Opinion
July 8, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 471
Marilyn Traub Meadoff, Denver, for petitioner.
John D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado).
SMITH, Judge.
This is an appeal by petitioner from the Industrial Commission's order affirming a referee's ruling that petitioner is disqualified from the receipt of any earned benefits for a period 13 weeks and that this amounts to a reduction of $598 in maximum benefits payable. We affirm.
Petitioner had been employed in Denver from April 16, 1973, to August 9, 1973, when her employer terminated her employment because of her illness. Late in September 1973, petitioner went to New Jersey to visit her ailing father. On October 1, 1973, petitioner took a job in New Jersey which she subsequently quit on November 9, 1973, to return to Denver. It is only this separation from the New Jersey job that is at issue.
The Commission relies on s 8--73--108(6)(d), C.R.S.1973, which provides, in essence, that no award of benefits be given to an employee who is separated from a job because she has moved to another locale, except for health reasons or to accept a better job. Petitioner's testimony is the only evidence in the record and states that the job in New Jersey was temporary and was to last only while she was visiting her sick father. She also stated that she quit the New Jersey job so that she could return to Colorado and that she had no firm prospects for a job in Denver or elsewhere prior to her termination of the New Jersey employment. Her own testimony clearly supports the application of the no award section of the act. See Anderson v. Valspar Corp., 29 Colo.App. 294, 482 P.2d 992, and Gatewood v. Russell, 29 Colo.App. 11, 478 P.2d 679.
Petitioner asserts that the reason for taking and quitting the New Jersey job was her filial obligation to her father and thus that s 8--73--108(8)(a), C.R.S.1973, is applicable. This section provides that a special award of benefits shall be granted where the separation from employment is due to marital, parental, filial, or domestic obligations. It also provides that an employee is not entitled to receive benefit payments until, subsequent to the separation which caused the special award, the employee has worked 13 weeks in full-time employment in Colorado, or in a job outside of Colorado which is also covered under unemployment insurance law. Here, there is no evidence that any filial obligation to her father caused either the separation from the New Jersey job or, in fact, from the Colorado job. On the contrary, she quit the New Jersey job so that she could return to Colorado. Furthermore, no evidence was presented to show that she has been employed for a 13-week period in such employment as is required by the statute.
Order affirmed.
ENOCH and KELLY, JJ., concur.