Opinion
B318480
04-25-2023
In re S. M., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. FRANCES C., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 21CCJP05443A-D Hernan D. Vera, Judge.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILEY, J.
A mother challenges many aspects of her dependency case. She argues the evidence does not establish the statutory symptoms of emotional abuse necessary to assume jurisdiction over her two youngest children. Because this ground is invalid and because the juvenile court improperly amended the petition to account for it, she argues, there also is no basis for assuming jurisdiction over her two elder children. The mother next claims the court erred by failing to make required dispositional findings; and, in any event, insufficient evidence supports the decision removing her two youngest children from her custody. The mother lastly argues the court improperly delegated its duty to specify her visitation.
The juvenile court made these rulings at a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on January 25, 2022, and in orders of the same date.
We find certain aspects of the mother's appeal moot and affirm the jurisdictional findings and disposition as to the two youngest children. Statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I.
Recent events have rendered some issues moot.
In May 2022 and January 2023, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction for the two elder children, S.M and D.F. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services asked us to take judicial notice of a related minute order concerning D.F. We grant the request.
This order says the conditions justifying the initial assumption of jurisdiction no longer exist and are unlikely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. It notes D.F. has been released to the mother.
The record contains an earlier order showing the court had terminated jurisdiction for S.M. because she "has reached majority or has been emancipated."
The Department claimed physical abuse of these two children as grounds for jurisdiction, but the juvenile court struck these allegations due to insufficient proof. The court ultimately assumed jurisdiction over these girls under section 300, subdivision (j) based on the mother's conduct towards their younger siblings (A.L. and V.L.). As we explain below, jurisdiction over these younger siblings is amply supported. The findings will remain.
S.M. is over age 18 and therefore will not be the subject of a future dependency case. D.F. is now 16. Neither D.F. nor S.M. was removed from the mother's custody. And while the father of the two youngest children initiated family court proceedings on the Department's recommendation, these proceedings are unlikely to involve S.M. or D.F. because that father is not their father. D.F.'s father is deceased.
There is no actual controversy for us to decide as to these former dependents. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.) [court's duty is to decide actual controversies, not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare legal principles that cannot affect the case].)
The mother's challenge to the January 2022 visitation orders also is moot. The juvenile court recently entered new visitation orders concerning A.L. and V.L., dated February 27 and March 3, 2023, which specify the mother "is to be awarded with overnight visits at the grandparents' home." We take judicial notice of these orders.
The new visitation orders supersede the old ones. There is no ongoing harm from the old orders, and we cannot provide effective relief. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
The mother articulates nothing to convince us to exercise our discretion to review the challenged visitation orders or the jurisdictional findings concerning the two elder children.
II
We move on to the remaining jurisdictional and dispositional challenges.
The February and March 2023 orders show the juvenile court has released the two youngest children to their father and terminated jurisdiction for them. The court also entered juvenile custody orders awarding sole physical custody to the father and joint legal custody to both parents.
We nevertheless decide the mother's appeal as to these children because the court's jurisdictional rulings paved the way for removing these children from her custody and could affect future family law proceedings. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 276-278 [order remains subject to challenge where it affects parental custody rights or results in dispositional orders that adversely affect a parent]; id. at p. 285 [appellate courts may exercise their discretion to reach the merits of a dispute where the findings could be prejudicial to a parent or could have consequences beyond jurisdiction, including in family law proceedings].)
We review jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders for substantial evidence. We indulge all reasonable inferences and resolve all conflicts in favor of the findings; examine the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations; and refrain from making credibility determinations. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154 (V.L.).)
A higher standard governs review for orders removing a child, which require clear and convincing evidence at the juvenile court. We ask whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. (V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149, 154-155.)
One way to establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c) is to establish (1) offending parental conduct; (2) causation; and (3) serious emotional harm or the risk of this harm, "evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior[.]" (§ 300, subd. (c); In re Roxanne B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.)
The record satisfies these elements.
A.L. and V.L. were nine and seven when the children heard their mother threaten to burn down their father's home. The children told relatives and school employees they were scared and did not feel safe at their mother's home. The mother responded by saying A.L. was very attached to his father, and the father was to blame for her son's false statements.
Both children reported the mother was emotionally abusive and treated them badly. They said she called them names like "bitches" and "little bitch." The mother admitted screaming at the children, calling them names such as "fuckn little bitches," and lashing out at them with bad language. She defended this by saying this was how she spoke when angry.
V.L. reported the mother constantly screamed and belittled her and her brother. She cried when this happened to her but tried to support her brother when the mother abused him.
A.L. had trouble sleeping when visiting the mother. He was scared of her and did not want to live with her because she called him names and yelled at him. He was also scared the mother would harm the father. During the child's first interview with a social worker, he started sobbing. After a break, he begged the social worker not to allow the mother to take him and his sister home.
V.L. made the same request of the social worker, who described the girl as "serious and scared" during her interview.
The older sibling S.M. generally sided with the mother but nevertheless acknowledged her mother is "unstable" and "yells a lot and cusses at her and her siblings."
The mother's threats were common. She regularly threatened that the children would not visit their father. Once she threatened to kill herself if V.L. returned to the father, which made V.L. cry. The mother admitted making this threat. She instructed the children not to disclose what happened at her home.
