Opinion
No. 5-772 / 05-0400
Filed November 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, James M. Drew, Judge.
Gary Kuper appeals from the denial of his claim for payment under a farm lease and oral agreements. AFFIRMED.
Brian R. McPhail of Gross McPhail, Osage, for appellant.
Thomas S. Reavely of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, and Earl Hill, Britt, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
For thirty-four years, Gary Kuper rented and farmed land owned by Richard and Wilma Grifhorst on a crop-share basis. The first twenty years were farmed under an oral lease, while the last fourteen years were under two written leases, the most recent beginning on March 1, 1995 and running until March 1, 2003. The written lease provides that improvements were considered to be additional rent that becomes the landlord's property and that "no expenses may be incurred on account of the landlord without first obtaining written authorization." The lease further provides Kuper an option to match any offer to purchase the land. Richard Grifhorst suffered a stroke in 1996, furthering his mental decline from prior dementia, until he passed away in 2002.
Kuper subsequently filed a claim in probate for $8,870 for improvements made to the farmland. On July 28, 2004, Kuper served on the executor of Richard's estate a request for admissions. The executor did not respond until November 17, 2004. On January 31, 2005, Kuper filed a motion to amend, in which he asserted an additional claim for $16,000, which was one-half of the cost of shelling corn.
The matter came on for trial on February 2, 2005. The court denied Kuper's motion to amend, concluding the "proposed amendment is an entirely new and different claim, it substantially changes the issues, [and] it's untimely. . . ." The court later entered a ruling in which it first addressed Kuper's request for admissions. It denied Kuper's request that the matters be deemed admitted, concluding Kuper could not claim prejudice. The court further rejected Kuper's claim for reimbursements of improvements made during his tenancy. It found Kuper's "evidence falls short of establishing an oral contract modifying the written lease." Kuper appeals from this ruling, specifically claiming the court erred in denying his request to deem the matters admitted and in overruling his motion for leave to amend.
Request for Admissions.
Because the executor's response to his request for admissions was clearly untimely, see Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.510(2), Kuper moved the district court to deem the requests for admissions admitted. The court denied the request. On appeal, Kuper claims the court erred in this respect.
The district court's decision regarding late responses will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Uthe v. Time-Out Family Amusement Ctrs., 475 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). In order to show an abuse of discretion, one generally must show the court exercised its discretion "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Blackwell, 238 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 1976).
The right to file late responses to a request for admissions rests in the court's discretion. Double D Land Cattle Co., Inc. v. Brown, 541 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). In making this determination, the district court is to consider (1) whether the presentation of the merits would be subserved by a late filing, and (2) whether the party who obtained or requested the admissions failed to satisfy the court that he would be prejudiced by a late filing. Allied Gas Chem. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 1983).
As the district court appropriately noted, the topics contained in Kuper's requests for admissions "go to the heart of the case." For example, Kuper asked the executor to admit or deny whether Richard agreed to reimburse him for improvements made to the farm and to admit or deny whether the un-reimbursed improvements exceeded $8,000 in value. Furthermore, we concur in the district court's assessment that Kuper cannot claim prejudice because of the executor's late response. The answers were filed well in advance of trial and therefore should not have affected Kuper's ability to investigate and argue his case. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying the request to have the matters deemed admitted.
Motion for Leave to Amend.
Kuper's original claim in probate only sought recovery for "improvements made to the decedent's farmland. . . ." His motion for leave to amend proposed adding a claim that he was owed $16,000 for half the costs of shelling corn under the lease. The court denied the motion for leave to amend.
We will reverse the trial court's refusal to allow an amendment of the petition only upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Porter v. Good Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 1993). Leave to amend pleadings should be freely given. Id. However, an amendment should not be allowed if it will substantially change the claim. W W Livestock Enters., Inc. v. Dennler, 179 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Iowa 1970).
We agree with the trial court that the amendment Kuper sought to make would have substantially changed his claims against the executor on the eve of trial. As noted, the motion to amend was made two days before trial was scheduled to begin and the executor claims she only received notice of the motion one day prior to trial. Moreover, the proposed amendment constituted an entirely different cause of action that would have entailed presentation of entirely different facts, leaving the executor little chance to assemble a new defense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Kuper to amend his petition.