Krasner v. Ward

Full title: LARRY KRASNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF…

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Sep 26, 2024

2 EAP 2023 (Pa. Sep. 26, 2024)

Opinion

2 EAP 2023 3 EAP 2023 4 EAP 2023 J-65A-C-2023

09-26-2024

LARRY KRASNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA v. SENATOR KIM WARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE; REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY R. BONNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG WILLIAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE JARED SOLOMON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; AND JOHN DOES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT COMMITTEE APPEAL OF: REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY R. BONNER AND REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG WILLIAMS LARRY KRASNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant v. SENATOR KIM WARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE; REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY R. BONNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG WILLIAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE JARED SOLOMON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; AND JOHN DOES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT COMMITTEE, Appellees LARRY KRASNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA v. SENATOR KIM WARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE; REPRESENTATIVE TIMOTHY R. BONNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE CRAIG WILLIAMS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; REPRESENTATIVE JARED SOLOMON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN IMPEACHMENT MANAGER; AND JOHN DOES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT COMMITTEE APPEAL OF: SENATOR KIM WARD

TODD, CHIEF JUSTICE

ARGUED: November 28, 2023

Appeal from the Order of Commonwealth Court entered on December 30, 2022 at No. 563 M.D. 2022.

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON JJ.

OPINION

TODD, CHIEF JUSTICE

This case is a direct appeal and cross appeal from the Commonwealth Court's adjudication of a petition for review brought by Appellant Larry Krasner, the elected District Attorney of Philadelphia County ("DA"), in which he raised several legal and constitutional challenges to articles of impeachment ("Articles" or "Articles of Impeachment") seeking his removal from office. The Articles were in the form of a resolution passed by a majority vote of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives ("House") on November 18, 2022, and they were transmitted to the Pennsylvania Senate ("Senate") on November 30, 2022 - the final day of the 206th Session of the General Assembly. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Articles became null and void upon the expiration of the 206th Session of the General Assembly on November 30, 2022, under Article II of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, thus, the Senate of the 207th Session of the General Assembly is not empowered by that charter to conduct a trial on the Articles to determine if the DA should be convicted and removed from office under them. We therefore reverse the portion of the order of the Commonwealth Court which denied the District Attorney's application for summary relief on this issue.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In Pennsylvania's November 7, 2017 General Election, Larry Krasner was the Democratic candidate for District Attorney of Philadelphia County - our Commonwealth's most populous county - and, in that election, he was elected by its voters to hold that position, having received more than 74% of the total votes cast in that race.^{1 1 1}

1 See https://vote.phila.gov/resources-data/past-election-results/.

1 See Pa. Const. art. II, § 4 ("The General Assembly shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected. It shall meet at twelve o'clock noon on the first Tuesday of January each year. Special sessions shall be called by the Governor on petition of a majority of the members elected to each House or may be called by the Governor whenever in his opinion the public interest requires.").

1 The Senate's resolution "[p]roposing special rules of practice and procedure in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials" reflects senators sitting for the impeachment trial would take an oath affirming they would "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws[.]" 2022 S.R. 386 (R.R. at 131a, 143a). This oath to do impartial justice is distinct from the oath of office contained in Article VI, Section 3. See Pa. Const. art. VI, § 3 (providing an oath to "support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and [to] discharge the duties of [] office with fidelity.").

From 2019 to 2021, Philadelphia experienced a significant increase in the rate of violent crime, including the rates of homicide committed through the use of a firearm.^{2 2 2} In 2021, when the DA ran for reelection, the escalation in violent crime in Philadelphia became a focal point of the campaign, with the DA's primary and general election opponents publicly attributing the increase in violent crime in Philadelphia to the manner in which the DA was performing the duties of his office, as well as his prosecutorial policies.^{3 3 3} In his public responses, the DA disputed a causal linkage between his policies and the spike in violent crime.^{4 4 4}

2 During this same time period, other areas of our Commonwealth and the nation experienced similar increases. See Scott R. Kegler et al., Notes from the Field: Increases in Firearm Homicide and Suicide Rates - United States, 2019-2022, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Oct. 20, 2022) at 1149-50, available at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/72/wr/pdfs/mm7242a4-H.pdf; Robert Orth et al., Crime in Pennsylvania, Offense Statistics and Trends over 10 years, 2013-2022, Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, available at https://www.pccd.pa.gov/Justice-Research/Documents/10Year%20PA%20Crime%20Trends.pdf.

2 Although Justice Mundy concurs in the determination that the effect of adjournment sine die raises a justiciable question, she dissents from the Majority's resolution of that question. Because I address only the dissenting portion of Justice Mundy's opinion, I refer to it as the "Dissent."

2 The Majority is correct that Griest did not address impeachment proceedings. See Maj. Op. at 49, fn 30. However, Griest stands for the principle that the Constitution provides certain processes that are separate from and unconnected to other Articles of the Constitution. See Griest, 46 A. at 506 (declaring the article providing for Constitutional Amendments is "a separate and independent article, standing alone and entirely unconnected with any other subject."). Article VI's impeachment power is, like the amendment process, "a system entirely complete in itself; requiring no extraneous aid, either in matters of detail or of general scope, to its effectual execution." Id. The impeachment power is not a legislative power, so the Majority's rejoinder to Griest-that "[t]here was no issue in that case as to whether the General Assembly which passed the proposed amendment was constitutionally empowered by Article II, Section 4 to do so"- is misplaced. See Maj. Op. at 49, fn. 30. Article II, Section 4, which addresses the duration of a legislative session, does not address the question of the duration of the Senate's duty to try all impeachments. Instead, Article VI, Section 5 addresses the Senate's role in the impeachment process, and it clearly does not contain a temporal restriction.

3 See generally Chris Brennan & Sean Collins Walsh, Philly DA Larry Krasner beats primary challenger Carlos Vega by wide margin in closely watched race, Philadelphia Inquirer (May 19, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-wins-election-carlos-vega-20210519.html; Michael Tanenbaum, Larry Krasner wins second term as Philadelphia district attorney, defeating Chuck Peruto, Phillyvoice.com (Nov. 2, 2021), available at https://www.phillyvoice.com/election-results-2021-philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-chuck-peruto.

3 Designated Appellee Senator Kim Ward's Br. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Contrary to Justice Wecht's legislative/judicial characterization, my position is based solely on the text of the Constitution which plainly distinguishes between the "legislative power" and the "power of impeachment." See Concurring Op. at 4 (Wecht, J.). Justice Wecht's concurring opinion dismisses the Constitution's textual distinction of the General Assembly's "legislative power" from the House's "power of impeachment" and the Senate's role as trier of impeachments because Article II specifies the composition of the legislature itself. See id. at 5. Again, Article II, Section 4 defines the session of the General Assembly as a collective body exercising its Article II, Section 1 legislative power. This is different from the other Article II provisions that Justice Wecht invokes. See id. at 5-6. Those other Article II provisions apply to individual senators and representatives (term length and eligibility) and to each House individually (quorum and open sessions). See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13. Thus, those requirements are distinct from Article II, Section 4 because Section 4 applies to the General Assembly as a collective body exercising its legislative power. To illustrate, the Senate could not conduct an impeachment trial with ineligible members because Article II, Sections 5-7 applies to individual members any time they sit in their official capacity. Similarly, the Senate could not try an official without a quorum because Article II, Section 10 applies any time the Senate sits as a body. In contrast, the Section 4 "continuing body" language applies only to the collective General Assembly in the exercise of its legislative power.

4 See generally Samantha Melamed & Julia Terruso, Philly elected Larry Krasner district attorney to reform the system. Here's what he did, Philadelphia Inquirer (May 14, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/philadelphia-district-attorney-da-larry-krasner-first-term-election-20210514.html.

4 See Dissent at 10 (referring to the Article II, Section 4 requirement that the House and Senate pass bills "in the same legislative session").

4 Specifically, the five impeachment trials were of: Comptroller General Nicholson (1793-94); Judge Addison (1802-03); Justices Shippen, Yeates, and Smith (1804-05); Judge Porter (1825); and Judge Chapman (1825-26). Ward's Br. at 12-17. In each case, the Senate conducted its impeachment trial on articles of impeachment issued by the House of Representatives of the prior legislative session. Id.

Ultimately, the voters of Philadelphia overwhelmingly chose to return the DA to office in 2021, as he garnered nearly 72% of the votes cast in the November 2, 2021 General Election.^{5 5 5} On January 2, 2022, the DA was sworn in to begin his second term.

5 See supra note 1.

5 See, e.g., Krasner v. Ward, 563 M.D. 2022, 2023 WL 164777, at *11 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 12, 2023) (en banc; unreported) ("The restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania Constitution upon the General Assembly's legislative powers . . . do not apply to its judicial powers of impeachment, trial, and removal."); Dissent at 4 ("[T]he Senate in its constitutional role as the trier of an impeachment is not exercising a legislative function. . . . When conducting an impeachment trial, the Senate has a specific role, separate and distinct from its legislative functions.").

5 Compare Pa. Const. art. IV, §§ I-II (1790), Pa. Const. art. IV, §§ I-II (1838), and Pa. Const. art. VI, §§ 1-2 (1874), with Pa. Const. art. VI, §§ 4-5 (1968).

On June 27, 2022, Representative Joshua D. Kail introduced H.R. 216 of 2022, a resolution creating a "Select Committee on Restoring Law and Order" ("Select Committee") empowered to "investigate, review and make findings and recommendations concerning: (1) The rising rates of crime, including, but not limited to, the enforcement and prosecution of violent crime and offenses involving the illegal possession of firearms, in the City of Philadelphia[;] (2) The use of public funds intended for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law and prosecuting crime in the City of Philadelphia[;] (3) The enforcement of crime victim rights . . . in the City of Philadelphia[; and] (4) The use of public funds intended for the purpose of benefiting crime victims . . . in the City of Philadelphia." H.R. 216, 2022 Gen. Assem., 206th Session. The Select Committee was also authorized by this resolution to, inter alia, make "[d]eterminations regarding the performance of public officials empowered to enforce the law in the City of Philadelphia, including the district attorney, and recommendations for removal from office or other appropriate discipline, including impeachment." Id. Further, the resolution granted to the chairperson of the Select Committee the authority to subpoena documents and witnesses on behalf of the committee. Id.

This resolution was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, reported out of that committee on June 28, 2022, and passed by the full House 114 to 86 on June 29, 2022.^{6 6 6}Pursuant to the requirements of the resolution, the Speaker of the House appointed three Republican House members - Representatives John Lawrence, Torren Ecker, and Wendi Thomas, and two Democratic house members - Representatives Amen Brown and Danilo Burgos - to serve on the Select Committee, and designated Representative Lawrence to serve as its chairman. The Select Committee began its work on July 13, 2022.

6 Legislative Journal-House, 206th Session of the General Assembly ("House Journal"), 6/29/22, at 797.

6 Dissent at 5 (quoting Pa. Const. art. II, § 1) (emphasis omitted).

6 Justice Wecht's suggested remedy that "the new House could always pass the articles of impeachment again" does little to address either of these concerns. See Concurring Op. at 8 (Wecht, J.). An official who wants to avoid a Senate trial still has every incentive to engage in delay tactics to run out the now-definite, two-year clock, even if the new House somehow initiates an impeachment on the first day of a new legislative session. Conversely, if the new House has no political will to impeach the official again, the public is denied the ability to have the impeached official tried by the Senate.

Subsequently, on August 8, 2022, the Select Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to the DA requesting, inter alia, documents which the DA had in his possession regarding his investigation and prosecution of former Philadelphia police officer Ryan Pownall for a shooting incident involving David Jones, including the DA's complete case file, written documents "related or referring to the investigative grand jury proceedings," as well as transcripts of those proceedings. See Krasner v. Select Committee on Restoring Law and Order, 450 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth.), Petition for Review, 9/2/22, Exhibit C. The subpoena additionally sought documents setting forth "positions or policies" of the DA relating to charging decisions, bail proposals, plea bargains, and sentence recommendations with respect to certain individuals and categories of crimes. Id.

