Opinion
Case No. 16-cv-02459-EMC
12-07-2016
DAN KRUGER, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Defendant.
ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND (3) REMANDING CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Docket Nos. 15, 16
In February 2009, Plaintiff Dan Kruger protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. See AR 203-04. The application was denied initially in April 2009, see AR 100-04, and then upon reconsideration in November 2009. See AR 108-12. Mr. Kruger then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). See AR 114. A hearing was held before ALJ Maxine R. Benmour in November 2010. See AR 52. Subsequently, in January 2011, ALJ Benmour issued her decision, concluding that Mr. Kruger was not disabled from October 20, 1995 (the alleged onset date) through December 31, 2000 (the date last insured). See AR 29-38. Mr. Kruger then asked the Appeals Council for the Social Security Administration ("SSA") to review the ALJ's decision, but that request was denied, thus leaving the ALJ's decision as "the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security." AR 1. Mr. Kruger then initiated Case No. C-12-5820 EMC, challenging the ALJ's decision.
In Case No. C-12-5820 EMC, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and this Court denied the Commissioner's motion but granted in part and denied in part Mr. Kruger's. The Court determined that a remand for further factual development of the record was necessary. See generally Kruger v. Colvin, No. C-12-5820 EMC (N.D. Cal.) (Docket No. 18) (order).
Consistent with the Court's order, the SSA conducted further factual development of the record. As noted by Mr. Kruger, he was "not able to offer any additional information beyond what [he] had initially provided," other than two letters from Dr. Bruce Blumberg, the genetic specialist who first diagnosed him with a condition known as Ehler's Danlos Syndrome, and more recent medical records from Kaiser, which were dated well past his date last insured. Mot. at 2-3. A new hearing was subsequently held before a different ALJ - Alberto E. Gonzalez - in April 2014. In September 2014, ALJ Gonzalez issued his decision, denying Mr. Kruger's claim for disability insurance benefits. See AR 548-61. The Appeals Council found that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. See AR 527. Mr. Kruger thereafter filed the instant action.
As indicated by the above, Mr. Kruger has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim of disability, and this Court has jurisdiction to review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Mr. Kruger has moved for summary judgment, seeking a reversal of the Commissioner's decision and a remand for an immediate award of benefits. The Commissioner has cross-moved for summary judgment. Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, including but not limited to the administrative record, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court hereby GRANTS Mr. Kruger's motion and DENIES the Commissioner's. The Court remands to the agency for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BCKGROUND
As noted above, ALJ Gonzalez rejected Mr. Kruger's claim for benefits, applying the five-step sequential evaluation process provided for by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
"Step one disqualifies claimants who are engaged in substantial gainful activity from being considered disabled under the regulations. Step two disqualifies those claimants who do not have one or more severe impairments that significantly limit their physical or mental ability to conduct basic work activities. Step three automatically labels as disabled those claimants whose impairment or impairments meet the duration requirement and are listed or equal to those listed in a given appendix. Benefits are awarded at step three if claimants are disabled. Step four disqualifies those remaining claimants whose impairments do not prevent them from doing past relevant work. Step five disqualifies those claimants whose impairments do not prevent them from doing other work, but at this last step the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the government. Claimants not disqualified by step five are eligible for benefits."Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).
In the instant case, ALJ Gonzalez made the following rulings.
• Mr. Kruger's date last insured ("DLI") was December 31, 2000. See AR 551; see also Sam v. Astrue, 550 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that "only disabilities existing before date last insured establish entitlement to disability insurance benefits").
• Mr. Kruger did not engage in substantial gainful activity from October 20, 1995 (the onset date that Mr. Kruger asserted before the first ALJ), to December 31, 2000 (the DLI). See AR 551.
• Through the DLI, Mr. Kruger had the following medically determinable impairments: Ehlers Danlos syndrome ("EDS") and annual fissures at the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels, status post intradiscal electrothemeral disc decompression, nuclectomy, and anuloplasty. See AR 551.
• Through the DLI, Mr. Kruger did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments - i.e., he "did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited the ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months." AR 551.
Although the ALJ referenced this alleged onset date, the Appeals Council properly noted that, at the hearing before the ALJ, Mr. Kruger amended the alleged onset date to December 1, 2000. See AR 526 (Appeals Council decision, dated November 6, 2015); AR 619 (ALJ hearing). --------
Accordingly, ALJ Gonzalez concluded that Mr. Kruger was not disabled from the alleged onset date of disability through December 31, 2000 (i.e., the DLI). AR 560. As indicated in note 1, the amended alleged onset date is December 1, 2000.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
After a final decision on a claim for benefits by the Commissioner, the claimant may seek judicial review of that decision by a district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner's decision will be disturbed only if the ALJ has committed legal error or if the ALJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See Stout v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We will uphold the Commissioner's denial of benefits if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and substantial evidence supports the decision."). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence - "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance" - that a reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). A court evaluates "the record as a whole, . . . weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ's conclusion" to determine if substantial evidence supports a finding. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence supports "more than one rational interpretation," the Court must uphold the ALJ's decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). B. Step Two Inquiry
As noted above, here, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Kruger was not disabled because, through the DLI, he did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. That is, he "did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited the ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months." AR 551. This was a step two finding. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (providing that a claimant "must have a severe impairment," i.e., "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities").
Mr. Kruger argues that ALJ Gonzalez's step-two analysis should be rejected because (1) the ALJ improperly gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. McCown, a nontreating, nonexamining medical expert who testified at the ALJ hearing, instead of crediting the opinions of Mr. Kruger's treating physicians, Dr. Saal and Dr. Blumberg; and (2) the ALJ improperly found Mr. Kruger only partially credible. The government disputes such. The Court, however, need not address the merits of these arguments at this time because there is a more fundamental problem before it. That is, the ALJ committed a legal error in his analysis. Although the ALJ properly acknowledged that, at step two, "[a]n impairment or combination of impairments is 'not severe' when medical and other evidence establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work," AR 550; see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996), he does not appear to have taken into consideration Ninth Circuit law explaining that "the step two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Id. (emphasis added); cf. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "[t]he step two and step five determinations require different levels of severity of limitations such that the satisfaction of the requirements at step two does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the claimant has satisfied the requirements at step five"). Because the ALJ did not take into account this Ninth Circuit law, he appears to have applied more rigor at step two than is permitted.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that summary judgment in Mr. Kruger's favor and a remand are appropriate. On remand, the agency shall reconsider, under the appropriate legal test, whether Mr. Kruger has met his burden at step two.
In so ruling, the Court is not expressing any opinion as to how step two or any of the later steps, if reached, should be resolved. It is worth noting, however, that much of the ALJ's analysis at step two - which was thorough and detailed - could well inform the agency's analysis at, e.g., step four, should it reach that step. For example, much of the evidence addressed by the ALJ may be relevant to determining what residual functional capacity Mr. Kruger had at the relevant time.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that there does not seem to be any real dispute that a person with Ehlers-Danlos syndrome can experience significant pain out of proportion to the objective medical findings. But, contrary to what Mr. Kruger suggests, even though he was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, that does not thereby mean that his complaints of disabling pain are unassailable. The ALJ was still entitled - indeed, required - to do a credibility assessment. That remains true for the agency on remand.
Finally, the Court notes that this case presents somewhat unique circumstances in that, even though the factual record has been further developed as previously ordered by the Court, there is still, quite simply, minimal evidence regarding Mr. Kruger's condition at the relevant time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Mr. Kruger's motion and denies the Commissioner's and further remands this case for further proceedings with the agency.
This order disposes of Docket Nos. 15 and 16.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 7, 2016
/s/_________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge