Krewson v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Kipp v. State

    704 A.2d 839 (Del. 1998)   Cited 12 times
    Discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession

    Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1983); State v. Carr, Del.Supr., 641 A.2d 833 (1994). Cf. Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840, 842 (1988). Therefore, Kipp's 1990 conviction for Assault in the Third Degree is valid.

  2. In re Mid-Atlantic Settlement Ser

    755 A.2d 389 (Del. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    avily influenced and directed by the requirements of the lender, while the consumer lacks experience and specialized knowledge in the process together with a typical recurring desire to obtain the closing of the transaction as efficiently, timely and inexpensively as possible. Moreover. since settlement expenses charged by the lender or its agent are uniformly added to the principal amount of the loan, although paid promptly to the lender or its agent at settlement, a financially desperate and unrepresented borrower is without leverage or knowledge to avoid being taken advantage of. The Board does not believe obtaining the borrower's signature on yet another detailed and fine-printed form in conjunction with a real estate settlement in Delaware, purporting to be a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of counsel, is an effective option for a typical borrower or consumer. This Court has previously addressed parallel concerns in the context of waiver of important legal rights (see Krewson v. State, Del. Supr., 552 A.2d 840 (1988)), especially in the context of an economic environment where the consumer is disadvantaged by knowledge and experience. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arms, Del. Supr., 477 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1984); Bryant v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 542 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1988); O'Hanlon v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co., D.Del., 522 F. Supp. 332, 335 (1981), aff'd 3d Cir., 681 F.2d 806 (1982).

  3. State v. Carr

    641 A.2d 833 (Del. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    PER CURIAM: In this discretionary appeal by the State of Delaware ("State"), we again address a question presumably settled by our decision in Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840 (1988): what constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of establishing the mandatory penalties for a subsequent offense of driving under the influence under 21 Del. C. ยง 4177(d)(2)? The Superior Court ruled that an earlier conviction entered on a guilty plea followed by first offender treatment could not be deemed a second offense "trigger" in the absence of a showing that the defendant had been warned of the effect of his diversion on any subsequent offense.

  4. Petition of State

    616 A.2d 292 (Del. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    Bordley, 545 A.2d at 620. The nature of its asserted breach of duty is Superior Court's alleged misinterpretation of this Court's holding in Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840 (1988), as applied to the facts of this case. The State argues that Superior Court has expanded the Krewson holding "for [sic] beyond what this Court intended."

  5. Brown v. State

    Case ID: 1502004036 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    We further rule that a defendant electing to participate in a first offender program, incident to a judicial proceeding, need not be warned of the triggering effect of the first offense on any subsequent conviction for driving under the influence." These cases make clear that any "notice" argument defendant may have elsewhere, there is no room for such an argument as a matter of Delaware law. 552 A.2d 840 (Del. 1998). State v. Carr, 641 A.2d 833, 834 (Del. 1994).

  6. State v. Pressley

    I.D. No. 0106017754 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002)

    Moreover, a conviction for driving under the influence which occurs as part of a judicial proceeding is not rendered invalid because the defendant was not given a judicial warning of the subsequent penalties triggered by the first conviction. State v. Carr, 641 A.2d 833 (Del. 1994). Although defendant appears to raise an issue as to whether or not certain prior convictions resulted from a valid judicial proceeding under Krewson v. State, 522 A.2d 840 (Del. 1988), I am constrained because of the requirements of Section 4177(B)(e)(5) which was enacted subsequent to Krewson and Carr. Section 4177(B)(e)(5) sets forth the procedures under which such challenges must be made. Therefore, I am going to sentence the defendant for a fourth offense.

  7. State v. Caulfield

    I.D. No. 9804022026 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2001)

    Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a).Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840, 842 (1988) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)). Regarding the jury trial of a forfeiture proceeding, the Supreme Court has stated the following guidelines:

  8. State v. Wilhere

    653 A.2d 282 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994)   Cited 1 times
    Interpreting 21 Del. C. ยง 2802, which defines an habitual motor vehicle offender, to all allow a motorist to be adjudicated as an habitual offender when he has accumulated three convictions for specific driving offenses, even though the third offense takes place prior to a conviction for the second offense

    Villa, 456 A.2d at 1232. See State v. Carr, Del.Supr., 641 A.2d 833 (1994) (holding that an earlier conviction for Driving Under the Influence followed by a second like offense "will subject the offender to second offense sanctions, whether or not the offender was expressly warned of that result"); see also Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840, 843 (1988). Accordingly, Defendant's latter argument must fail.