Opinion
B277432
08-08-2017
In re CLAIRE N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL N., Defendant and Appellant.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK02946) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Emma Castro, Judge. Affirmed. Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Paul N. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating dependency jurisdiction over his daughter, Claire N., and granting monitored visitation for Father at least one time per month. Father contends the court erred when it delegated to Claire's mother Kelly S. (Mother) the authority to choose the monitor for Father's visits. Because Father did not object to the condition of visitation, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 16, 2014, the juvenile court declared, Claire, then 11 years old, and her 15-year-old sibling Paul N. (Paul), dependents of the court after sustaining allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The petition alleged that Mother and Father were unable to provide appropriate parental care and supervision for Paul, who suffered from emotional and behavioral problems, which endangered the child's health and safety and placed him and Claire at risk of harm. The petition further alleged under b-2 that the children were at risk because of Father's alcohol abuse. The court ordered Paul be placed at an adolescent care center and that Claire remain released to Father.
Father appealed and on January 27, 2015, this court reversed the judgment as to its jurisdictional findings as to Father. (See In re Claire N. et al. (Jan. 20, 2015, B256529) [nonpub. opn.].)
On August 8, 2014, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 387 supplemental petition, deemed by the juvenile court to be a section 342 subsequent petition, on behalf of Claire. The petition alleged Father's unresolved history of substance abuse and his current use of alcohol and prescription medication placed the minor at risk of harm. The court ordered Claire removed from Father and placed her in foster care. On June 10, 2016, Mother sought the return of Claire to Mother's custody; Mother asserted that she was capable of caring for Claire. Mother testified that if the court released Claire to her, the child would reside with Mother in New Mexico and attend counseling.
On June 22, 2016, the court declared Claire a dependent of the court under the section 342 petition, ordered she be removed from Father's custody and, pursuant to section 361.2, found that Mother was a noncustodial parent requesting custody. The court placed Claire with Mother and ordered DCFS to initiate an Interstate Compact on the Placement of the Child (ICPC) in New Mexico. The court ordered monitored visits for Father when the minor was in California.
At a subsequent hearing on July 20, 2016, DCFS asked the juvenile court to return Claire to California because the ICPC had not yet been approved, and because DCFS could not provide services in New Mexico. In the alternative, DCFS recommended that if the child remained in New Mexico with Mother without an approved ICPC, the court should terminate jurisdiction. The minor's counsel and Mother asked the court to terminate jurisdiction and grant Mother sole legal custody. Father's attorney objected to Mother having custody and requested the child be returned to California. The juvenile court found it would be emotionally devastating to Claire to remove her from a stable placement with Mother and return her to California. The court further found the child was not at risk in Mother's custody and that the conditions that justified jurisdiction as to Mother no longer existed. The court granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of Claire and terminated its jurisdiction. The court also ordered monitored visitation for Father of at least once per month in San Juan County, New Mexico or Los Angeles County, California if the child was in Los Angeles. The court also ordered that Mother had to approve the monitor.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
" 'When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is empowered to make "exit orders" regarding custody and visitation. [Citations.] Such orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child and will remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by the family court. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799; see § 362.4.) "The power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case resides with the court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private parties. [Citation.]" (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.)
Here, Father contends the court's order allowing Mother to select the monitor for his visits with Claire violated the rule that prohibits the court from delegating authority to determine visitation. We need not decide the merits of Father's claim because he waived his complaint by failing to make a proper objection below.
When the dependency court announced the orders and findings, Father's counsel objected to the order granting Mother sole legal custody and the order terminating jurisdiction, but Father's lawyer did not object to any aspect of the visitation order. General and non-specific objections are not sufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review. (In re Anthony P. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 635, 642.) And in general, issues concerning visitation orders are waived by the failure to object below. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1001.) Because Father's objection to the custody order and order terminating jurisdiction did not state any ground for objecting to visitation, we deem the issue waived.
Likewise, Father failed to preserve any complaint that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to order that its exit order be filed in New Mexico. Father did not raise this issue below and in any event, has not shown he has suffered any prejudice as a result. Consequently we do not consider it here.
DISPOSITION
The visitation order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:
CHANEY, J.
JOHNSON, J.