In response, on August 22, 2022, the DA filed objections with the Select Committee asserting that the investigation: did not serve a legitimate legislative purpose; violated the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government; improperly sought materials containing internal confidential work product that was privileged and also sought the disclosure of secret grand jury materials related to the Pownall investigation, the release of which was forbidden by law. The DA's objections also averred that, because the work of the Select Committee had, as its ultimate goal, his impeachment and removal from office, such purpose was improper because he was not subject to impeachment and removal by the General Assembly, and doing so would deny the constitutional rights of Philadelphia's citizens who had elected him to his position. Id., Exhibit D. The Select Committee denied these objections by letter on August 24, 2022, in which it declined to withdraw the subpoena, and further indicated that it reserved the right to compel compliance through, inter alia, contempt proceedings. Id., Exhibit E.

The DA next filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court on September 2, 2022. Therein, he renewed the objections he had made to the Select Committee, and he requested that the Commonwealth Court quash the Committee's subpoena and prohibit it from issuing additional subpoenas of this nature, as well as issue an order enjoining its members from conducting "any investigation or performing any work authorized by H.R. 216." Id., Petition for Review, at 40.^{7 7 7}

7 The Commonwealth Court never issued a final ruling on the merits of the DA's petition. After a series of responsive pleadings were filed by the Committee and the DA, on December 19, 2022 the DA voluntarily discontinued that action without prejudice. The DA cited as the basis for discontinuance his assertion that the Select Committee's subpoena duces tecum, as well as its authority to continue its investigative activities, terminated upon the adjournment of the General Assembly on November 30, 2022. Krasner v. Select Committee on Restoring Law and Order, 450 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth.), Praecipe for Discontinuance, 12/19/22.

7 Pa. Const. art. V, § 1; see also Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 927 (Pa. 2013) ("The judicial power of the Commonwealth is not vested in the General Assembly, but in a unified judicial system, which includes the Commonwealth Court and, ultimately, this Court, which presides over our branch of government.").

7 As the Majority resolves this case based solely on the principle of sine die adjournment, I reserve my opinion regarding the remaining issues we accepted for appeal.

While the DA's petition was pending before that tribunal, on September 13, 2022, the House voted 162 to 38 to hold the DA in contempt for failure to turn over the documents and materials it had requested.^{8 8} Two weeks after that vote, the DA began providing documentation to the Select Committee regarding his policies and procedures.

8 House Journal, 9/13/22, at 995-96.

8 See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10.

Ultimately, the Select Committee, after receiving and reviewing this and other documentary evidence, conducting witness interviews, and holding two days of public hearings, produced a 63-page Second Interim Report. See Select Committee on Restoring Law and Order, Second Interim Report, 10/24/22, available at https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/TR/Reports/2022_0017R.pdf. ("Second Interim Report").

The Second Interim Report covered a number of subject areas. Principally, the report discussed: crime statistics in the City of Philadelphia and the DA's prosecution rate for firearms-related crimes and homicides; the personnel changes made by the DA after he assumed office; and the DA's implementation of new policies for the prosecution and sentencing of certain offenses and the use of cash bail for individuals accused of particular classes of misdemeanors and felonies. Second Interim Report at 20-51. The report also recounted the expert testimony it had received from Professor Bruce Antkowiak, who is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Program on Criminology, Law, and Society at St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pennsylvania, regarding the legal and constitutional constraints on the discretion of an elected district attorney to determine the manner in which certain types of crimes will be handled by their office. Id. at 53-54. Additionally, the report noted criticism the DA had received from members of the judiciary in published opinions. See id. at 56-58. Finally, the report leveled additional criticism of the DA for what it termed his "refusal to cooperate" with the Select Committee's investigation by turning over the requested documents and, instead, commencing a lawsuit in the Commonwealth Court to quash the subpoena and stop the Committee's investigation. Id. at 63.

Ultimately, the report concluded:

[A]ddressing the increase in crime in Philadelphia requires the cooperation and collaboration of all stakeholders who share in the responsibility of addressing public safety, including, but not limited to, joint efforts to create policies and programs that harmonize protection of the public and the avoidance of unjust results. The Select Committee is hopeful that its work has underscored this critical need and that such cross-office cooperation can and does result from its work.

Id. The report did not recommend impeachment of the DA, his removal from office, or any other disciplinary action against him.

The Select Committee voted 5 to 0 to send its report to the House, which, on October 24, 2022, formally accepted it by a vote of 189 to 11.^{9 9} Two days later, on October 26, 2022, Representative Martina White introduced a resolution calling for the impeachment of the DA "for misbehavior in office; and providing for the appointment of trial managers." See H.R. 240, P.N. 3607, 206th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. This resolution recited many of the findings of the report, and it set forth two articles of impeachment seeking removal of the DA.

9 House Journal, 10/24/22, at 1125.

9 See Pa. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 3, 4.

The first article was based on the assertion that

District Attorney Krasner, by and through his failed policies and procedures, and throughout the discharge of his duties as Philadelphia's chief law enforcement officer, has been derelict in his obligations to the victims of crime, the people of the City of Philadelphia and of this Commonwealth. Under District Attorney Krasner's administration . . . his lack of proper leadership serves as a direct and proximate cause of the crisis currently facing the City of Philadelphia. These policies have eviscerated the District Attorney's Office's ability to adequately enforce the laws of this Commonwealth; endangered the health, welfare and safety of more than 1.5 million Pennsylvanians that reside in Philadelphia and the tens of millions of Americans who visit the City every year; and, have brought the Office of District Attorney into disrepute.

Id.

The second article sought the DA's impeachment and removal from office for alleged obstruction of the Select Committee's work by his response to the Committee's subpoena. The resolution was referred to the House Judiciary Committee. Thereafter, that same day, the House adjourned. House Journal, 10/26/22, at 1241-42.

On November 8, 2022, Pennsylvania held its General Election, and the voters elected 49 new members of the House of Representatives and 6 new members of the Senate.

The House subsequently reconvened on November 14, 2022. On November 16, 2022, H.R. 240 was reported out of the Judiciary Committee, and it was amended and passed 107 to 85 by a vote of the full House that same day. House Journal, 11/16/22, at 1279. The amended resolution, H.R. 240, P.N. 3634 ("Impeachment Resolution"), set forth seven Articles of Impeachment, based on alleged acts of "Misbehavior In Office":

Article I: Dereliction of Duty and Refusal to Enforce the Law

Article II: Obstruction of House Select Committee Investigation

Article III: Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the Matter of Robert Wharton v. Donald T. Vaughn

Article IV: Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the Matter of Commonwealth v. Pownall

Article V: Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor to Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the matter In re: Conflicts of Interest of Philadelphia District Attorney's Office (sic) [244 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2020) (order)]

Article VI: Violation of Victims Rights

Article VII: Violation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania By Usurpation of the Legislative Function

Impeachment Resolution at 26-48.

The Impeachment Resolution also required the Speaker of the House to appoint a three-member committee, with two members from the majority party and one from the minority party, for the purposes of exhibiting the Articles to the Senate, and "on behalf of the House of Representatives to manage the trial thereof." Id. at 50. Thereafter, then-Speaker of the House Bryan Cutler appointed Republican Representatives Timothy Bonner and Craig Williams, along with Democratic Representative Jared Solomon, as Impeachment Managers ("Impeachment Managers").^{10 10}

10 Representative Solomon voted against the Impeachment Resolution, and he did not participate in the proceedings brought by the DA in the Commonwealth Court, nor did he oppose the relief sought by the DA therein. Representative Solomon is likewise not participating in this appeal.

10 See Pa. Const. art. II, § 10.

On November 29, 2022, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 29 to 21, S.R. 386, which established "special rules of practice and procedure in the Senate when sitting on Impeachment trials," S.R. 386, 206th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., which included, inter alia, the formation of an Impeachment Committee. Id. at 6-7. It also adopted, by a vote of 30 to 20, S.R. 387 - a resolution which directed the House to exhibit the Articles. S.R. 387, 206th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.; Legislative Journal-Senate, 206th Session of the General Assembly ("Senate Journal"), 11/29/22, at 1243-49.

Impeachment Managers formally exhibited the Articles to the Senate on November 30, 2022. Senate Journal, 11/30/22, at 1253-58. That same day, the Senate adopted a resolution, S.R. 388, directing: that an impeachment writ of summons be prepared for the DA; requiring service of the writ on the DA by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate before December 7, 2022; setting a deadline of December 21, 2022 for the DA to file an answer to the writ; and requiring an impeachment trial to convene in the Senate on January 18, 2023. See S.R. 388, 206th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.; Senate Journal, 11/30/22, at 1259-60.

On November 30, 2022, both the House and Senate concurrently adjourned sine die - that is, adjourned without scheduling a date certain on which to reconvene.^{11 11} House Journal, 11/30/22, at 1317; Senate Journal, 11/30/22, at 1269. As a result, and as we explain further herein, under Article II, Sections 2 and 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,^{12 12} the 206th Session of the General Assembly formally ended at that time.

11 The term sine die means "'without day,' and a legislative body adjourns sine die when it adjourns 'without appointing a day on which to appear or assemble again.'" Creamer v. Twelve Common Pleas Judges, 281 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa. 1971); accord Scarnati v. Wolf, 173 A.3d 1110, 1114 n.4 (Pa. 2017).

11 See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 5, 6, 7.

12 These constitutional provisions state:

Members of the General Assembly shall be chosen at the general election every second year. Their term of service shall begin on the first day of December next after their election.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 2.

The General Assembly shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected. It shall meet at 12 o'clock noon on the first Tuesday of January each year.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 4.

12 See Pa. Const. art. II, § 3.

After service of the Senate's writ of summons, the DA filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction on December 2, 2022 naming as respondents then-Interim President Pro Tempore, now-President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Senator Kim Ward ("Senate President"),^{13 13} along with Impeachment Managers.^{14 14} Krasner v. Ward, 563 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth.), Petition for Review ("Petition for Review"). The Petition for Review sought declaratory relief based on three grounds: (1) the Articles, as a pending matter in the General Assembly, were rendered void upon the termination of the 206th Session of the General Assembly on November 30, 2022, and did not carry over to the 207th General Assembly, id. at ¶¶ 40-50; (2) the Pennsylvania Constitution did not empower the General Assembly to impeach local elected officials such as the DA, and, relatedly, the power of removal of locally elected officials in the City of Philadelphia was delegated to its government under its Home Rule Charter, id. at ¶¶ 51-61; and (3) the Articles did not assert viable claims that the DA engaged in "misbehavior in office" as that term is used in Article VI, Section 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution id. at ¶¶ 62-79.

13 Senator Ward succeeded Senator Jake Corman to this position upon his retirement at the expiration of his legislative term on November 30, 2022.

13 See Pa. Const. art. II, § 13.

14 The petition also listed two members of the Senate Impeachment Committee, the creation of which was provided for in S.R. 386, as respondents, but, because the Committee had not been formed in the Senate at the time of the petition's filing, and, thus, no members had been formally appointed, the petition referred to those Senators as John Does.

14 Commonwealth v. Griest, 46 A. 505 (Pa. 1900).

As specific relief, the DA requested that the Commonwealth Court make the following declarations:

o [T]he Amended Articles and related legislative business, including Senate Resolutions 386, 387, and 388, became null and void on November 30, 2022, upon the adjournment sine die of the 206th General Assembly legislative session.

o Article VI, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not authorize impeachment of [the DA] by the General Assembly.

o [T]he Amended Articles against [the DA] do not allege conduct that constitutes "any misbehavior in office" within the meaning of Article VI, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

o [T]he Respondents have no authority to take up the Amended Articles and any such efforts would be unlawful.

o [T]hat any effort by the Respondents, House of Representatives or Senate to take up the Amended Articles or related legislation, including Senate Resolutions 386, 387, or 388, is unlawful.

