We agree with the Seventh Circuit that now that Solidarity is a part of the Polish coalition government, the Board properly took notice of this fact and reasonably inferred that, generally speaking, Solidarity members will not be persecuted. Kubon v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Kaczmarczyk v. I.N.S., 933 F.2d at 594 ("it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that Poland's changed political circumstances substantially diminished the likelihood that the Polish government would persecute Solidarity members and activists").

We review the decision of the BIA, not the IJ. See Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States Dep't of Immigration and Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988). Section 106(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), confers jurisdiction on this court to review "all final orders of deportation." The final order before us is the BIA's order dismissing Balazoski's appeal from the decision of the IJ.

This Court is authorized to review only the order of the Board, not the decision of the immigration judge. See Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988). We refuse, however, to allow a mere technicality in pleading to result in a denial of an opportunity for petitioner to obtain a decision on the merits.

However, in all three of these cases, the prisoners were not mistreated during their respective detentions. See Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990)(Zalega, though arrested and interrogated five times, with detentions of up to thirty-six hours, "was not mistreated while incarcerated"); Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1987) (four days' detention; "There is no indication that [Mendez] was tortured or molested while in detention"); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (no evidence that Kubon was mistreated during his five-day detention). Additionally, in Zalega and Kubon, the Seventh Circuit also relied on the improving political situation in Poland to justify its affirmance of the BIA's denial of asylum in both cases.

Cases in which the appellate court has affirmed the BIA's decision upholding an immigration judge's denial of asylum for lack of a well-founded fear of persecution include Mustafa v. INS, No. 92-2247, 1993 WL 347441 at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1993); Tokarska v. INS, 978 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1992); Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 971 F.2d at 29; Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d at 771; Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 172-73 (8th Cir. 1991); Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47 (3d Cir. 1991); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d at 591; and Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1990). In these circumstances, the INS, not Petitioners, bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that changed conditions since the time of the persecution no longer justify Petitioners' well-founded fear of being persecuted.

. It follows that the Board may not use its undoubted authority to take official notice of a change in a government abroad, see, e.g., Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1991); Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 48 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1991); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1991); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990), in such a way as to deny an applicant for asylum her Due Process right to a meaningful hearing. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).

The BIA based its decision upon a ground entirely different than did the IJ, and it is the BIA's decision that we review. See Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1988). Second, Gutierrez argues that the BIA erred in rejecting her claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution or, in the alternative, that it is more likely than not that she will be persecuted if she returns to Nicaragua.

The Board is entitled to take administrative notice of a change of government. See, e.g., Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991) (notice taken of Solidarity party becoming member of Polish coalition government); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States ex rel. Mercer v. Esperdy, 234 F. Supp. 611, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (notice taken of unsafe conditions in Haiti). An agency such as the Board may take official notice of "commonly acknowledged facts, [and] . . . technical or scientific facts that are within the agency's area of expertise."

It is highly unlikely, therefore, that Janusiak would be persecuted for his activities on behalf of that organization. See Kubon v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (member of Solidarity could not prove a well-founded fear of persecution because Solidarity is now part of the governing coalition in Poland). The Board often aids courts of appeals "by taking administrative notice of important facts about the country in question."

"Although the term `persecution' includes actions less severe than threats to life or freedom, actions must rise above the level of mere harassment to constitute persecution." Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Gormley, 364 F.3d at 1176; see Dandan 339 F.3d at 573 (holding that three-day detention which included interrogations, beatings, and deprivation of food and water did not compel a conclusion of past persecution); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that brief confinement for political opposition to a totalitarian regime did not constitute persecution); Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a four-day detention did not amount to persecution). "Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment that our society regards as offensive."