Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 16-0257
12-06-2016
KRISTEN B., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, B.S., Appellees.
COUNSEL Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Laura J. Huff Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD27123
The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Samuel E. Vederman joined. WINTHROP, Judge:
The Honorable Samuel E. Vederman, Judge of the Arizona Superior Court, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
¶1 Kristen B. ("Mother") appeals the family court's order severing her parental rights to B.S. ("the child"). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") met its burden of proving the statutory grounds for severance by clear and convincing evidence. Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide her with reunification services. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Mother and J.S. ("Father") are the biological parents of the child, who was born in 2009. Mother has a history of substance abuse, including the use of heroin. In 2012, DCS received a report from a substance abuse treatment facility in California that, against medical advice, Mother had left the facility with the child, stating that she planned to return to Arizona to use drugs again. In September 2013, Mother left the child with her sister ("Aunt") for the night. The next morning, a friend returned to Aunt's house with Mother, who was "completely passed out" from drinking all night. DCS was notified of the situation and promptly took temporary custody of the child and placed him with Aunt.
The family court also severed Father's parental rights to the child, but he is not a party to this appeal.
¶3 In October 2013, DCS initiated dependency proceedings, alleging that Mother had neglected the child by leaving him with family members for extended periods of time and abusing substances, such as alcohol and heroin. Mother denied the allegations but submitted the issue to the court, which adjudicated the child dependent.
¶4 The court approved a case plan of family reunification. To further that goal, DCS offered Mother parent aide services, a substance-abuse assessment and treatment, urinalysis testing, and visitation. Mother did not participate in the services offered by DCS. Mother also failed to maintain regular contact with DCS during this time.
¶5 At a June 2014 Report and Review Hearing, Mother indicated that she would be checking into an in-patient drug-treatment program. Although Mother started the program, she left after a week.
¶6 In December 2014, the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. DCS then moved to sever Mother's parental rights on the grounds of chronic substance abuse and nine- and fifteen-month out-of-home placement. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(a), (c) (Supp. 2015).
Absent material changes after relevant events, we cite a statute's current version.
¶7 Mother subsequently agreed to participate in services offered by DCS. A substance abuse assessment was conducted and Mother began group sessions for substance abuse treatment, but was eventually closed out of the program for noncompliance. DCS also arranged a psychological evaluation for Mother in May 2015, after which she was diagnosed with "opioid use disorder, severe." The psychologist stated that Mother's "longstanding substance use disorder . . . has rendered her incapable of parenting her child in a safe and effective manner." The psychologist also noted "[i]t remains unclear if [Mother] is genuinely committed to stabilizing her life such that she could reassume care of [the child]," and "[s]everance and adoption may prove to be the appropriate case plan with this parent and her child."
¶8 In May 2016, after a two-day hearing, the juvenile court issued an order severing Mother's rights to the child, finding that DCS had met its burden of proving the statutory grounds for severance by clear and convincing evidence and that severance was in the child's best interest.
¶9 Mother timely appealed the order, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution; A.R.S. § 8- 235(A); and Rule 103(A) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.
ANALYSIS
¶10 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination was warranted for substance abuse under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and for nine- and fifteen-month out-of-home placement under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) and (c). Mother also claims that DCS denied her certain reunification services, such as a parent aide, individual counseling, a psychiatrist to evaluate and treat her anxiety, therapeutic visitation, and failed to provide letters explaining the services DCS was to provide for her.
Although a DCS caseworker testified at the severance hearing that he did not know of any letters DCS sent to Mother detailing the services offered, the juvenile court's minute entries demonstrate that Mother was advised multiple times in court of the services that DCS was to make available to her. Additionally, throughout the dependency proceedings, DCS had difficulty maintaining contact with Mother due to her transient lifestyle.
¶11 We review a juvenile court's order severing a parent's rights for abuse of discretion. Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions, 239 Ariz. 184, 190, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d 88, 94 (App. 2016). We will affirm a juvenile court's factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93-94, ¶ 4, 210 P.3d 1263, 1264-65 (App. 2009).
¶12 Although a parent possesses a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of her child, see Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005), a court may sever those rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for severance, and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the child's best interest. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 281-82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41, 110 P.3d at 1015-16, 1022.
¶13 A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) provides that termination of the parent-child relationship is justified where a parent is "unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period." In making a termination decision, courts must also consider the best interest of the child. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B).
Mother does not contest the juvenile court's finding that severance was in the best interest of the child. She has therefore waived any challenge to that finding. See Childress Buick Co. v. O'Connell, 198 Ariz. 454, 459, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 413, 418 (App. 2000) ("[I]ssues not clearly raised in appellate briefs are deemed waived.").
¶14 Here, Mother contends that there is no evidence she is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities at the present time. She claims that she has "successfully addressed her past issues" with drug use because she has not used drugs in over six months, she is involved in a methadone maintenance program, and she is attending 12-step meetings and has a sponsor. But, Mother admitted during her psychological evaluation that she does not find the meetings helpful, and she has no current plans to wean off methadone.
¶15 Further, throughout dependency proceedings, Mother exhibited a pattern of claiming she would seek treatment and then failing to complete the programs. Mother also repeatedly refused to participate in services offered to her by DCS. Even when she finally agreed to participate, Mother failed to complete the program and was closed out for noncompliance. Accordingly, although Mother now asserts that she is no longer using drugs, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights on the ground of chronic substance abuse. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29, 231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010) (stating that "temporary abstinence from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a parent's] significant history of abuse or [] consistent inability to abstain during th[e] case"). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Because the record supports the juvenile court's order severing Mother's parental rights due to chronic substance abuse, we do not address Mother's arguments on other statutory grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002) ("If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds."). --------
CONCLUSION
¶16 The juvenile court's order severing Mother's parental rights is affirmed.