Id., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ (A)-(E). The DA also filed an accompanying application for summary relief on these claims.

Impeachment Managers responded by filing preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the petition, asserting: (1) the questions of whether impeachment proceedings can continue into a new session of the General Assembly, as well as whether the DA's alleged conduct constitutes "any misbehavior in office," were non-justiciable political questions; and (2) the questions of whether an elected district attorney is subject to impeachment and removal by the General Assembly, and whether the impeachment charges against the DA allege conduct sufficient to warrant his removal from office, were not ripe for judicial review.

Senate President filed an answer to the DA's motion for summary relief, and a cross application for summary relief in which she asserted that the Senate, as a whole, was an indispensable party to this action, and that the DA's failure to join the Senate deprived the Commonwealth Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Senate President also joined Impeachment Managers' argument that the DA's claims were neither justiciable nor ripe for review, and, in any event, were legally insufficient to justify a grant of declaratory relief.

The Commonwealth Court undertook adjudication of this matter on an expedited basis. The Minority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate, Senator Jay Costa, ("Senate Minority Leader"), filed a petition to intervene, which the court granted.

After receiving expedited briefing from the parties, the Court issued an order on December 30, 2022, disposing of the Petition for Review. Krasner v. Ward, 563 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Dec. 30, 2022) (order).^{15 15} Regarding the jurisdictional question, the court ruled against Senate President's claim that the Pennsylvania Senate and the Senate Impeachment Committee were indispensable parties, on the basis that the Senate President was named as a party and her interest was "indistinguishable from that of the Senate as a whole, and of the [Impeachment Committee], and her involvement here has positioned her to adequately defend and protect those parties' interests." Id. at 2.^{16 16}Relevant to the issues presented in the present appeal, the court overruled Impeachment Managers' preliminary objection based on justiciability, and denied Impeachment Managers' preliminary objection and Senate President's request for summary relief based on the ripeness of the DA's claims. Id. at 2-3.

15 Comprising the Commonwealth Court panel were Judges Renee Cohn-Jubelirer, Patricia McCullough, Michael Wojcik, and Ellen Ceisler. The order was signed by Judge Ceisler. No judge on the panel noted any dissent to the order.

15 Id. at 506.

16 Senate President does not renew this claim before us.

16 Dissent at 12.

On the merits of the DA's issues, the order denied the DA relief on his claim that the Articles terminated upon adjournment of the General Assembly and also denied the DA relief on his claim that Article VI, Section 6, applied only to statewide officeholders. Id. at 3. The court, however, agreed with the DA that Article VI, Section 6, allows impeachment of a public official only for conduct which amounts to the common law crime of "'misbehavior in office,' i.e., failure to perform a positive ministerial duty or performance of a discretionary duty with an improper or corrupt motive." Id. at 4 (quoting, inter alia, In re Braig, 590 A.2d 284, 286-88 (Pa. 1991)). The order also found Articles of Impeachment I and VI improperly challenged the DA's discretionary authority, and Articles III, IV and V unconstitutionally intruded upon this Court's exclusive authority to govern the conduct of attorneys in the Commonwealth - including district attorneys. Id. at 4. The order indicated that an opinion would follow.^{17 17}

17 Subsequently, on January 5, 2023, the court dismissed a pro se petition to intervene nunc pro tunc filed on January 3, 2023 by Vamsidhar Vurimindi. The court ruled that this petition was untimely, as it was filed "well beyond" the time allowed by the court's December 6, 2022 case management order. Krasner v. Ward, 563 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jan. 5, 2023) (order). The court also ruled that Vurimindi failed to meet any of the grounds for intervention. Vurimindi appealed this dismissal at 5 EAP 2023, which we address separately.

17 See Second Brief of Designated Appellant District Attorney Larry Krasner at 60 n.34 ("Respondents Bonner and Williams argue that a rule terminating articles of impeachment upon sine die adjournment would give impeached officials an incentive to try to 'beat[] the clock.' That argument is deeply ironic. Here, the House adopted the Amended Articles on November 16, 2022, in a lame duck session largely along partisan lines after an election in which it became clear that Republicans would lose control of the House. The House exhibited the Amended Articles to the Senate on November 30, 2022, the very last day of the session. In turn, the Senate then issued an impeachment summons hours before the expiration of the 206th General Assembly. If anyone was trying to 'beat the clock,' it was Respondents and the Republican-led expired 206th General Assembly.") (citation and emphasis omitted).

On January 11, 2023, the Senate of the 207th Session of the General Assembly met and administered an oath to its members for the purpose of sitting as jurors in an impeachment trial of the DA; however, the Senate then immediately voted to postpone the trial indefinitely. Senate Journal, 1/11/23, at 69-70.

On January 12, 2023, the Commonwealth Court issued an opinion in support of its order. Krasner v. Ward, 563 MD 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Jan. 12, 2023) (unpublished memorandum) ("Krasner"). The opinion was authored by Judge Ceisler and joined in full by Judge Cohn-Jubelirer. Judge Wojcik joined the majority opinion on all issues except the justiciability question, from which he dissented, despite his original vote to join the court's order in full. Judge McCullough filed a separate dissenting opinion.

Pertinent to the issues raised in the present appeals, the Commonwealth Court first considered Impeachment Managers' claim that the DA's challenges were non-justiciable. The court recognized that there is a limited category of legal issues which are political questions and not subject to judicial review: they involve the Legislature's exercise of a power which the Constitution "entrust[s] exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for 'self-monitoring.'" Krasner, slip op. at 11 (quoting Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 705-706 (Pa. 1977)). The court noted that "courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines." Id. at 12 (quoting In re Dauphin County Grand Jury, Sept. 1938, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (Pa. 1938) (emphasis original)). The court interpreted this pronouncement as establishing that "determining the constitutionality of an impeachment proceeding is something that falls squarely within the scope of judicial authority, but anything beyond that rests within the sole purview of the General Assembly." Id. (emphasis original).

The court found that, because the DA's claims that the impeachment proceedings violated provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution governing which officeholders can be impeached and removed, the permissible reasons for impeachment and removal, and when such impeachment and removal proceedings can take place, they presented non-political questions which are justiciable by a court of the Commonwealth.

The court also noted that the specific remedy which the DA sought - declaratory relief under Section 7541(a) of the Declaratory Judgments Act - was compatible with its prior holding in Larsen v. Senate of Pennsylvania, 646 A.2d 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (holding that courts could not halt an impeachment proceeding through the issuance of an injunction), as the DA did not seek to bar the Senate from conducting an impeachment hearing, but, instead, trusted that, if a declaratory judgment was entered indicating that the impeachment was unconstitutional, the Senate would refrain from carrying out the hearing. Krasner, slip op. at 12 n.7. The court found this to be consistent with the remedial purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act: that it is to be liberally construed to effectuate its ultimate goal of providing "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Id. at 12 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a)). Therefore, the court refused to accede to Impeachment Managers' argument that the questions raised in the DA's petition were non-justiciable.

Regarding the question of whether the DA's specific claims were ripe for review, the court found that they were. Even though the Articles of Impeachment set forth procedures allowing the DA to raise objections to evidence and make motions during the impeachment trial, the court found that "each of District Attorney's claims presents threshold questions of law and constitutional interpretation that require no additional factual development." Id. at 16-17.

Turning to the substantive constitutional issues before us, the court first considered the DA's claim that the adjournment sine die of the 206th General Assembly also terminated the impeachment proceedings against him. The court acknowledged prior decisions from our Court, such as Brown v. Brancato, 184 A. 89 (Pa. 1936) (holding that the powers of an investigative committee created by the House expired upon the General Assembly's adjournment sine die), and Frame v. Sutherland, 327 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1974) (plurality) (interpreting our Constitution to require the mutual consent of both the House and Senate to adjourn sine die, given that allowing unilateral adjournment by the House or the Senate would render the other body powerless to have its bills enacted into law), but interpreted them as standing for the limited proposition that only legislative actions are terminated upon the adjournment of the General Assembly sine die. Consequently, it deemed those decisions not to control the outcome of this case, based on its conclusion that impeachment proceedings are not of the same nature as legislative proceedings. Krasner, slip op. at 21.

The court instead relied on our decision in Commonwealth v. Griest, 46 A. 505 (Pa. 1900) (holding that a proposed constitutional amendment did not have to be presented to the Governor for his approval or disapproval, given that the approval process for an amendment was in a separate article of the Constitution and established an entirely distinct process than that for enacting legislation), which it interpreted to mean that, whenever one Article of the Constitution provides for a specific procedure, that Article governs over the Article setting out the General Assembly's general legislative powers - i.e., Article III. The court noted that the legislature's impeachment power and procedures are delineated in Article VI, Sections 4 and 5, of our Constitution,¹⁸ and so it reasoned that these powers and procedures are distinct from the General Assembly's power and procedures to promulgate laws set forth in Article III.

18 These sections of our Constitution provide:

§ 4. Power of impeachment

The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Pa. Const. art. VI, § 4.

§ 5. Trial of impeachments

All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for that purpose the Senators shall be upon oath or affirmation. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Pa. Const. art. VI, § 5.

Although citing no authority from Pennsylvania courts characterizing the General Assembly's power of impeachment as a judicial power, the court nevertheless concluded that it was, based upon a 1913 decision of a New York trial court and a 1924 decision of the Texas Supreme Court. Krasner, slip op. at 22 (citing People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 143 N.Y.S. 325, 327 (Ny. Sup. 1913); Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888 (Tex. 1924) (holding that the power conferred by the Texas Constitution on its house of representatives to bring charges and its senate to try those charges are, at their core, judicial in nature and do not involve legislative functions)).

The court conceded that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not explicitly address the duration of what it perceived to be this judicial power, or what effect the termination of one session of the General Assembly and the beginning of a new session had on its ability to exercise that power. Even so, it concluded, based on its review of the general historical authority governing British parliamentary proceedings, as well as prior impeachment proceedings in Pennsylvania, other states, and at the federal level, that our Constitution does not require the impeachment and trial of a public official to be completed within the same session of the General Assembly.

In this regard, the court found persuasive the reasoning of an 1872 decision from the Florida Supreme Court which analogized the position of state senators sitting as judges in an impeachment proceeding to that of judges presiding over an ordinary trial, and that the Florida Senate, when acting in the role of a judicial tribunal, did not die or cease to exist with the adjournment of the session; rather, its business "remain[s] upon its calendar or docket until the Senate sitting as a court enters an order finally disposing of each case." Id. at 23 (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 14 Fla. 289, 297-98 (Fla. 1872) (emphasis original)). Consequently, the court concluded that the Senate's adjournment after receiving the Articles of Impeachment did not affect its power to conduct a trial on those articles.

With respect to the DA's second issue raised before our Court - whether the DA is a "civil officer" within the scope of the impeachment power of the legislature delineated in Article VI, Section 6, of our Constitution - the court concluded that he was. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on prior caselaw from our Court in which we suggested that Article VI, as a whole, extends not only to elected state officeholders, but also to local officeholders. The court noted that, in prior cases involving Article VI, Section 7¹⁹ - which governs the removal of civil officers - our Court has extended the scope of its application to county and local officials on the basis that "civil officers," as referred to therein, may be state, county, or municipal. Krasner, slip op. at 27-28 (citing, e.g., Burger v. McGuffey School District, 923 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 2007) (school superintendent appointed by school board was within the category of "civil officers" referred to in Article VI, Section 7)).

19 This constitutional provision states:

All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers elected by the people, except the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.

Pa. Const. art. VI, § 7.

The court also highlighted that, in Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 232 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1967), a fractured plurality of our Court agreed that then-District Attorney Arlen Specter was subject to identical removal provisions in a prior version of Article VI, Section 7, as he was within the category of "all civil officers" referred to by that Article. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that there was no basis to treat the identical language in Article VI, Section 6, governing civil officers differently, and, hence, the court ruled that it applied to the DA as a county official.²⁰

20 The court also acknowledged that procedures exist under the First Class Cities Government law, 53 P.S. §§ 12199-12205, which allow for the removal of municipal officers like the district attorney, but it viewed these procedures as merely complementary to the impeachment procedure of Article VI, Section 6.

