This position is shared by other jurisdictions which have concluded, even in the absence of an artificial insemination provision, that placing a high burden on a spouse to demonstrate that he or she did not consent to the artificial insemination procedure ensures that the best interests of the child are considered. For example, in K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J.Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64, 66 (1981), the New Jersey court concluded that, even in the absence of a statutory artificial insemination provision, "[p]ublic policy considerations seeking to prevent children born as a result of [artificial insemination] procedures from becoming public charges ... require that a presumption of consent exist and that a strong burden be placed on one seeking to rebut the presumption." Id. at 68.
Thus, the court concluded, the husband was liable for the support of the child, whether on the basis of an implied consent to support, or by reason of the application of the doctrine of estoppel. In K.S. v. G.S. (1981), 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64, the wife did not conceive until approximately 15 months after the husband gave his oral consent to the artificial insemination. The husband claimed that he withdrew his consent and that the wife proceeded without his knowledge or approval.
`Almost exclusively, courts which have addressed this issue have assigned parental responsibility to the husband based on conduct evidencing his consent to the artificial insemination.' ( In re Baby Doe (1987) 291 S.C. 389 [ 353 S.E.2d 877, 878]; accord, Gursky v. Gursky (1963) 39 Misc.2d 1083 [ 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-412] [even though child was not technically `legitimate' under New York law at the time, husband's conduct in consenting to the artificial insemination properly invoked application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel requiring him to support the child]; Anonymous v. Anonymous (1964) 41 Misc.2d 886 [ 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836-837] [following Gursky]; K.S. v. G.S. (1981) 182 N.J. Super. 102 [ 440 A.2d 64, 68] [because husband did not offer clear and convincing evidence that he had withdrawn his consent to artificial insemination procedure, he was bound by initial consent given earlier and accordingly held to be lawful father of the child]; In re Marriage of Adams (1988) 174 Ill. App.3d 595 [124 Ill.Dec. 184, 528 N.E.2d 1075, 1087] [affirming child support award where trial court had determined there was `actual consent' to artificial insemination]; K.B. v. N.B. (Tex.Ct.App. 1991) 811 S.W.2d 634, 639] [even though husband did not consent in writing to insemination procedure, his full knowledge of the facts and willing participation in the artificial insemination, involvement in child birth classes, speaking of the child as `our baby' and passage of time before repudiation established that he ratified procedure and was therefore liable for child support]; Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 [consent of husband to wife's artificial insemination meant obligation t
"Almost exclusively, courts which have addressed this issue have assigned parental responsibility to the husband based on conduct evidencing his consent to the artificial insemination." ( In re Baby Doe (1987) 291 S.C. 389 [ 353 S.E.2d 877, 878]; accord, Gursky v. Gursky (1963) 39 Misc.2d 1083 [242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-412] [even though child was not technically "legitimate" under New York law at the time, husband's conduct in consenting to the artificial insemination properly invoked application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel requiring him to support the child]; Anonymous v. Anonymous (1964) 41 Misc.2d 886 [246 N YS.2d 835, 836-837] [following Gursky]; K.S. v. G.S. (1981) 182 N.J. Super. 102 [ 440 A.2d 64, 68] [because husband did not offer clear and convincing evidence that he had withdrawn his consent to artificial insemination procedure, he was bound by initial consent given earlier and accordingly held to be lawful father of the child]; In re Marriage of Adams (1988) 174 Ill. App.3d 595 [124 Ill.Dec. 184, 528 N.E.2d 1075, 1087] [affirming child support award where trial court had determined there was "actual consent" to artificial insemination];K.B. v. N.B. (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) 811 S.W.2d 634, 639] [even though husband did not consent in writing to insemination procedure, his full knowledge of the facts and willing participation in the artificial insemination, involvement in child birth classes, speaking of the child as "our baby" and passage of time before repudiation established that he ratified procedure and was therefore liable for child support]; Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994) 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 [consent of husband to wife's artificial insemination meant obligation
" In 1981, New Jersey considered a case (K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J.Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64) that factually is nearly identical to the case before us, including that the wife did not conceive until approximately fifteen months after the husband gave his oral consent to the artificial insemination. The husband claimed that he withdrew his consent and that the wife proceeded without his knowledge or approval.
. In K.S. v. G.S. 182 N.J.Super. 102, 107, 440 A.2d 64 (1981), a New Jersey court articulated the strong public policy underlying the common law presumption: [P]ublic policy considerations seeking to prevent children born as a result of AID procedures from becoming public charges or being bastardized require that a presumption of consent exist and that a strong burden be placed on one seeking to rebut the presumption.
The courts of other states have reached similar results and have assigned parental responsibility based on conduct evincing consent to the artificial insemination. See Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963) (husband held liable for support of a child conceived by artificial insemination under either the basis of implied consent to support or the application of the doctrine of estoppel); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981) (oral consent of husband was effective at the time pregnancy occurs unless established by clear and convincing evidence that consent has been revoked or rescinded); In re Marriage of L.M.S., 105 Wis. 2d 118, 122-23, 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (App. 1981) (sterile man who suggested to his wife that she become pregnant by another man and promised that he would acknowledge the child as his own has a legal obligation "to support the child for whose existence he is responsible"); In re Baby Doe, 291 S.C. 389, 353 S.E.2d 877 (1987) (husband's consent to artificial insemination may be express, or implied from conduct). Here, Raymond's alleged conduct evinces a powerful case of actual consent.
We hold that a husband who consents for his wife to conceive a child through artificial insemination, with the understanding that the child will be treated as their own, is the legal father of the child born as a result of the artificial insemination and will be charged with all the legal responsibilities of paternity, including support. See,e.g., R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wis.2d 118, 312 N.W.2d 853 (1981); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981); Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc.2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973); People v. Sorensen, supra. See also, Estate of Gordon, 131 Misc.2d 823, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1986).
Consistent with our State's strong presumption of legitimacy, as well as the compelling public policy of protecting children conceived via AID, we follow the lead of other jurisdictions that impose a rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of a woman who conceives by AID, shifting the burden to the husband to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence ( see e.g. In re Baby Doe, 291 SC at 391, 353 SE2d at 878; K. S. v G. S., 182 NJ Super 102, 109, 440 A2d 64, 68; People v Sorensen, 68 Cal 2d 280, 283, 437 P2d 495, 497; but see Jackson v Jackson, 137 Ohio App 3d 782, 795, 739 NE2d 1203, 1213 [burden on wife to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence]). Although our Legislature has provided an avenue to avoid factual disputes essentially by creating an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy where the prerequisites of the statute are met ( see Domestic Relations Law § 73), the need for a rebuttable presumption also clearly exists, especially so in light of the evidence that medical personnel who conduct AID procedures are not always aware of statutory consent requirements ( see e.g. Anonymous v Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, *18 [Sup Ct, NY County 1991]; Jackson v Jackson, 137 Ohio App 3d at 793, 739 NE2d at 1211).
Various theories have also been applied in states without AID statutes or in cases issued before a particular state statute was enacted. See Levin v. Levin (Ind. 1994), 645 N.E.2d 601 (no statute; equitable estoppel); In re Baby Doe (1987), 291 S.C. 389, 353 S.E.2d 877 (no statute; express or implied consent sufficient); K.S. v. G.S. (N.J.Super. 1981), 182 N.J. Super. 102, 108, 440 A.2d 64, 68 (pre-statute; based on public policy considerations, consent is presumed unless husband proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence); and Gursky v. Gursky (N.Y.Sup. 1963), 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (pre-statute; implied contract). In one of the leading pre-statute or common law cases, the California Supreme Court stated that: