Mobile County v. Brantley, 507 So.2d 483 (Ala. 1987). See also Kupka v. Dickson, 72 Wn.2d 217, 432 P.2d 657 (1967). Here, Art Daniels' testimony as to Anderson's statements was substantial evidence concerning the cause of the cracking.
Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law — 1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. Rev. 527 (1973). Under the former statutes the husband acting alone as manager of the community property could bind the marital community to a purchase of real property. Kupka v. Dickson, 72 Wn.2d 217, 432 P.2d 657 (1967); Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wn. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914). Such was not the case, however, when the husband attempted to transfer or encumber the community real property; former RCW 26.16.040 specifically required that the wife join in the execution of the actual instrument of conveyance and that it be acknowledged by her. Washington cases construing this provision broadly interpreted "join" to mean "participation," which in turn was held to include the elements of authorization, ratification, and estoppel.
See Zarbell v. Mantas, 32 Wn.2d 920, 204 P.2d 203 (1949). If the note is executed for the benefit of the marital community, the presumption of community obligation is not overcome. Thus money borrowed to pay off a community debt or to acquire a community asset is for a community purpose. Kupka v. Dickson, 72 Wn.2d 217, 432 P.2d 657 (1967); Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wn.2d 360, 387 P.2d 366 (1963); Beyers v. Moore, supra, Fies v. Storey, supra; Ness v.Bender, 18 Wn.2d 243, 138 P.2d 864 (1943); Mattinson v. Mattinson, 128 Wn. 328, 222 P. 620 (1924); Rea v. Eslick, 87 Wn. 125, 151 P. 256 (1915). If the debt is separate in character, the note is collectible only out of separate property. Smyser v. Smyser, 17 Wn.2d 301, 135 P.2d 455 (1943).