The court next addressed the DA's claim that the Articles of Impeachment failed to allege that he engaged in "any misbehavior in office," as required for impeachment under Article VI, Section 6. The court noted that, while our Court has never construed the meaning of the term "any misbehavior in office" within the context of this provision, in In re Braig, 590 A.2d 284 (Pa. 1991), we interpreted this term as used in a now-repealed section of the Pennsylvania Constitution - former Article V, Section 18(1), governing removal of jurists who were convicted in a court of law "of misbehavior in office" - as well as its present use in Article VI, Section 7, and held that "misbehavior in office" referred to "a common law crime consisting of the failure to perform a positive ministerial duty of the office or the performance of a discretionary duty with an improper or corrupt motive." Krasner, slip op. at 32 (quoting Braig, 590 A.2d at 362).

The court below noted that Article VI, Section 6, was amended to its present form in 1966, having previously applied only to "any misdemeanor in office," and, based on its examination of the historical context of the substitution of "misbehavior in office" for the prior terminology, the court concluded that the 1966 amendments were intended to align the provision with other provisions of the Constitution, such as Article VI, Section 7. Thus, the Court determined that this language, as employed in Article VI, Section 6, means, as it does in those other provisions, "the failure to perform a positive ministerial duty or the performance of a discretionary duty with an improper or corrupt motive." Id. at 37. Accordingly, the court ruled that "each of the [Articles of Impeachment] meets constitutional muster only if the assertions made therein would support a conclusion that [the DA] failed to perform a positive ministerial duty or performed a discretionary duty with an improper or corrupt motive." Id. at 38.

Applying this standard to the allegations against the DA in Articles of Impeachment I and VII, the court concluded the allegations therein did not facially constitute "misbehavior in office" and so they did not support his impeachment under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.

Specifically, Article I alleged that the District Attorney was derelict in his official duties by, inter alia, firing experienced line prosecutors and hiring ones without the necessary level of expertise; withdrawing his office from the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association due to policy disagreements; reorienting office charging and plea bargaining policies regarding certain prostitution, drug possession, and other low-level crimes to focus on limiting pre-trial detainment; and increasing the use of alternative sentencing practices instead of post-conviction incarceration, which the Article asserted led to decreased prosecution of crimes and guilty verdicts, as well as a sharp increase in the crime rate in Philadelphia. Impeachment Resolution at 26-29.

The Commonwealth Court found that:

Each of the House's concerns in Article I pertains to discretionary determinations made by [the DA] in his role as Philadelphia's district attorney, but are not supported by allegations that those determinations were the product of an improper or corrupt motive. Instead, the House simply appears not to approve of the way [the DA] has chosen to run his office. Regardless of whether any of the House's concerns have substantive merit, it remains that such disagreements, standing alone, are not enough to create a constitutionally sound basis for impeaching and removing [the DA].

Krasner, slip op. at 39. The court observed that the DA's elected position gives him wide latitude to implement the policies he deems best; however, critically from the court's perspective, there were no assertions made that the DA's policy decisions were the product of any misbehavior in office - i.e., that they were the product of an improper or corrupt motive on his part.

Similarly, the court concluded that the DA's decision to deprioritize the prosecution of certain types of crime, including "prostitution, theft and drug-related offenses, among others," which formed the factual basis of Article of Impeachment VII, see Impeachment Resolution at 49, was also within the broad discretion conferred on him by virtue of his office to make policy decisions and prosecution choices. The court found that these allegations, in and of themselves, did not establish that he exercised this discretion with an improper or corrupt motive; hence, the court ruled they were also insufficient as a matter of law to serve as a basis for impeachment under Article VI, Section 6.

Finally, the court considered the DA's claim that the allegations of his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility contained in Articles of Impeachment III, IV, and V were beyond the purview of the General Assembly to adjudicate because the jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims is exclusively vested with our Court. The court agreed with the DA's argument, noting that, under the provisions of 16 P.S. § 1401(o),²¹ a district attorney is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that, under this statutory provision, in order for an alleged violation of these provisions to be adjudicated, a complaint must be filed with the Disciplinary Board of our Court, and the complaint will then proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures our Court has established for that process. This, the court determined, was consistent with Article V, Section 10(c),²² of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests the exclusive power to govern the conduct of attorneys to our Court.

21 This statute provides:

(o) A district attorney shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the canons of ethics as applied to judges in the courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth insofar as such canons apply to salaries, full-time duties and conflicts of interest. Any complaint by a citizen of the county that a full-time district attorney may be in violation of this section shall be made to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. If any substantive basis is found, the board shall proceed forthwith in the manner prescribed by the rules of the Supreme Court and make such recommendation for disciplinary action as it deems advisable, provided, however, that if the Supreme Court deems the violation so grave as to warrant removal from office, the prothonotary of the Supreme Court shall transmit its findings to the Speaker of the House of Representatives for such action as the House of Representatives deems appropriate under Article VI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

16 P.S. § 1401(o).

22 This Article of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace, including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the General Assembly may by statute provide for the manner of testimony of child victims or child material witnesses in criminal proceedings, including the use of videotaped depositions or testimony by closed-circuit television.

Pa. Const. art. V, § 10.

The court noted that Section 1401(o) would also allow our Court, upon a finding that the DA's violation was so grave as to warrant removal from office, to refer the matter to the "Speaker of the House . . . for such action as the House . . . deems appropriate under Article VI." Krasner, slip op. at 42 (quoting Section 1401(o)). The court reasoned that, based on this statutory language and the allocation of constitutional responsibility for attorney discipline, our Court was the proper forum for review of these claims in the first instance, not the General Assembly, which can only commence a removal process for grave violations after our Court makes the necessary finding and referral.

In his concurring opinion, Judge Wojcik candidly admitted to joining the court's per curiam order in full, but he indicated that, after further reflection, he had concluded that the questions regarding the constitutionality and legality of Articles of Impeachment I, II, VI, and VII were non-justiciable, as, in his view, the power to issue those Articles, and to try them, was vested by the Constitution solely in the House and Senate, respectively. He joined the majority opinion in all other respects.

In her dissenting opinion, Judge McCullough opined that the Commonwealth Court did not have jurisdiction over this matter because the Senate Impeachment Committee, which at the time of the litigation had not yet been formed, was not joined as an indispensable party. Judge McCullough further asserted that, assuming arguendo that the Commonwealth Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal, she would join the court's rejection of the DA's first and second claims regarding whether his impeachment survived sine die adjournment and whether he was a civil officer subject to impeachment. However, she indicated she would find that the DA's claims that the Articles of Impeachment failed to state sufficient legal grounds for his removal were non-justiciable, as, in her view, he is challenging conduct - his conviction and removal - which has not yet occurred.

Impeachment Managers appealed from the Commonwealth Court's order, and the Senate President and the DA cross-appealed. Our Court consolidated these appeals for disposition, and we have designated the DA as the Appellant herein.

II. Issues

In his appeal, the DA presents the following two issues for our Court's consideration, which we have rephrased for clarity:

a. Whether the Articles of Impeachment passed by the 206th General Assembly carry over into the 207th legislative assembly, after the 206th General Assembly adjourned sine die?

b. Whether the DA, who is a locally elected official, is an "other civil officer" subject to impeachment under Article VI, Section 6, of the Constitution?

DA's Brief at 8.

In their cross-appeal, Impeachment Managers raise the following issues, which we have reordered for purposes of our discussion and have rephrased for clarity:

a. Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the DA's challenges to his impeachment proceedings were justiciable?

b. Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the issues presented by the DA's challenges to his impeachment proceedings were ripe for review?

c. Whether the DA is a civil officer subject to impeachment under Article VI, Section 6, of the Constitution?

d. Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the conduct alleged in the Articles of Impeachment did not constitute "misbehavior in office" in accordance with the meaning of that term as it is used in Article VI, Section 6, of the Constitution?

e. Whether Articles of Impeachment III, IV, and V, which were based on the DA's alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct, intruded on this Court's exclusive authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to govern the conduct of attorneys in our Commonwealth?

f. Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the DA's conduct alleged in Articles of Impeachment I and VII did not furnish a basis for impeachment, as it involved the exercise of his discretionary authority?

Impeachment Managers' Brief at 6-8.

III. Analysis

We turn now to the substantive issues raised by the parties to this appeal and cross-appeal. For reasons we explain at greater length herein, we find the DA's first claim - that the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the Articles of Impeachment did not expire upon the sine die adjournment of the 206th Session of the General Assembly - to be dispositive of this appeal; thus, we confine our analysis to this issue.

However, before we consider the substantive merits of this issue, we must address the initial contention of Impeachment Managers that this issue is a non-justiciable political question.²³

23 Senate President does not join in this argument in her brief. Further, Impeachment Managers raise no argument regarding the ripeness of this issue for review.

A. Justiciability

1. Arguments

Impeachment Managers aver that, as our Court has recognized, the question of justiciability is a threshold one which must be resolved before a court addresses the merits of a case. Impeachment Managers' Brief at 24 (quoting Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 917 (Pa. 2013)). Impeachment Managers note that, in Robinson Township, our Court set forth a "well settled" standard for a court to determine whether a claim is non-justiciable and will, as a result, refrain from taking action on it. Under this standard, courts will refrain from resolving a dispute and reviewing the actions of another branch only "'where the determination whether the action taken is within the power granted by the Constitution has been entrusted exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for self-monitoring'." Id. at 25 (quoting Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 928).

Impeachment Managers argue that Article VI of the Pennsylvania Constitution "confers impeachment matters exclusively to the General Assembly," given that Article VI, Section 4, grants the House "the sole power of impeachment," and Section 5 of that same Article specifies that "all impeachments shall be tried by the Senate." Id. at 26-27 (emphasis original). Impeachment Managers buttress their textual commitment claim by highlighting that Article II, Section 11, of the Constitution also gives the House and the Senate the "power to determine the rules of its proceedings." Id. at 27 (quoting Pa. Const. art. II, § 11). Impeachment Managers reason that these provisions, read in toto, give the House and Senate the right to make rules prescribing how impeachment proceedings will be carried out. Therefore, they view the question of whether an impeachment proceeding can carry over from one term of the General Assembly to another to fall within this rulemaking power as merely "a basic housekeeping matter for the General Assembly." Id. at 28.

Impeachment Managers additionally aver that our Court recognized the principle that courts have no role to play in the impeachment process in In re Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (Pa. 1938), wherein we stated that "the courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct." Impeachment Managers' Brief at 28 (emphasis original). Impeachment Managers also argue that Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (examining the history of the federal Constitutional Convention to conclude that the Framers intended no role for the judiciary in the impeachment process), supports this proposition, albeit in the context of impeachment proceedings under the federal Constitution. Impeachment Managers likewise contend that the Commonwealth Court adhered to this principle in In re Larsen, 646 A.2d 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), when it held that the impeachment procedures adopted by the Senate in that case were not subject to judicial review. Thus, Impeachment Managers contend that the Commonwealth Court should not have addressed the question of the effect of sine die adjournment on the Articles of Impeachment.

In reply, the DA emphasizes that our Constitution "does not clearly and unambiguously entrust to the General Assembly the 'sole prerogative' to determine whether articles of impeachment survive the adjournment sine die of the General Assembly." DA's Reply Brief at 10. Further, the DA highlights that our Court has previously and explicitly recognized that we have "the power to make sure that the General Assembly is exercising its impeachment powers within the limits of the Constitution[.]" Id. at 10 (quoting In re Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.2d at 803 ("[T]he courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines." (emphasis original))).

