Opinion
B309965
12-29-2021
In re L.M., Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20CCJP05026 Debra R. Archuleta, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, J. 1
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over L.M., the daughter of C.H. (mother) and J.M. (father) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court found L.M. was at risk of harm due to mother's neglect, which caused L.M. to sustain a skull injury, and mother's failure to provide L.M. with medical attention for her injury.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal, mother challenges both jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). She contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the skull injury was caused by her neglect. Further, she contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of medical neglect. As discussed below, we disagree with her contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mother and father have one child, L.M. At the time this case was initiated, L.M. was seven months old. L.M. resided with mother. Father resided separately.
On September 17, 2020, mother took L.M. to the hospital due to swelling on her head. Mother reported to hospital personnel that on September 16, 2020, she was giving L.M. a bath and noticed the swelling. The next morning, she noticed the swelling had increased and decided to take L.M. to the hospital. She did so after work, at around 10:30 p.m. Once there, mother reported to hospital staff that on September 12, 2020, L.M. had hit her head on the headboard of a bed she was sitting on. Mother 2 said she was able to console L.M. and "did not think anything of it afterward."
L.M. was admitted and underwent an x-ray. It showed she had "an acute non-displaced non-depressed skull fracture of the right parietal bone" and a right parietal hematoma. The treating doctor reported the injuries were inconsistent with mother's explanation. Instead, the doctor believed the injury was consistent with non-accidental trauma. The doctor therefore suspected physical abuse. The incident prompted a referral to the Department of Children and Family Services (Department).
The following day, a social worker for the Department interviewed mother at the hospital. Mother said L.M. might have hit her head on the headboard, but there was no redness or swelling, nor did she display any signs of being in pain. Mother was unsure whether L.M. had even hit her head because she was not crying. She claimed she kept L.M. awake to make sure she did not have a concussion. Mother further reported that four days later, while giving L.M. a bath, she noticed a soft spot on L.M.'s head. She claimed she was confused as the spot was on the side of L.M.'s head, but L.M. had hit the back of her head. Mother claimed L.M. had an abnormal soft spot when she was three to four months old. Because the swelling increased by the next morning, mother decided to take L.M. to the hospital. Mother did so later in the evening after she had gone to work. Mother admitted both maternal aunt and maternal grandmother, who helped her babysit L.M., saw the bump and swelling. They both advised mother to take L.M. to the doctor.
The Department also interviewed the doctor, who was a child abuse specialist. He stated the injury was inconsistent with mother's story. Contrary to mother's reported cause for L.M.'s 3 injury, the doctor believed the injuries were consistent with short falls and accidental force trauma. At the time, the doctor could not rule out inflicted trauma as the cause of the injury.
Two days after taking L.M. to the hospital, mother admitted to a Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Deputy that she lied about how L.M. sustained her injury. Mother stated that, rather than hitting her head on the headboard of a bed, L.M. fell from a bed when mother turned around to make her a bottle. When interviewed by the Department about the true story, mother claimed she did not take L.M. to the hospital because she was "embarrassed about what the family would think." She believed her family would blame father. Additionally, she said L.M. did not display any signs of discomfort and there were no visible marks or bruises on the child until 72 hours after the incident.
On September 21, 2020, the juvenile court issued an expedited removal order and the Department detained L.M. from mother. Following an investigation, the Department filed a petition on behalf of L.M. under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition alleged L.M. was at serious risk of physical harm due to (1) mother's neglect which caused L.M. to suffer a fractured skull (counts a-1 and b-1), and (2) mother's failure to provide L.M. with ongoing and necessary medical treatment for her injuries (count b-2). The petition indicated the Department would rely on section 355.1, subdivision (a) to assert a rebuttable presumption existed that L.M. is a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).
As reflected in the jurisdiction report, when confronted with the allegations of the petition, mother agreed she was being neglectful when L.M. fell. She denied, however, that either she 4 or father had intentionally hurt L.M. She further stated she observed L.M. throughout the night for any signs of a concussion. Mother admitted she did not want to take L.M. to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt the day after the injury occurred because she was worried they would be upset.
The petition was adjudicated at a hearing held in December 2020. After hearing argument, the juvenile court dismissed the a-1 count and sustained the remaining counts. It removed L.M. from father and placed her with mother under the Department's supervision. Mother was ordered to participate in individual counseling to address child protection and safety, co-dependency and domestic violence.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
We review a juvenile court's jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) Under this standard, "we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and orders." (Ibid.) "We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]" (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) "The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment [citation], and an appellate court may not evaluate that testimony as a basis for reversal. [Citation.]" (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)
"Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. It is not synonymous with 'any' evidence. [Citation.] 5 The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]" (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) "The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) "'"The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)
Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child[.]"
"[T]he purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect the child from a substantial risk of future physical harm, and that risk is determined as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing." (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397, italics omitted.) "A dependency court is not required to 'wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.' [Citation.]" (In re J.M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 921.)
"[T]here are three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), namely, (1) neglectful conduct or substance abuse by a parent in one of the specified forms, (2) causation, and (3) serious physical harm to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm. [Citations.]" (In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-725.) The first element "requires no more than the parent's 'failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.' [Citations.] Indeed, the surrounding provisions in 6 section 300 support the conclusion that the first clause of section 300(b)(1) does not require parental culpability. [Citation.]" (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) "The third element 'effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).' [Citation.]" (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
Section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides that "[w]here the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300."
