Opinion
6:22-cv-04480-TMC-JDA
12-14-2022
Brandon Krouser, Plaintiff, v. The Cove at Fair Forest, Management/Owner, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Brandon Krouser (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against the Cove at Fair Forest (“Defendant”). All pretrial proceedings in this matter were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on December 12, 2022. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that he “was moved into a cockroach infested apartment unit.” [Id. at 5.] Although Plaintiff explained the issue to management on the day that he moved, the issue had not been fixed a few weeks later. [Id.] Plaintiff was therefore issued a refund, but not in full. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff was not reimbursed for the loss of his food. [Id.] Plaintiff contends these events all occurred from November 2, 2022, through December 3, 2022. [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff contends that he lost more than $700 in food, over 200 articles of clothing at a cost of over $2,000, an $800 dresser, and a $1,200 bed set. [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff was forced to pay over $900 for take-out food because the microwave and oven were both infested. [Id.] Finally, Plaintiff was forced to stay in a hotel for the last two weeks prior to vacating the apartment, costing him $1,150. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that these losses were all due to the cockroach infestation in his apartment. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court possesses the inherent authority to review the pro se pleadings to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous. See Ferguson v. Wooton, 741 Fed.Appx. 955 (4th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases and explaining that “[f]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the district court's inherent authority, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee” and that “dismissal prior to service of process is permissible when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”); Doiley v. Lieber Corr. Inst., No. 2:07-cv-3969-PMD, 2008 WL 190637, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2008) (explaining a plaintiff's “claims are subject to an initial sua sponte review by the Court pursuant to the Court's inherent authority to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists” even where the pro se plaintiff paid the filing fee and did not seek to proceed in forma pauperis).
DISCUSSION
Allegations Regarding Jurisdiction
In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify whether he brings this action based on the Court's diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. [See Doc. 1 at 3 (question on the standard complaint form for the basis of jurisdiction left blank).] Nevertheless, it appears that Plaintiff intends to bring this action based on diversity jurisdiction. For example, on the standard complaint form, Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of South Carolina and that Defendant is also a citizen of South Carolina. [Id. at 4.] Likewise, Plaintiff alleges the amount in controversy is $5,500. [Id. at 5.]
Jurisdiction Generally
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required to determine if “a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings, McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.”
Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1331 provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists ‘only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'” Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties are completely diverse only if no party on one side is a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978); Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD Fin. Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “no plaintiff may share a citizenship with any defendant”).
Analysis
The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.
First, Plaintiff has not pled facts showing the Court has federal question jurisdiction, and the Court is unable to glean any basis for federal question jurisdiction from the face of the Complaint. Although Plaintiff has not identified any specific cause of action, his allegations appear to sound in state law. Further, the Complaint is devoid of any reference to a federal statute, rule, or constitutional provision that could support federal question jurisdiction.
Second, the allegations in the Complaint fail to satisfy the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. As noted, Plaintiff alleges that the amount in controversy is $5,500, which is far short of the statutory amount required. Further, Plaintiff alleges that both parties are citizens of South Carolina. Thus, because the amount in controversy is not satisfied and complete diversity between the parties does not exist, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action on either federal question or diversity grounds, this case should be dismissed.
This Court's conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims does not mean that he is without a remedy. For example, Plaintiff may be able to bring his state law claims in the state court.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).