The DA stresses that Impeachment Managers have identified no clause of the Constitution which provides that the House has the "sole prerogative" to determine whether articles of impeachment survive the sine die adjournment of the General Assembly. Id. at 11. The DA agrees that Articles VI, Sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do empower the General Assembly to take certain actions with respect to the impeachment process; however, the DA disputes that these sections also give the General Assembly the exclusive responsibility to interpret its own powers with respect thereto, as the text of those sections does not confer such a power.

Relatedly, the DA underscores that Article II, Section 4, "does not expressly commit to the General Assembly the power to review its compliance with this provision or exempt issues relating to sine die adjournment (including impeachment) from judicial review." Id. at 14. Indeed, the DA points out that our Court has already reviewed and adjudicated what effect sine die adjournment had on actions of the General Assembly in Frame and Brown, supra, and he asserts these decisions demonstrate there is no impediment to our Court's consideration of the application of Article II, Section 4, to the resolution of this matter.

Senate Minority Leader's brief aligns with the DA's arguments on this issue, but additionally notes that he regards our Court's exercise of its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution to resolve constitutional questions as "no slight to its coequal branches, but, rather, [it] reflects a commitment to the rule of law and our fundamental legal principles even when they may lead to unpopular, but constitutionally required results, that all three branches should share." Senate Minority Leader's Reply Brief at 5 n.2.

2. Discussion

Resolving controversies involving whether a particular action of the General Assembly has transgressed the limitations on its power to act set by our Commonwealth's Constitution is one of this Court's most fundamental responsibilities under that charter. Our exercise of that responsibility through the process of judicial review - to "say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) - is integral in ensuring that our Commonwealth's democratic form of government functions as it was designed and intended by its architects. As we have emphasized in this regard:

The cornerstone of our republican democracy is the principle of government divided into three separate, co-equal branches that both empower and constrain one another. Judicial review stands as a bulwark against unconstitutional or otherwise illegal actions by the two political branches. . . . The foundation for the rule of law as we have come to know it is the axiom that, when disagreements arise, the Court has the final word regarding the Constitution's meaning.

William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, 170 A.3d 414, 435-36 (Pa. 2017) (citation and internal quotation omitted).

Thus, "[o]rdinarily, the exercise of the judiciary's power to review the constitutionality of legislative action does not offend the principle of separation of powers, and abstention under the political-question doctrine is implicated in limited settings." Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 927-28 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, there are certain legislative powers which our Constitution confers on the legislative branch of our tripartite system of governance that are not subject to judicial review. Indeed, "[a] challenge to the Legislature's exercise of a power which the Constitution commits exclusively to the Legislature presents a nonjusticiable 'political question.'" Sweeney, 375 A.2d at 705. The meaning and scope of the political question doctrine under the United States Constitution and its application by federal courts since its articulation in the seminal United States Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) has been, and continues to be, the subject of intense scholarly debate. Sweeney, 375 A.2d at 705; see also Curtis Bradley & Eric A Posner, The Real Political Question Doctrine, 75 Stan. L. Rev. 1031 (2023).

Nevertheless, whatever may be the current contours of this doctrine utilized by federal courts, it is well-established in our jurisprudence that "notions of case or controversy and justiciability in Pennsylvania have no constitutional predicate, do not involve a court's jurisdiction, and are regarded instead as prudential concerns implicating courts' self-imposed limitations." Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 917. In matters involving our Constitution, "we will abstain from reviewing cases only where the determination whether the action taken is within the power granted by the Constitution has been entrusted exclusively and finally to the political branches of government for 'self-monitoring'." William Penn School District, 170 A.3d at 439 (emphasis original). Thus, when considering whether to refrain from adjudicating a challenge involving the interpretation of particular constitutional provisions under this doctrine we must assess "whether our Constitution, explicitly or impliedly, can be read as reflecting the clear intent to entrust the legislature with the sole prerogative to assess the adequacy of its own effort to satisfy that constitutional mandate." Id.

Our Court has enumerated a panoply of potentially relevant factors in making this assessment, such as whether:

there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the disputed issue to a coordinate political department; there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the disputed issue; the issue cannot be decided without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; a court cannot undertake independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and there is potential for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 928. The justiciability arguments Impeachment Managers present to our Court, which are textual in nature, focus only on the first of these factors.

As indicated above, Impeachment Managers contend that because Article II, Sections 2, 4 and 11, and Article VI, Sections 4 and 5, read collectively, establish that the General Assembly has been given the right to prescribe the manner in which impeachment proceedings will be carried out - i.e., to establish procedures for conducting an impeachment - this also grants it the exclusive right to decide the separate substantive question of whether it had the constitutional authority to act on the Articles of Impeachment after sine die adjournment. Respectfully, we reject that conclusion.

The text of Article II, Sections 2 and 4, is utterly devoid of any language which would confer an exclusive right on the General Assembly to determine its own compliance with these provisions. Impeachment Managers are correct that Article II, Section 11, which grants each House of the General Assembly the right "to determine the rules of its proceedings," Pa. Const. art. II, § 11, textually empowers both the House and Senate to promulgate procedural rules for impeachment proceedings transpiring in either body; however, this exclusive power is properly implicated only when those impeachment proceedings are authorized by the Constitution. Section 11 does not, however, textually confer on the House or the Senate the exclusive power to finally determine whether the act of conducting the impeachment proceeding itself is permitted by the Constitution, which is the issue in this case. See Brown v. Brancato, 184 A. 89, 93 n.6 (Pa. 1936) (observing that Article II, Section 11, had no application in our Court's interpretation of Article II, Section 4, to determine whether the investigative and subpoena powers held by a House impeachment committee continued after sine die adjournment of the General Assembly); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1170 (Pa. 1981) (holding that a determination of whether a gubernatorial appointment to the State Tax Equalization Board was approved by "a majority of the members elected to the Senate," as required by Article IV, Section 8(a), was a question involving the meaning of our Constitution, which is "within the province of the courts to interpret"; hence, Article II, Section 11, did not foreclose our Court from adjudicating that issue as a political question).

Likewise, there is nothing in the text of Article VI, Sections 4 or 5, which grants the House or Senate the exclusive authority to decide this issue. The fact that Article VI, Section 4, grants to the House the "sole power of impeachment," and Section 5 reserves to the Senate the power to try all cases of impeachment, does not compel a different conclusion. As we explained in William Penn, supra, "whether the constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental function to one of the political branches" is not the dispositive consideration. 170 A.3d at 439 (citation omitted). Instead, "the issue is whether the Constitution has given one of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature of such a power." Id. (emphasis added). There is simply nothing in the text of Sections 4 or 5 which confers on either the House or Senate the final responsibility to determine the question of the duration of the powers granted to those bodies by these provisions. Rather, as resolution of this question involves interpretation of the functional interrelationship of those constitutional provisions with Article II, Sections 2 and 4, this is a responsibility the Constitution expressly confers on our Court. See id. at 437 ("It is the province of the Judiciary to determine whether the Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth require or prohibit the performance of certain acts."). Indeed, as noted above, our Court has previously exercised our constitutional power of judicial review to determine the very type of issue presented by this case: whether one chamber of the General Assembly remained empowered to undertake official actions after it had adjourned sine die. See Brown supra. Consequently, our Court's performance of this task in this instance does not infringe on the powers conferred on the General Assembly under Article VI, Sections 4 and 5, to conduct impeachment proceedings.

Moreover, In re Dauphin County Grand Jury, supra, does not compel a contrary result, as Impeachment Managers have argued. In that case, we considered the question of whether a trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order barring the testimony of two witnesses before a committee of the House which was investigating whether sufficient evidence existed to prove that certain civil officers committed criminal acts that constituted misdemeanors in office, which was at that time the requirement under Article VI, Section 3, for impeachment of such officials.

Our Court concluded that our Constitution did not confer on the trial court the power to enjoin the committee from calling the witnesses to testify. We observed that Article VI, Section 1, granted to the House the "sole power of impeachment," which we characterized as "plenary within constitutional limits." 2 A.2d at 803 (emphasis added). We explicitly recognized, however, that the substantive question of whether the conduct in question met the constitutional definition of a misdemeanor in office was not then before our Court; rather, the issue was purely jurisdictional in nature: whether the trial court had the authority to bar the committee from calling witnesses as part of its investigation. We concluded that the trial court could not, reasoning that "courts have no jurisdiction in impeachment proceedings, and no control over their conduct, so long as actions taken are within constitutional lines." Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, we held that "[t]he courts cannot stay the legislature and the witnesses named are subject to call by the legislative committee at any time." Id.

Our Court therefore recognized a clear distinction between the authority of courts to judicially manage the conduct of impeachment proceedings which the General Assembly has already commenced pursuant to the power conferred on it by the Constitution, and the authority of the courts to make the final determination as to whether the impeachment proceedings themselves meet the Constitution's fundamental requirements. Thus, although we found no such constitutional grant of authority to courts for the wielding of the former power, critically, we recognized that, by contrast, courts have the full and exclusive right under our Constitution to exercise the latter power.

For all of these reasons, we conclude the question of the effect of the adjournment sine die is justiciable, and so we may address it.

B. The effect of adjournment sine die on the Articles of Impeachment

1. Arguments

The DA's central contention is that all "pending business before the General Assembly's two legislative bodies - the House and the Senate - terminates upon the adjournment sine die of the General Assembly." DA's Brief at 22. The DA argues that the business which was pending before the 206th Senate at the time of its adjournment sine die on November 30, 2022 included the Articles of Impeachment themselves, and thus these articles, which were pending in the Senate, terminated as of that date.²⁴ The DA avers that, because the Articles became null and void at the end of the 206th Senate, the 207th Senate is constitutionally prohibited from taking further action on them. The DA avers that the text of our Constitution compels this conclusion.

24 The DA adopts our Court's prior definition of the term sine die, set forth in Creamer, supra, which is to adjourn without fixing a date to reassemble. See supra note 11.

Specifically, the DA maintains that Article II, Section 4, establishes that the General Assembly exists as a continuing body for only two years, which is the term of elected Representatives under Article II, Sections 2 and 3; hence, he contends the 206th General Assembly ended on November 30, 2022, when it adjourned sine die. In the DA's view, any business pending before that body upon adjournment also expired at that time and may not carry over to a new session of the General Assembly. The DA emphasizes in this regard that the text of our Constitution is plain in establishing that the General Assembly's power to act on unfinished matters terminates upon adjournment at the end of its session, and nowhere in the text of those provisions or anywhere else in the Constitution is there an exception to this rule for what the Commonwealth Court considered to be "judicial business." Id. at 25. The DA contends that this is consistent with our decisions in Brown and Frame, supra, which he argues stand for the broad proposition that all of the General Assembly activities terminate at the time its session ends.

The DA avers that the requirements in Article II, Section 4, must be read in conjunction with Article VI, which governs impeachments. The DA highlights that Article VI, Section 4, grants to "[t]he House of Representatives" the "sole power of Impeachment," and Article VI, Section 5, requires that "[a]ll impeachments shall be tried by the Senate." Id. at 26 (quoting Pa. Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 5) (emphasis original). The DA emphasizes that these bodies - the House and the Senate - are the same bodies referenced in Article II, Section 4; thus, the limitations in Article II, Section 4, must be considered to be limitations on the impeachment process. The DA reasons that such restrictions are no different from other constitutional restrictions on the House and Senate, such as its requirements as to age and other qualifications for service of the members who will be participating in the impeachment process.

The DA reminds that, whenever the Constitution sets forth exceptions to its general requirements or its grant of powers to the General Assembly, it does so explicitly, such as in Article III, which places restrictions on the legislature's ability to enact legislation, or Article XI, which mandates the process for amending the Constitution. The DA notes that there is nothing in the text of Article VI which suggests an exception to the sine die rule for impeachment proceedings. Indeed, the DA points out that Article VI is, as the Commonwealth Court acknowledged, silent on the question of the temporal limits of the General Assembly to exercise its powers thereunder.