"Once the petitioner establishes a prima facie case under section 355.1 the burden of producing evidence 'shifts to the parents the obligation of raising an issue as to the actual cause of the injury or the fitness of the home.' [Citation.] 'The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.' (Evid. Code, § 604.)" (In re D.P. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 903-904, italics omitted.) 7
II. Analysis a. Count b-1
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by sustaining count b-1. Although not entirely clear, she appears to raise three arguments in support of her position: (a) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that L.M.'s injuries would not ordinarily have been sustained but for negligent conduct by mother, and therefore section 355.1 does not apply in this case; (b) even if section 355.1 applied in this case, she produced sufficient evidence to raise an issue regarding the actual cause of L.M.'s injury; and (c) assuming section 355.1 did not apply, count b-1 is unsupported by substantial evidence because, as of the adjudication, L.M. was not at substantial risk of physical harm. We address each argument in turn below.
First, mother's argument that she was not neglectful because the injuries were the product of an accident, improperly conflates culpability with neglect. Often, neglect is neither intentional nor purposeful. And, as discussed above, section 300, subdivision (b) "does not require parental culpability. [Citation.]" (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
Furthermore, "[w]hile the presumption under section 355.1 'disappears upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of its nonexistence (Evid. Code, § 604), the trier of fact, here the juvenile court, must still weigh the inferences arising from the [professional's] testimony which gave rise to the presumption against the contrary evidence . . . and resolve the conflict. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re D.P., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 904-905.) Here, as discussed below, the doctor testified the injury could have been accidental. He was, however, concerned, as mother delayed seeking medical treatment because 8 L.M. was not "symptom free" or "asymptomatic." Instead, mother "recognized swelling on [L.M.'s] scalp and waited at least a day or more" to go into the hospital. "'Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact. [Citation.]' [Citation]" (Id. at p. 905)
Mother's second argument fails because she produced no evidence showing L.M.'s injury was caused by something other than parental neglect. Moreover, "[b]y its terms, the first clause [of section 300, subdivision (b)(1)] requires no more than the parent's 'failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.' [Citations.]" (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 629.) Indeed, mother admitted L.M. was injured when she left L.M. unattended in the bed and L.M. rolled off. Moreover, mother admitted she was neglectful in doing so.
Third, mother's argument that count b-1 is unsupported by substantial evidence is without merit. While mother eventually admitted responsibility for L.M.'s injuries, she did so only after the Department and medical professionals debunked her attempts to deceive hospital staff, the Department social workers, and law enforcement regarding the cause of L.M.'s injuries. In other words, the record reflects mother prioritized her concerns regarding her self-image over her child's safety by declining to take L.M. to receive medical care when needed, and attempted to mislead medical personnel, law enforcement, and Department staff about what happened to avoid responsibility. Under these circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's finding, the evidence supports the reasonable conclusion that mother sacrificed her child's safety to avoid being viewed negatively by others, and failed to seek proper medical 9 care for the child, thereby placing L.M. at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that mother's neglect was within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). Thus, mother has not shown the juvenile court erred by sustaining count b-1 in the petition.
b. Count b-2
Finally, mother argues the juvenile court erred by sustaining count b-2 as there was no showing of medical neglect because the child's injuries did not require either medical treatment or any immediate intervention. Mother claims "there was no medical evidence that the parents were untimely in seeking medical care for [L.M.] as she did not display any swelling until 48 hours later and was acting normally with no symptoms."
While it is true the doctor did not believe L.M. would have any long-lasting harm, he testified he was concerned by mother's delay in seeking medical treatment. Specifically, he was concerned because L.M. was not "symptom free" or "asymptomatic." Instead, mother "recognized swelling on [L.M.'s] scalp and waited at least a day or more" to go into the hospital. Furthermore, father, who was present immediately after the fall, told mother to take L.M. to the hospital because she was crying in a way that was "not like her normal cry." Finally, even after mother herself noticed the swelling, she waited two full days to take L.M. to the hospital.
The record reflects maternal grandmother picked up L.M. the day after the injury and noticed L.M. was crying and appeared fussier than usual. A few days later, while bathing the 10 child, maternal grandmother noticed the right side of the child's head appeared "mushy." She was concerned and advised mother to take L.M. to the doctor. Mother agreed to do so, but waited two additional days.
Maternal aunt also reported she noticed the bump on L.M.'s head two days before mother took L.M. to the hospital. Maternal aunt called mother and asked "What the [expletive] is going on with [L.M.'s] head?" Mother responded she "was aware." When maternal aunt offered to take L.M. to urgent care, mother refused and said she would take her.
Finally, mother admitted she did not take L.M. to the hospital earlier because she was worried about what her family would say about father. Instead, mother used Google to look up what to do if a child falls and resorted to bathing L.M. to keep her awake. Mother also admitted she did not want to take L.M. to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt the day after the injury occurred because she was worried they would be upset.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that mother neglected to provide L.M. with prudent medical attention, and thereby placed L.M. at "substantial risk of serious physical harm" within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b). Thus, mother has not shown the juvenile court erred by sustaining count b-2. 11
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MANELLA, P.J. COLLINS, J. 12