Opinion
570548/09.
Decided November 19, 2009.
Defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Nelida Malave-Gonzalez, J.), entered June 19, 2009, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Order (Nelida Malave-Gonzalez, J.), entered June 19, 2009, reversed, with $10 costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
PRESENT: McKeon, P.J., Shulman, Hunter, JJ.
Defendant made a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendant's radiologist reviewed MRI studies of plaintiff's spine and observed preexisting degenerative disease. Moreover, defendant's neurologist examined plaintiff and concluded that she had no neurological deficits or disabilities. In opposition, plaintiff failed to offer any explanation for her cessation of treatment six months after the vehicular accident — approximately 21 months before defendants' summary judgment motion — which fatally undermined plaintiff's claim of serious injury ( see Krieger v Diallo, 62 AD3d 504; Rivera v Gelco Corp., 58 AD3d 477; Day v Santos, 58 AD3d 447).
We additionally note that no triable issue was raised concerning plaintiff's claim that she sustained a medically determined, nonpermanent injury that prevented her from performing substantially all of her usual and customary daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident. Plaintiff's intermittent inability to work in the months following the accident does not establish a "90/180 day" claim ( e.g. Colon v Tavares, 60 AD3d 419). Moreover, plaintiff's treating doctor's assertions that plaintiff was "disabled" and that he "advised [plaintiff] . . . to limit her daily activities" are too general to raise an issue of fact ( see Morris v Ilya Cab Corp., 61 AD3d 434; Valentin v Pomilla, 59 AD3d 184).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.