Senate Minority leader has filed a brief wholly aligned with the DA's interpretation in this regard. Senate Minority Leader adds that the principle that an adjournment sine die renders all pending business null and void has been acknowledged by the Senate itself with its adoption of Senate Rule 12(j), which provides:

(j) Consideration - second regular session.-- All bills, joint resolutions, resolutions, concurrent resolutions, or other matters pending before the Senate upon the recess of a first regular session convening in an odd-numbered year shall maintain their status and be pending before a second regular session convening in an even-numbered year but not beyond adjournment sine die or November 30th of such year, whichever first occurs.

Pa. Senate Rule 12(j) (emphasis added).

Additionally, Senate Minority Leader highlights that the practical effect of the Commonwealth Court's decision - creating what is, in essence, a freestanding judicial power in the legislature with respect to impeachments that transcends expiration of a session of the General Assembly - means, as a practical matter, "the House of any General Assembly can impeach any public official and leave the proceedings open in perpetuity, and the Senate of any General Assembly can convict them," which would thereby indefinitely subject that public official to the omnipresent threat of removal. Senate Minority Leader's Brief at 21 (emphasis original). Senate Minority Leader asserts that such an interpretation "simply cannot be the law." Id.

In response, Senate President argues that the structure of the Constitution does not support the DA's suggested construction. Senate President notes that the General Assembly's legislative and impeachment functions are provided for in two different articles of the Constitution, Articles II and VI. She reasons that their arrangement in this fashion evidences an intent to make the process of impeachment a wholly separate and distinct process from the process of legislation and, thus, that the provisions of Article II governing legislation do not apply to the impeachment process.

In support of this suggested construction, Senate President highlights the fact that, when the text of Article II is considered, it applies, as its introductory clause specifies, only to "legislative power" and does not mention impeachment; similarly, she notes that Article III, which concerns legislation, does not refer to impeachment. Senate President's Brief at 22 (emphasis original). Instead, in her view, Article VI controls because it is the sole article of the Constitution addressing impeachment. She stresses that, unlike Article II, Article VI does not refer to the exercise of legislative power.

Senate President urges this Court to reject what she characterizes as the DA's "invitation to engraft Article II's limitations on legislative authority onto the impeachment provisions of Article VI." Id. at 24. She notes that lawmaking is, at its core, an exercise in rulemaking with broad application, whereas holding an impeachment trial is a duty imposed solely on the Senate, confined to an individual case; these are markedly different exercises of power, in her view, and the Constitution should not be construed to treat them as equivalent.

Senate President acknowledges that there is no Pennsylvania appellate decision addressing this specific constitutional question; however, she asserts that our decision in Griest, supra, supports her conclusion, which the Commonwealth Court recognized. She avers that, just as the constitutional amendment process provided for in Article XVIII of the 1874 Constitution at issue in Griest was independent of other constitutional provisions, such as Article III, and, thus, did not depend on any other provision of the Constitution in order for its provisions to be executed, she reasons that Article VI is likewise independent, and does not depend on any other provision, such as Article II, in order for it to be effective.

Senate President also recounts five impeachments spanning the period from 1793 to 1826 in which the House authorized articles of impeachment against judges and other public officials, but then adjourned sine die, and the Senate trial on the articles took place in the subsequent session of the General Assembly. Senate President's Brief at 12-17. Senate President suggests these past practices are entitled to recognition by our Court in deference to the General Assembly's own interpretation of the constitutional provisions governing its functions.

In their separate response, Impeachment Managers' arguments parallel those of Senate President.

2. Discussion

Our Court's resolution of this question is guided by well-established tenets of constitutional interpretation. Paramount among these is that the plain language of the text of the constitutional provision at issue is the polestar of our analysis. In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 659 (Pa. 2014). Thus, "the Constitution's language controls and must be interpreted in its popular sense, as understood by the people when they voted on its adoption." League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 802 (Pa. 2018). Consequently, we will not interpret the Constitution "in a technical or strained manner, but are to interpret its words in their 'popular, natural and ordinary meaning.'" Scarnati, 173 A.3d at 1118) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1976)).

Of greatest significance in this process of Constitutional interpretation is the principle that we consider our Constitution to be "an integrated whole" and strive "to give concomitant effect to all constitutional provisions." In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 660. This approach "reflects an understanding that our charter is a fundamental document, which, in recognizing citizens' rights and establishing government, provides essential checks and balances whose complexity is to be neither undervalued nor disregarded." Id.

We begin by reiterating the relevant constitutional provisions which are the focus of the parties' arguments.²⁵ Article II, entitled "The Legislature," contains four relevant provisions, Sections 1 through 4, which provide:

25 Because we are construing our Commonwealth's Constitution as presently written, we do not regard the five impeachments from 1793 to 1826 cited by the legislative parties - for which impeachment articles were passed by the House in one session of the General Assembly, but trial occurred in a subsequent session of the Senate - to be relevant guideposts for our analysis of this issue. Those impeachments took place under earlier versions of our Constitution which, critically, did not contain the present language of Article II, Section 4, approved by the voters of our Commonwealth on May 16, 1967. While this history must be considered, given the fundamentally dissimilar nature of the present constitutional provisions to the ones at issue in those cases, we do not find the practice utilized in those cases to be dispositive herein. Likewise, we do not find the interpretations of the United States Constitution by federal courts, historical British parliamentary practices, or cases from other jurisdictions construing their state's constitutions, see Senate President's Brief at 33-35, to be controlling of our interpretation of the current constitutional language.

§ 1. Legislative power

The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

§ 2. Election of members; vacancies

Members of the General Assembly shall be chosen at the general election every second year. Their term of service shall begin on the first day of December next after their election. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in either House, the presiding officer thereof shall issue a writ of election to fill such vacancy for the remainder of the term.

§ 3. Terms of members

Senators shall be elected for the term of four years and Representatives for the term of two years.

§ 4. Sessions

The General Assembly shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected. It shall meet at 12 o'clock noon on the first Tuesday of January each year. Special sessions shall be called by the Governor on petition of a majority of the members elected to each House or may be called by the Governor whenever in his opinion the public interest requires.

Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 2-4.

Article VI, entitled "Public Officers," contains two relevant provisions, Sections 4 and 5, which provide:

§ 4. Power of impeachment

The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.

§ 5. Trial of impeachments

All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for that purpose the Senators shall be upon oath or affirmation. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Pa. Const. art. VI, §§ 4-5.

Under the organization of our Constitution, certain provisions of Article II, including those set forth above, serve to establish general and irreducible foundational requirements which must be met in order for the General Assembly to be empowered to perform any of its duties enumerated in the remainder of the Constitution. Article II, Section 1, establishes the structure of the General Assembly as consisting of two bodies, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Article II, Sections 2 and 3 establish the manner in which members of the House and the Senate are to be chosen - by election - and the duration of their terms of service - two years for members of the House and four years for members of the Senate.²⁶ Once their members have been elected, Article II, Section 4, specifies how long the House of Representatives and the Senate may function, collectively, as the General Assembly. Article II, Section 4, designates this period of time as a "session," and mandates that it last only for the duration of the terms of the members of the House of Representatives selected in the preceding election - that is, two years.

26 One half of the Senate's 50 members are elected by the voters every two years. 101 Pa. Code § 7.2(1).

Article II, Section 5 establishes additional qualifications which members of the House of Representatives and the Senate must meet in order to serve in those respective bodies during a session of the General Assembly. Members of the House must be at least 21 years of age, and members of the Senate must be at least 25 years of age. Pa. Const. art. II, § 5. Members of both the House and the Senate must be "citizens and inhabitants" of the Commonwealth for four years, inhabitants of their districts for one year prior to their election, and residents of their districts while serving their terms of office. Id.

Article II, Section 10, establishes the minimum number of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate who must be present in order for those bodies to be empowered to conduct their chosen business, i.e., a quorum:²⁷ "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and compel the attendance of absent members." Pa. Const. art. II, § 10.

27 A quorum is generally defined as the "minimum number of members . . . who must be present for a deliberative assembly to legally transact business." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

To reiterate, it is axiomatic that the Constitution is to be read as an integrated whole, with "effect . . . given to all of its provisions whenever possible." Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 528 (Pa. 2008) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Davis, 440 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. 1982)); In re Bruno, supra. Thus, when the terms "House of Representatives" and "Senate" are used in other provisions of the Constitution which confer specific powers on those bodies to collectively take official action, those terms must be understood to have the same meanings ascribed to them by Article II, and, consequently, as a necessary condition precedent to the House of Representatives and Senate executing powers afforded by such provisions, each body must be duly constituted and authorized to act under Article II.

Under the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution which delineate the powers of the House and the Senate with respect to impeachment proceedings, Article VI, Section 4, confers on the "House of Representatives" the sole power of impeachment. This means that only the House of Representatives, acting as a collective body, may exercise this power. The collective body that constitutes the House of Representatives when utilizing this power is comprised of the 203 Representatives elected for a term of two years which begin on the first day of December following their election in the preceding November.²⁸ See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 2, 3; Pa. Const. art. II, § 16 (dividing the Commonwealth into "203 representative districts"); see also 101 Pa. Code § 7.2. ("The General Assembly consists of a: . . . (2) House of Representatives, composed of 203 Representatives elected for terms of two years beginning on the first day of December next after their election.").

28 Under the Pennsylvania Election Code, elections for Representative and Senator in the General Assembly are held "the Tuesday next following the first Monday of November in each even-numbered year." 25 P.S. § 2751.

Once the House of Representatives has exercised its power of impeachment, then, textually, this immediately triggers the requirement of Article VI, Section 5, that "the Senate," again acting collectively as a body, hold a trial on the articles of impeachment passed by the House. The collective body of the Senate when this duty arises is comprised of 50 Senators, half of whom will be those members elected for terms of four years which begin on the first day of December following their election in November of that year, and the other half will be those serving the remainder of their four-year terms which began two years earlier. See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 2, 3; Pa. Const. art. II, § 16 (dividing the Commonwealth into "50 senatorial" districts); see also 101 Pa. Code § 7.2. ("The General Assembly consists of a: (1) Senate, composed of 50 Senators elected for terms of four years beginning on the first day of December next after their election. One-half of the Senators are elected every two years. . . .").

As set forth above, Article II, Section 4, entitled "Sessions," establishes that the General Assembly - which is further defined in Article II, Section 1, as consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate - "shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected." Pa. Const. art. II, § 4. Under Article II, Section 2, the term of an elected Representative begins on December 1 and, under Section 3 it is two years in duration; thus, it ends two years later on November 30. Therefore, under Article II, Section 4, the General Assembly is a continuing body only for this two year session, and, upon the expiration of that session, it ceases to exist. Necessarily then, so do the House of Representatives and the Senate, which together comprise the General Assembly, cease to exist as functioning bodies at that time as well. See Stroup v. Kapleau, 313 A.2d 237, 242 (Pa. 1973) (after final adjournment "the Senate was not physically nor . . . technically [i]n session").

Concomitantly, all powers granted by the Constitution to the House of Representatives and the Senate last only for the duration of the session of the General Assembly in which those bodies came into being under Article II, and those powers expire when that session expires. The Constitution simply does not textually permit the House and the Senate of a subsequent session of the General Assembly to take any further action on matters which the House or Senate of a prior session of the General Assembly may have begun, but not finished during that session, given that they are constitutionally distinct entities under Article II.²⁹ Accordingly, given these explicit constitutional constraints, we conclude that, when the House exercises its power of impeachment during one session of the General Assembly via the passage of articles of impeachment, trial on those articles must be held by the Senate of that session before it ends. ³⁰

29 In this regard, it is irrelevant whether the impeachment power of the General Assembly can be categorized as judicial, as the Commonwealth Court concluded below, or legislative. The impeachment process concededly has both legislative and judicial aspects. The articles of impeachment, like ordinary legislation, are passed by a majority vote of the House of Representatives, and an ultimate judgment to convict or acquit in the Senate is also rendered by a vote of that body, which is in accordance with the manner in which legislation is ordinarily enacted. However, unlike with ordinary legislation, Article VI, Section 5, requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate to render a final decision, and that body sits as a jury to consider evidence presented to it by members of the House on whether the standard for impeachment and removal set forth in Article VI, Section 6 - "misbehavior in office" - has been established. Nevertheless, we need not definitively categorize this power for purposes of this decision, as, whatever its label, impeachment is, at its essence, the exercise of a power of the General Assembly conferred by our Constitution, and it, like all such powers of that body, endures only so long as our organic charter allows.

