Opinion
Argued December 16, 1999
December 27, 1999
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated February 9, 1999, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Kelly, Rode Kelly, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (John D. Kelly and John W. Hoefling of counsel), for appellant.
Parker Waichman (DiJoseph, Portegello Schuster, P.C., New York, N.Y. [Arnold E. DiJoseph III] of counsel), for respondent.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., SONDRA MILLER, FRED T. SANTUCCI, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
It is well settled that summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when there are no triable issues of fact (see, Accius v. Town of Hempstead,___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Nov. 8, 1999]; Akseizer v. Kramer, ___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Oct. 12, 1999]). Since there are numerous triable issues of fact in this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion (see, Roy McCutcheon, Architect, P.C. v. Dolgin,___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Nov. 15, 1999]; Gonzalez v. Mott Haven Assoc. Number Eight, ___ A.D.2d ___ [2d Dept., Oct. 12, 1999]).
BRACKEN, J.P., S. MILLER, SANTUCCI, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.