Defendant filed a motion to sanction Plaintiff under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for filing claims that, according to Defendant, "are clearly preempted by binding precedent." Motion for Sanctions (dkt. 49) at 7-8 (citing Kuroiwa v. United States, 351 F. App'x 238 (9th Cir. 2009); Shepard-Hall v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp. PC, No. 2:16-CV-01361-MCE-GGH, 2017 WL 2654855 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2017)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims under the CCRAA are preempted and that, by asserting these claims, Plaintiff's attorneys either failed to conduct necessary diligent research or acted strategically and improperly.

See, e.g., In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The party against whom sanctions would be imposed must actually make the reasonable argument, not merely assert after-the-fact that a reasonable argument could have been made"); Hoatson v. New York Archdiocese, 280 F.App'x. 88, 92 (2nd Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (sanctions appropriate where attorney offered no argument for reversing law that was "well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question") (internal citations omitted); Friedler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 86 F.App'x. 50, 56 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (sanctions appropriate where "counsel pursued a claim that he should have known was unsupported by existing law and he made no argument to change it); Collie v. Kendal, 220 F.3d 585 (Table) at 2 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (sanctions appropriate where attorney's argument was no more than an assertion "that long-standing precedent [is] wrong and should be changed"); Kuroiwa v. U.S., 351 F.App'x. 238, 241 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (Rule 11 sanctions appropriate where counsel advanced legal theory plainly rejected by Ninth Circuit precedent). As it explained at the hearing, the Court is deeply troubled by Counsel's refusal to recognize that issues which have been decided unanimously by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal are settled law.