30 Our decision in Griest, supra., relied on by the Commonwealth Court, is not to the contrary. Griest simply did not address the question of the duration of the General Assembly's constitutional power to conduct impeachment proceedings; rather, it concerned the discrete question of the constitutional process the General Assembly was obligated to follow when passing a proposed constitutional amendment: the one provided in Article III governing the passage of ordinary legislation, or the separate process specially provided for by the amended article to the Constitution. Our Court concluded the latter was applicable. There was no issue in that case as to whether the General Assembly which passed the proposed amendment was constitutionally empowered by Article II, Section 4, to do so; thus, our analysis therein has no bearing on our resolution of this matter.

This conclusion is reinforced by the manner in which the impeachment process is conducted. As in this case, articles of impeachment are passed by the House in the form of a simple legislative resolution, which is either approved or disapproved by the House via majority vote. As our Court has held, such a legislative resolution is generally regarded as "[a] formal expression of the opinion or will of an official body or a public assembly, adopted by vote." McGinley v. Scott, 164 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1960). Thus, an impeachment resolution must be considered the formal expression of the opinion of the House of Representatives of the session of the General Assembly which passed it that the subject of the impeachment committed the acts described in the articles, as well as its opinion that those acts constituted misbehavior in office as that behavior is defined in Article VI, Section 6. In directing that the articles be transmitted to the Senate for trial thereon, such a resolution must also be considered an expression of the will of the then-sitting House of Representatives that the then-sitting Senate conduct a trial on the allegations contained in the articles.

Likewise, resolutions adopted by the Senate for the purposes of conducting a trial on impeachment articles passed by the House of Representatives in a session of the General Assembly function as an expression of the collective will of the Senate of that session that a trial be conducted by that particular body in accordance with the terms therein. Given that, under Article II, a House impeachment resolution authorizing impeachment and the transmission of articles of impeachment to the Senate for trial, and a Senate resolution which accepts those articles for trial, expire with that session of the General Assembly, such resolutions can have no legal force and effect in a new session of the General Assembly whose membership has been altered by an intervening election and is now composed of both reelected and newly elected members.

Moreover, a contrary interpretation permitting one legislative body to direct the actions of a future legislative body could yield incongruous and legally impracticable results, such as indefinitely obligating any and all future sessions of the Senate to conduct a trial on impeachment articles once such articles have been passed by the House in a prior session of the General Assembly, no matter how long ago that passage may have been. Further, it would permit impeachment managers who are members of the House of Representatives, and appointed when such articles are first passed, to continue to serve indefinitely in that capacity to represent the House in a Senate trial during any future session of the General Assembly, even if it is no longer consistent with the will of the then-sitting House and, indeed, arguably, even if such managers are no longer duly elected members of that body.

That is precisely the type of incongruous result which threatens to transpire in this case, given that the Senate of the 206th Session of the General Assembly, before final adjournment, issued a summons to the DA to appear for an impeachment trial that would, of necessity, occur in the Senate of the 207th Session of the General Assembly which had not yet come into existence. See S.R. 388. The composition of the 207th Senate differs from the 206th Senate in that it has 50 newly elected or reelected members, some of whom were not in office at the time the 206th Senate accepted the Articles of Impeachment for trial.³¹ Moreover, if a trial were held by the 207th Senate, it would be conducted, under the terms of the Impeachment Resolution, by Impeachment Managers "on behalf of the House of Representatives." Impeachment Resolution at 50. This "House of Representatives" is the 206th House of Representatives, the one which approved the resolution, and it no longer exists; thus, there is no longer an entity which the Impeachment Managers can act "on behalf of" in an impeachment trial in the 207th Senate. We must reject an interpretation of our organic charter which permits such nonsensical results. As our Court has emphasized, "[c]onstitutional provisions, like all laws, must receive a sensible and reasonable construction." Commonwealth v. Novak, 150 A.2d 102, 109-10 (Pa. 1959); Commonwealth v. Darcy, 66 A.2d 663, 670 (Pa. 1949) (constitutional language should not be construed in a manner which will yield an unreasonable or absurd result).

31 Similarly, the 207th House has 203 newly elected or reelected members.

For all of these reasons, we hold that the Articles of Impeachment passed by the House of Representatives of the 206th Session of the General Assembly, and transmitted to the Senate of the 206th Session of the General Assembly, became null and void upon the expiration of the 206th Session of the General Assembly on November 30, 2022. Accordingly, we must reverse that portion of the order of the Commonwealth Court which denied the DA summary judgment relief on this question.

Order reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Justices Donohue and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.

Justice Mundy files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Justice Dougherty did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

Justice Brobson did not participate in the decision of this matter.

CONCURRING OPINION

WECHT, JUSTICE

I join the Majority Opinion. In its scholarly and well-reasoned analysis, the Majority persuasively establishes that the text and structure of the Pennsylvania Constitution do not permit unfinished business of the General Assembly to extend beyond its adjournment sine die at the end of its two-year session, because the legislature is a "continuing body" for only that period of time.¹ I agree with the Majority that impeachment matters are not a special exception to that general rule.

I write separately because the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (the "Dissent")²raises substantial points that merit additional discussion, particularly concerning the practical consequences of today's ruling. The Dissent articulates well the opposing perspective on this matter, and it notes a number of serious and legitimate areas of concern. Nonetheless, there are several reasons that I respectfully differ with the Dissent, and that cause my views to remain aligned with the Majority.

At the outset, it is noteworthy that there appears to be no dispute about the general application of the rule concerning adjournment sine die, or that it is, in fact, a rule of constitutional magnitude. Indeed, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate begins her argument to this Court with the acknowledgment that it is "axiomatic that all legislative matters pending before the preceding session of the General Assembly are terminated upon adjournment sine die and cannot 'carry over' from one General Assembly to the next."³ The Dissent, as well, acknowledges that this is the general rule, and that the rule derives from Article II, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.⁴ It appears, thus, that all can agree upon the effect of adjournment sine die as a general matter.

The argument against applying the general rule to the matter before us is premised upon the suggestion that there is something unique about impeachment matters that exempts them from compliance with the requirements of Article II of our Constitution. This special attribute of impeachment, the argument goes, follows from the assertion that impeachment is not a "legislative" matter, and that it is better characterized as "judicial" in some sense (at least regarding the Senate's role as trier of impeachments).⁵ Because impeachment is not "legislative," and because the constitutional authority for impeachment, trial, and removal from office appears in a separate Article of our Constitution, it is argued, the requirements of Article II are inapplicable.

I do not find the "legislative" versus "judicial" distinction to be particularly compelling. The Dissent stresses, for instance, that the "text of the relevant provisions of Article II clearly outlines the legislative powers of the General Assembly," emphasizing that Article II, Section 1 provides that the "legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."⁶ This is surely true, of course, but it does not follow that Article II is therefore irrelevant to Article VI, or that the powers vested in the General Assembly-or the House or Senate individually-become "judicial" by virtue of their appearance in a separate Article of the Constitution. To the contrary, our Constitution is very clear about where it vests the "judicial power of the Commonwealth": "in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace."⁷ The fact that an impeachment trial can, in some colloquial sense, be called judicial or quasi-judicial does not strike me as dispositive. Indeed, one might just as easily suggest that impeachment is, in fact, a "legislative power"; it is a power exercised by the legislative branch of government.

To the extent that the exercise of "legislative power" is a matter solely of making legislation, it is noteworthy that the adjournment sine die rule does not appear alongside the constitutional requirements for that activity. Rather, it appears among the rules for what constitutes the legislature itself. Article II is entitled "The Legislature," and it contains not only the adjournment sine die rule, but also the rules specifying, e.g., the term lengths of Representatives and Senators, their qualifications (and disqualifications), how many members constitute a quorum, etc.⁸ These provisions establish the framework for what constitutes the legislature in the first place-what it is, who may be a member of it, and when it is empowered to act. The rules for legislating appear in Article III, entitled "Legislation," and they include requirements such as the single-subject rule, the original-purpose rule, the three-considerations rule, etc.⁹ If the adjournment sine die rule only concerned the power to make ordinary legislation, and did not apply to any other activity of the House or Senate, then one would expect the rule to appear in Article III, alongside the other such rules. But it does not; it lies in Article II with the other foundation blocks of the General Assembly.

Those numerous other requirements in Article II provide an insight that substantially affects my view of this case. As far as I can tell, the adjournment sine die rule is the only rule in Article II that the opposing view would deem categorically inapplicable to impeachment matters. Would the House be empowered to impeach an official without a quorum, or could the Senate try the official without a quorum?¹⁰ Could the Senate conduct an impeachment trial with ineligible members?¹¹ Could it do so outside of the terms for which its members were elected?¹² Could it do so in secret?¹³One would expect the answer to be "no" to all of the above, for a simple reason: such actions would violate the Constitution. If an official complained that he had been impeached without a quorum, for example, it is hard to imagine that such a core violation of the Constitution would be waved off because it only appears in Article II and thus concerns "legislative" power, as opposed to the purportedly "judicial" power of impeachment. And if the remainder of Article II continues to apply to impeachment matters, then there is no reason to conclude that just one rule in Article II is inconsequential.

This same line of reasoning leads me to conclude that the opposing view's reliance upon Griest ¹⁴ is misplaced. As the Majority explains, Griest addressed the question of whether a proposed constitutional amendment required submission to the Governor for approval or veto, as is the case for ordinary legislation. This Court reasoned that, because the Constitution spelled out a complete process for amendment that conflicted with the ordinary requirements for legislating (by providing no role for the Governor), there was no basis for inserting into the amendment process the distinct requirements applicable to ordinary legislation under Article III.

Taken in isolation, one passage from Griest likely provides the opposing view with its strongest argument-that the amendment process was "a separated and independent article, standing alone and entirely unconnected with any other subject," which did not "contain any reference to any other provision of the constitution as being needed or to be used in carrying out the particular work to which the eighteenth article is devoted."¹⁵ On the surface, this language does provide support for the view that, because impeachment proceedings are addressed in an article (Article VI) separate from the one that prescribes requirements for ordinary legislation (Article III), the latter does not control the former. But the Article II requirements are something different; again, they concern the structure of the legislature, not the rules for legislating. This is a significant difference. If the question in Griest concerned, for example, whether the House and Senate could propose a constitutional amendment without a quorum, or with ineligible members, I suspect that the answer would have been quite different. This is because the Article II rules-the adjournment sine die rule included-concern the foundational operating requirements of the legislature, not the rules for making legislation.

Finally, although I differ with the Dissent's view of the merits, I believe that the Dissent identifies a legitimate practical concern with application of the adjournment sine die rule to impeachment matters. If the entire impeachment proceeding must take place within a single two-year legislative session, the Dissent warns, then an impeached official could attempt to "run out the clock" with delay tactics, and thus avoid trial in the Senate and the potential consequences of conviction.¹⁶ Although this is a potential issue, there are risks of timing manipulation either way.¹⁷

Regardless, I believe that there is a remedy for the concern. Should the Senate fail to act upon an impeachment prior to adjournment sine die and the expiration of the legislative session, the new House could always pass the articles of impeachment again. This would renew the two-year period within which to conduct the impeachment trial. Indeed, if the conduct of the impeached official truly warrants such intervention on the part of the legislature, then it should not be especially difficult to provide the impeachment proceedings with the legitimacy fostered by a vote of the Representatives who represent the will of the people at the time.

