Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-001324-MR NO. 2013-CA-001359-MR
03-13-2015
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLANT v. BONNIE L. WILLIAMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS APPELLEES AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS APPELLANT v. BONNIE L. WILLIAMS AND KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS: Benjamin Long Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION: Patrick B. Shirley Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BONNIE L. WILLIAMS: Edward Dove Lexington, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-06557
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; J. LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES. VANMETER, JUDGE: The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission ("KUIC") and the Administrative Office of the Courts ("AOC") each appeal from the Fayette Circuit Court's order reversing the decision of the KUIC to deny Bonnie L. Williams unemployment benefits. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand this case to the Fayette Circuit Court with directions to enter an order affirming the KUIC's decision.
Williams was employed with the AOC as a deputy court clerk in Fayette County from January 2005 until June 2010. Prior to her resignation, Williams had exhausted all of her leave time but requested time off work without pay for personal medical appointments and her husband's upcoming surgery. On June 18, 2010, Williams' supervisor denied her request for leave without pay. Williams asked what would happen if she were absent on the days in question, and her supervisor made a statement that the employer would "take action," which Williams interpreted to mean that if she did not show up for work on those days, she would be terminated. Williams claims she researched unemployment law and decided that she had good cause to quit her position, and tendered her resignation on June 22, 2010.
Williams applied for, but was denied, unemployment benefits due to a determination that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employment, and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits. On appeal, a referee found that Williams' supervisor directly informed her that she would be fired if she were absent on the days she requested unpaid leave. Nonetheless, the referee found that Williams' resignation in order to avoid being discharged constituted leaving her employment without good cause attributable to the employment.
Williams appealed to the KUIC, which found that Williams' supervisor merely told her that if she were absent on the days in question, the employer would "take action," and Williams interpreted this statement to mean she would be discharged. The KUIC noted that the supervisor's statement that the employer would "take action" could have implied a variety of disciplinary measures other than discharge. The KUIC affirmed the referee's decision, finding that Williams voluntarily quit in order to avoid the mere possibility of being discharged, and thus, Williams quit without good cause attributable to the employment. Williams appealed this decision to the Fayette Circuit Court, which summarily reversed the KUIC's decision, finding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence and Williams was placed in a circumstance that justified her leaving her employment. From that order, the KUIC and AOC appeal.
On appeal, the KUIC and AOC argue that the trial court erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the KUIC. They claim that the KUIC's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the KUIC properly applied the applicable law.
The Supreme Court has described the judicial standard of review in unemployment cases as follows:
Judicial review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission is governed by the general rule applicable to administrative actions. "If the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence of probative value, then they must be accepted as binding and it must then be determined whether or not the administrative agency has applied the correct rule of law to the facts so found." Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence which has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. If there is substantial evidence in the record to support an agency's findings, the findings will be upheld, even though there may be conflicting evidence in the record. An agency's findings are clearly erroneous if arbitrary or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. If the reviewing court concludes the rule of law was correctly applied to facts supported by substantial evidence, the final order of the agency must be affirmed.Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil, 381 S.W.3d 238, 245-46 (Ky. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
The standard of review at the KUIC level is substantially less deferential. "The commission may on its own motion affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of a referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking of additional evidence, or may permit any of the parties to such decision to initiate further appeals before it." KRS 341.430(1). This court has detailed the KUIC's review process accordingly:
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
"Except in instances where the commission orders cases removed to it from a referee, all appeals to the commission may be heard upon the records of the division and the evidence and exhibits introduced before the referee." 787 KAR 1:110(2)(2)(a); formerly 903 KAR 5:130(2)(2)(a). Thus, while the Commission generally does not hear evidence directly from witnesses, it has the authority to enter independent findings of fact. 787 KAR 1:110(2)(4)(a). Necessarily, such authority allows the Commission to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and to disagree with the conclusion reached by the referee.Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Ky. App. 1998), abrograted on other grounds by Cecil, 381 S.W.3d at 238. Thus, the KUIC may enter new findings of fact and owes no deference to the referee's decision, whereas this court must uphold the KUIC's decision if the decision was supported by substantial evidence and reached through a correct application of the law.
KRS 341.370 states, in pertinent part:
(1) A worker shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which:(Emphasis added). "The employee must establish that the conditions of the job are such that any reasonable person would believe he had no alternative but to quit." Brownlee v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Ky. 2009).
. . . .
(c) He has left his most recent suitable work or any other suitable work which occurred after the first day of the worker's base period and which last preceded his most recent work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employment.
The trial court does not state in its order why it found that the KUIC's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Judicial review is limited to the KUIC's findings of fact, which found that Williams was not directly told that she would be terminated if she was absent on the days for which she was denied unpaid leave and that Williams merely interpreted her supervisor's statement to mean such. Accordingly, the supervisor's statement that the employer would "take action" could very well have implied disciplinary measures other than termination. "A [reviewing] court may not substitute its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Thompson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky. App. 2002). "Although a reviewing court may arrive at a different conclusion than the trier of fact in its consideration of the evidence in the record, this does not deprive the agency's decision of support by substantial evidence." Transp. Cabinet v. Thurman, 897 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Ky. App. 1995).
Williams likens her case to the fact pattern in Cantrell v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 450 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 1970), wherein the claimant's husband was gravely ill, and her employer permitted her to take time off to be with him, but was ultimately forced to replace her before she could return to work. However, in the present case, Williams was not given permission to take time off work, a decision which is the employer's prerogative. See Brown Hotel Co. v. White, 365 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1962) ("[a]bsences from work affect the entire work schedule of an employer and frequently make it impossible to utilize to the full extent the services of the employees who are present."). Here, Williams' quitting is attributable to her interpretation of her supervisor's words and her research into unemployment law, not the employer's actions.
We believe the facts as found by the KUIC amount to sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Williams chose to resign based on her assumptions of what would occur if she did not show up for work on the days in question. We further agree with the KUIC that this does not constitute "good cause attributable to the employment," since we do not believe that a reasonable person in Williams' position would feel that she had no alternative but to quit her employment. Since the KUIC properly applied the law and its decision was supported by substantial evidence, reversal by the trial court was erroneous.
For the above reasons, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is reversed and we remand with directions for the trial court to enter an order affirming the KUIC's decision to disqualify Williams from receiving unemployment benefits.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS:
Benjamin Long
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION:
Patrick B. Shirley
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BONNIE L.
WILLIAMS:
Edward Dove
Lexington, Kentucky