The father claimed the mother had been inappropriate with the children ever since he and the mother separated two years earlier. He accused the mother of involving the children in the parents' problems and causing them stress, anxiety, and depression.
One time the mother yelled at the children to get out of the car when the father picked them up from school. A.L. was scared. The mother grabbed him and tried to pull him out of the car. Then she started screaming at him, asking why he lied and demanding he tell the truth.
Another time, the mother and her sister went to the school and screamed that they wanted to see V.L. but wanted nothing to do with A.L. A.L. told the social worker he had seen his mother outside school and had said hello, but she ignored him. This was not the only time the mother asked for V.L. but not A.L.
Later in the Department's investigation, A.L. continued to say all he heard at his mother's home was yelling and cussing by his mother, his aunt, and his sisters. He said his mother recently told him not to call her "mom" because he did not love her and he lied about her. These statements really hurt him, and he did not want to visit her for a while.
The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report noted the mother had anger issues and "the dynamics and relationships in the home are not healthy, mother does not know how to communicate effectively with her children. The continuous yelling, cussing and derogatory comments made toward the children has caused the children emotional abuse and mental issues that must be addressed." The report concluded the children suffered emotional distress, anxiety, and depression from the mother's yelling and derogatory name calling, and from her putting the children in the middle of her conflict with the father.
This is substantial evidence the mother caused her two youngest children to suffer extreme emotional turmoil and put them at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional harm. It satisfies section 300, subdivision (c).
The evidence shows more than a "deep dislike and fear" of a parent and therefore distinguishes In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380, cited by the mother. Further, Brison C. suggests finding "serious emotional disturbance or unhealthy parental alienation" would be enough. (See ibid.) This case presents both factors.
The mother and others deny some of these events, deny any emotional abuse, and claim the father negatively influences and "brainwashes" the two youngest children against the mother. These denials have no bearing in our substantial evidence review. Similarly, the mother asks us to infer the children's fear relates to something other than her, which contradicts the principles of our review. (See V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 154, 156, 157 [appellate courts view the evidence favorably to the respondent and disregard conflicting evidence].)
Substantial evidence also supports the removal orders. A reasonable trier of fact could have found it highly probable these children faced a substantial danger to their well-being if they returned to their mother's home and no reasonable means short of removal could protect them. (See § 361, subd. (c)(1); V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156-157.)
Even after the case began, the mother continued to be manipulative and cruel. Even after attending parenting classes and through the hearing, she continued to deny wrongdoing, to blame the father, and to paint her younger children as untruthful. This evidence signals she lacked the willingness or ability to change her behavior and therefore alternatives to removal-such as counseling and orders against making disparaging remarks-would be ineffective. "In light of mother's failure to recognize the risks to which she was exposing the minor[s], there was no reason to believe the conditions would not persist should [they] remain in her home." (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293; see also ibid. [no way to guarantee minor's well-being in maternal custody where the mother was unable to refrain from harmful behavior despite knowing it would affect the proceedings negatively, and where she refused to acknowledge her behavior and its potential effect on the minor].)
This case is unlike In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803 (Ashley F.), cited multiple times by the mother. In that case, a mother moved out of the family home after the detention hearing, expressed remorse for the injuries she had inflicted on her child, and was striving to learn better discipline methods through parenting classes. (Id. at p. 810.)
III
The juvenile court satisfied its duty to make removal findings under section 361.
At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court folded its findings on jurisdiction into its assessment of disposition.
Regarding jurisdiction, the court stated: "The court finds more specifically that the level of verbal and emotional abuse is way beyond the pale, distinguishing the cases that are cited by mother's counsel. This is a case where that level of emotional abuse has brought the children to a level of suffering that no court should allow. And has caused them to exhibit anxiety and a level of fear of the mother that is exceptional."
Earlier in the hearing, the court had commented, "The children are besides themselves with not only fear but anxiety. Why is it unlikely that they will suffer other physical manifestations given the years of shouting and name calling?"
When discussing disposition, the mother's counsel argued against removal, mentioned a safety plan, and asked the court to consider, among other things, "frequent, unannounced visits by the Department [and] for both children to be enrolled in and engaged with mental health therapy."
The court had earlier rejected unannounced visits as not "sufficient to ameliorate the risk." It ordered counseling for the children but nevertheless concluded: "The court is removing the younger children . . . from mother based on the dependency court removal order as set forth in the minute order. The reasons that removal are necessary include but are not limited to the many, many instances of verbal and emotional abuse by mother against [A.L. and V.L.] that formed the basis for the court sustained c counts."
The minute orders for each child include findings that there were no reasonable means to protect the children's physical health without removing them from the mother's home.
Neither subdivision (c), (d), nor (e) of section 361 requires the court to put on the record why potential alternatives to removal are unworkable. Subdivision (e) requires the court to "state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based." The court did that here. (Contra, Ashly F. supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [dispositional order reversed where juvenile court failed to state facts supporting its conclusion about removal].)
Even were we to find the court failed to state required facts, we would conclude from the evidence the failure was harmless. (V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.)
DISPOSITION
We dismiss the mother's appeal as to S.M., D.F., and the visitation orders. We affirm the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional rulings regarding A.L. and V.L.
We concur: STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J.