adequate progress with his case plan or to address the issues that led to the child's dependency, while sometimes relevant to evaluating the quality of the parent-child relationship and weighing the consequences of severing of that relationship against the benefits of a permanent adoptive home, is not a categorical bar to establishing the exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637-638.) The critical question is whether the child's relationship with his parent is so significant that it outweighs the benefits of adoption, not whether the parent has satisfactorily addressed the issues that led to the child's proceedings. (Id. at pp. 635-636.)
Thus, to show the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, the parent bears the burden of establishing three elements: (1) regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) the existence of a substantial, positive, emotional attachment between the child and the parent - the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship; and (3) that terminating the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In evaluating whether the exception applies, courts should look to several factors, including the age of the child, the amount of time he spent in his parent's custody, the quality of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) If the parent establishes all three elements, the exception applies, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption. (Caden C., at pp. 636-637.)
Typically, the juvenile court's findings on the first two elements-regular visitation and whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship-are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Courts review the third element using a hybrid standard: reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence and the weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) But where, like in this case, the appellant contends that the court below erred in finding he did not meet his burden of proof, we must determine whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 (I.W.), disapproved of on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) "Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' and (2) 'of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.' [Citation.]" (I.W., at p. 1528.)
In Caden C., unlike here, the juvenile court found the mother met her burden to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, but the appellate court reversed the juvenile court's ruling. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 628-629.)
As a preliminary matter, the court didn't make an express finding on the first element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception-i.e., whether father maintained regular visitation with V.R. But, as father acknowledges, a court isn't required to make express findings when it concludes the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption does not apply. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156 [the juvenile court is not required to recite specific findings when it concludes that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental to the child].) Where, as here, the record doesn't clearly establish the court resolved the issue of visitation in father's favor, we must construe the court's ruling on "the visitation element in a manner that supports its order terminating father's parental rights." (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1069; see also Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631 [the trial court's ruling is presumed correct, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance].) Thus, we must presume the court found father didn't meet the regular visitation element.
Father's visitation with V.R. throughout the dependency proceedings was sporadic at best. In the month leading up to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, father missed 10 visits with his son. From February through mid-June 2019, father only visited V.R. 12 times, while missing 28 visits. As of January 2020, father was visiting V.R. only a few times a month, even though father was allowed to visit the child at least twice a week. While father started to make a more concerted effort to visit V.R. in February 2020, he still missed or cancelled nine visits that month. And, in March 2021, only a few months before the selection and implementation hearing, father didn't visit V.R. for at least two weeks.
Aside from missing numerous visits throughout V.R.'s proceedings, father also cut many of his visits short. As the Department documented, father would often leave visits early because he became frustrated with V.R.'s behavior. There also was evidence that father's inconsistency in visiting V.R. negatively affected the child. As the paternal cousin reported before the six-month review hearing, it took V.R. a long time to become comfortable around father because father wasn't visiting the child on a regular basis.
Father points out that he testified at the selection and implementation hearing that he visited V.R. twice a week "85 percent of the time," which he claims supports a finding that he established the visitation element. But the court was free to discredit father's testimony, especially in light of contradictory evidence it had before it, such as the Department's and the cousin's reports that father's visitation was largely sporadic throughout V.R.'s proceedings. (See I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528 [appellant challenging finding that he failed to meet his burden of proof in the juvenile court must show that his evidence was" 'uncontradicted and unimpeached' "].)
In short, father has not shown that he established, as a matter of law, that he maintained regular visitation and contact with V.R. For that reason alone, the court did not err when it terminated father's parental rights.
In any event, father did not establish the other elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. To prove the second element-that V.R. would benefit from continuing their relationship-father needed to show that V.R. had a "substantial, positive, [and] emotional attachment" to him. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) That means father needed to demonstrate that V.R.'s attachment was "significant" and conferred more than "some incidental benefit" to the child. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) To do so, father needed to present evidence about how long he cared for V.R., the effects of his interactions with V.R., how V.R. reacted to visits with father, and V.R.'s particular needs. (Caden C., at p. 632.)
To be sure, it is undisputed that V.R. shared a bond with father. Throughout much of the proceedings, the Department and the paternal cousin observed that V.R. had an attachment to father and appeared to enjoy his visits with him. While we don't doubt that father and V.R. shared an attachment and often enjoyed each other's company, a "parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits." (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) Father failed to do that here.
Most importantly, by the time of the selection and implementation hearing, V.R. had spent little to no time in father's care. When V.R. was born in August 2018, father wasn't part of the child's or mother's life. Only two months later, V.R. was placed in the paternal cousin's care. Since then, V.R. has lived only with the paternal cousin and her family. V.R. quickly developed a strong emotional attachment to the paternal cousin, which eventually extended to the paternal cousin's husband and daughter. V.R. was happy and comfortable in the paternal cousin's home, and he looked to all members of that household for comfort and nourishment. In addition, the paternal cousin and her family were committed to providing V.R. a permanent and stable home.
The record is replete with evidence that father didn't share a similar type of bond with V.R. For instance, V.R. frequently became upset and would throw "fits" or "tantrums" during his visits with father. V.R. never looked to father for comfort, instead always turning to the paternal cousin for relief. There were numerous documented instances of father not knowing how, or refusing, to deal with V.R.'s tantrums. Father would often cut visits short because V.R. became cranky or upset, and he frequently handed V.R. over to the paternal cousin when the child became upset instead of trying to console the child himself. And, on one occasion only a little more than a month before the selection and implementation hearing, father became so upset with V.R.'s behavior that he told the paternal cousin that he couldn't "take this," called V.R." 'retarded, '" and promptly ended the visit.
Father insists the court erred because it relied on his failure to occupy a "parental role" in V.R.'s life when it found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. As some courts have held after Caden C. was decided, it is improper for a juvenile court to rely primarily on a parent's failure to occupy a parental role in the child's life in determining whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies. (See In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [reversing order terminating parental rights because it was unclear how much weight the court placed on its conclusion that the parents didn't occupy a "parental role" in their children's lives]; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 864-865 (J.D.) [same]; In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 270-271 (D.M.) [same]; In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 208-212 (L.A.-O.) [same].) That doesn't mean, however, that the juvenile court can never consider whether the parent occupies a "parental role" in his child's life, so long as that fact is relevant to evaluating whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship and, on balance, be harmed by terminating it. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637-638; see also In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 319-322 [affirming court's determination that father failed to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship exception despite court finding father failed to occupy "parental role" in his child's life].)
While the court found father did not occupy a parental role in V.R.'s life when it determined the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply, this case is starkly different from the cases father cites to where reliance on the lack of a "parental role" was deemed inappropriate. In J.D., the court of appeal reversed the order terminating the mother's parental rights because the juvenile court improperly focused on whether mother occupied a "parental role" in her child's life despite numerous reports suggesting mother and child shared a substantial emotional bond. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 856-857, 864-865.) Similarly, in D.M., there was evidence that the children were closely bonded to their father, wanted to be returned to his custody, and, importantly, had lived with him for several years. (D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271.) Likewise, in L.A.-O., two of the three children had lived with their parents for several years before dependency proceedings were initiated, and there was evidence that the mother and all three children shared a close emotional bond. (L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.) Similar evidence does not exist in this case. As we just explained, V.R. never lived with father for an extended period and, although he appeared to enjoy visits with father, nothing indicates V.R. looked to father for positive emotional feedback or otherwise shared a close emotional bond to him. In other words, the court's conclusion that father did not occupy a "parental role" in V.R.'s life does not establish the court applied an improper standard when it terminated father's parental rights.
Regardless, even if we were to assume father did establish the first and second elements of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found the harm caused by terminating father's parental rights did not outweigh the benefits of providing V.R. a permanent adoptive home. At this stage of the proceedings, the juvenile court "must decide whether the harm from severing the child's relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Put another way, "[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn't outweigh its loss, termination would be 'detrimental to the child due to' the child's beneficial relationship with a parent." (Id. at pp. 633-634.)
Father does not address the third element of the exception, whether termination of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the child, in any detail. Instead, father concludes, without any analysis, that the court never considered this element because it relied on inappropriate factors in the application of the second element. [*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Here, there is no evidence that V.R. would suffer any harm from terminating his relationship with father. Nothing in the record indicates V.R. had difficulty leaving father after their visits ended or being away from father outside of their visitation period. To the contrary, V.R. often acted out during his visits with father, prompting father to cut numerous visits short. And, when he became upset, V.R. always turned to the paternal cousin, and not father, for comfort. Likewise, V.R. was very comfortable and happy in the paternal cousin's home and had become closely bonded to the cousin and her family, who had provided the child a stable, caring, and loving home for nearly his entire life.
In short, father failed to establish every element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. He therefore has not shown the court erred when it terminated his parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The court's order terminating father's parental rights and setting adoption as the permanent plan is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: EGERTON, J. KALRA, J. [*]