For these reasons, I respectfully differ with the views of the Dissent, and I join the Majority Opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

MUNDY, JUSTICE

I agree with the Majority's conclusion that the question of the effect of sine die adjournment is justiciable. However, because Article VI, Section 5 of our Constitution does not contain a temporal limitation on the mandate that the Senate hold a trial on "all impeachments," and Article II, Section 4 similarly does not impose such a limitation on the Senate's role in conducting an impeachment trial, I respectfully dissent.

Article VI of the Pennsylvania Constitution is titled "Public Officials." Article VI, Sections 4 and 5 specify the powers and roles of the House of Representatives and the Senate in impeachment proceedings as follows:

§ 4. Power of impeachment

The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Pa. Const. art. VI, § 4.

§ 5. Trial of impeachments

All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for that purpose the Senators shall be upon oath or affirmation. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Pa. Const. art. VI, § 5.

In Article VI, Sections 4 and 5, the text of our Constitution plainly and unambiguously delineates the separate, distinct, and independent roles of the House of Representatives and the Senate in the impeachment of a public officer. The House of Representatives has "the sole power of impeachment." Pa. Const. art. VI, § 4; accord In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, Sept. 1938, 2 A.2d 802, 803 (Pa. 1938) (finding the constitution's plain language provides the House's impeachment power is plenary). Once the House exercises this power that it alone possesses, the Constitution then obligates the Senate to hold a trial on the impeachment. Pa. Const. art. VI, § 5. This division of powers plainly means that the roles of the House and the Senate regarding impeachment and trial are distinct and occur independently of each other without requiring concurrence from one another.

Further, the Constitution obligates the Senate to try "all impeachments." Pa. Const. art. VI, § 5. This directive is not limited by or contingent upon which session of the House of Representatives exercises its power of impeachment. The Constitution simply does not specify that the Senate must hold a trial in the same legislative session as the one in which the House has issued articles of impeachment. To the contrary, the Senate in its constitutional role as the trier of an impeachment is not exercising a legislative function. The Constitution's structure places the impeachment procedure in Article VI, separate from the House of Representatives' and the Senate's other powers and roles, making clear that this is a distinct procedure. Further, the language of Article VI, Section 5 provides that Senators "sitting for that purpose," i.e., to adjudicate an impeachment, must follow different procedures, namely taking an oath or affirmation¹ and obtaining a two-thirds vote to convict, which plainly prescribes a separate "purpose" to the Senate when it is sitting as the trier of an impeachment. Id. When conducting an impeachment trial, the Senate has a specific role, separate and distinct from its legislative functions.

Accordingly, pursuant the plain text of the Constitution, the House of Representatives completed the exercise of its impeachment power on November 16, 2022, when it passed House Resolution 240 containing amended articles of impeachment against Larry Krasner. The Senate's independent constitutional obligation to hold a trial on Krasner's articles of impeachment then arose, and that obligation was not terminated when the 206^th legislative session ended. Instead, the Constitution obligated the senate of the 207^th Session to try the impeachment. Nothing in the Constitution provides otherwise.

In concluding the opposite, the Majority reads Article II, "The Legislature," in combination with Article VI, "Public Officers," to impose a temporal restriction on the Senate's duty to try all impeachments such that the House's impeachment power and the Senate's trial must be completed in the same legislative session. The text of the relevant provisions of Article II clearly outlines the legislative powers of the General Assembly as follows:

§ 1. Legislative power

The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).

§ 4. Sessions

The General Assembly shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected. It shall meet at twelve o'clock noon on the first Tuesday of January each year. Special sessions shall be called by the Governor on petition of a majority of the members elected to each House or may be called by the Governor whenever in his opinion the public interest requires.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).

The Majority's purported textual analysis of Article II is not textual at all, it is highly attenuated. Initially, Article II-titled "The Legislature"-plainly defines the legislative powers of the General Assembly. As seen above, Article II, Section 1 provides "the legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Pa. Const. art. II, § 1. Notably, this "legislative power" is textually distinct from the "sole power of impeachment" bestowed by Article VI, Section 4 on the House of Representatives and from the duty to conduct a trial of "all impeachments" conferred on the Senate by Article VI, Section 5. See Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Griest, 46 A. 505, 505-06 (Pa. 1900) (recognizing that an Article of the Constitution may be construed as "a system entirely complete in itself").² The Commonwealth's legislative power is exercised by the collective General Assembly, whereas each House has a distinct and independent power regarding impeachment. Thus, when Article II, Section 4 states that the "General Assembly shall be a continuing body during the term for which its Representatives are elected[,]" it plainly means the General Assembly as the body exercising the Commonwealth's legislative power given its placement in Article II. This makes sense because only the General Assembly acting as an integrated unit can pass legislation. The same is not true of the distinct roles of impeachment (House) and trial (Senate). Each of those roles is fulfilled by a single House acting without the other.

Despite the Majority's efforts to read Article II as a limitation on the Senate's constitutional duty to try all impeachments, such a temporal limitation does not exist in the text of the Constitution. The Majority begins its reasoning with foundational constitutional principles that are not in dispute. The Majority states that the Constitution's use of "House of Representatives" and "Senate" "must be understood to have the same meanings ascribed to them by Article II, and, consequently, as a necessary condition precedent to the House of Representatives and Senate executing powers afforded by such provisions, each body must be duly constituted and authorized to act under Article II." Maj. Op. at 47. But this does not answer the question of whether the Senate's duty to conduct a trial on all impeachments is temporally restricted. It simply means that when the Senate sits to try an impeachment, it must be duly constituted and authorized to act.

Next, the Majority states that when the House of Representatives has exercised its impeachment power, it "immediately triggers the requirement of Article VI, Section 5 that 'the Senate,' again acting collectively as a body, hold a trial on the articles of impeachment passed by the House." Id. Nonetheless, Article VI, Section 5 does not specify a timeframe within which the Senate's trial must be commenced or completed, nor does it state or imply that it must be the Senate of the same session in which the impeachment took place. Similarly, the Majority explains that "under Article II, Section 4, the General Assembly is a continuing body only for this two year session, and upon the expiration of that session, it ceases to exist." Id. at 47. As explained above, Article II, Section 4 refers to specifically legislative powers of the General Assembly, which are distinct from the individual Houses' impeachment powers.³

From these foundational constitutional principles, the Majority then extrapolates a temporal limitation on the Senate's impeachment role that is not contained in the Constitution. Referring to the definition of a legislative session in Article II, the Majority opines:

all powers granted by the Constitution to the House of Representatives and the Senate last only for the duration of the session of the General Assembly in which those bodies came into being under Article II, and those powers expire when that session expires. The Constitution simply does not textually permit the House and the Senate of a subsequent session of the General Assembly to take any further action on matters which the House or Senate of a prior session of the General Assembly may have begun, but not finished during that session, given that they are constitutionally distinct entities under Article II.

Id. at 48. The Majority continues, "under Article II, a House impeachment resolution authorizing impeachment and the transmission of articles of impeachment to the Senate for trial, and a Senate resolution which accepts those articles for trial, expire with that Session of the General Assembly, such resolutions can have no legal force and effect in a new session of the General Assembly whose membership has been altered by an intervening election and is now composed of both reelected and newly elected members." Id. at 50. Even conceding that each House's powers expire when a legislative session expires, the Constitution nonetheless vests every session of the Senate with the obligation to try "all impeachments," independent of the whether the same or a prior session of the House of Representatives issued the articles of impeachment. In terms of this case, the House of Representatives of the 206th Session of the General Assembly completed the exercise of its constitutional power of impeachment when it issued the resolution containing the articles of impeachment, which triggered the requirement that the Senate hold a trial. Although the Senate of the 206th Session of the General Assembly's obligation to conduct a trial expired at the end of its session, Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution imposes that same obligation on the Senate of the 207th Session of the General Assembly.

Next, the Majority states that articles of impeachment "must also be considered an expression of the will of the then-sitting House of Representatives that the then-sitting Senate conduct a trial on the allegations contained in the articles." Id. at 49. But there is no textual support for such a concept. Given that the Constitution requires the Senate to try "all impeachments" it is more accurate to say that the articles of impeachment express the House's intent that the Senate conduct a trial regardless of the time in the future or the specific legislative session in which that occurs. Here, the House of Representatives exercised its power of impeachment under Article VI, Section 4, giving rise to the Senate's constitutional duty to conduct a trial of that impeachment. The Constitution simply does not specify that the Senate sitting when the House of Representatives passed its articles of impeachment must conduct the impeachment trial. Instead, the Constitution directs the Senate to try all impeachments. The majority converts this to some impeachments.

Notably, the text of Article VI does, in at least one instance, require action by the General Assembly as a whole. See Pa. Const. art. VI, § 2 ("The General Assembly may by law declare what offices are incompatible."). By referring to the legislative body as a unit in the exercise of its lawmaking function, Section 2 incorporates from Article II, Section 4 the requirement, attendant to that specific function, that the Houses and the Senate pass the bill in the same legislative session. However, Sections 4 and 5 of Article VI are distinctly different from Section 2 in that they only refer to the two Houses individually in their separate functions. This implicates the principle of construction that, where language appears in one section of a statute but is omitted from a related provision, a different meaning is presumed. See In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 244 (Pa. 2017). To the extent this leaves any uncertainty concerning whether the framers intended that the House of one session could impeach and the Senate of a subsequent session could hold a trial, such uncertainty is resolved by the command, expressed in unambiguous terms and without exception, that "all impeachments" must be tried by the Senate. The word "all" being universal necessarily incorporates impeachments by the House during a prior session.

Lastly, the Majority concludes "that the Articles of Impeachment passed by the House of Representatives of the 206th Session of the General Assembly, and transmitted to the Senate of the 206th Session of the General Assembly, became null and void upon the expiration of the 206th Session of the General Assembly on November 30, 2022." Id. at 51. As explained above, this holding is not supported by the Constitutional text or history. Instead, and consistent with the above explanation, the House of Representatives' transmission of the articles of impeachment to the Senate represents the completion of the House's exercise of its power of impeachment, which then constitutionally obligates the Senate to try that impeachment. There is no constitutional expiration date for such obligation. Because the Constitution's plain text does not temporally restrict the Senate's duty to try all impeachments, the Senate of the 207th Session of the General Assembly was not constitutionally prohibited from conducting a trial on the articles of impeachment.

This interpretation of the nature of impeachment proceedings as surviving a sine die adjournment of the General Assembly has been consistent throughout our Commonwealth's history. As Designated Appellee Senator Kim Ward chronicles, five impeachments in our history have continued from one legislative session of the General Assembly to a subsequent session.⁴ While the General Assembly's understanding of the Constitution and its practice are not binding on the judiciary, it is persuasive as "strong evidence of the true interpretation of the constitutional power of the legislature[.]" Olive Cemetery Co. v. Phila., 93 Pa. 129, 132 (1880) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Greene v. Gregg, 29 A. 297, 298 (Pa. 1894). Additionally, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania issued an opinion in 1913 concluding that a special committee empaneled by the House of Representatives to conduct an impeachment investigation had the authority to continue its work after the adjournment of the General Assembly. See Umbel's Case, 41 Pa.C.C. 414, 417 (1913). The Attorney General reasoned that impeachment is not a legislative function and that each house of the legislature "has a separate and distinct function to perform in such proceedings." Id. This evidence of the historical practices and interpretation regarding impeachment is persuasive given that the Constitution's impeachment powers, currently found in Article VI, Sections 4 and 5, have not been substantively altered since the Constitution of 1790.⁵Ultimately, the touchstone in interpreting the Constitution "is the actual language of the Constitution itself," which we must interpret "in its popular sense, as understood by the people when they voted on its adoption." Robinson Twp., Wash. Cty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 943 (Pa. 2013). As the impeachment and adjudication powers currently found in Article VI, Sections 4 and 5 have remained substantively identical since 1790, despite renumbering and minor grammatical alterations, I interpret those provisions to embody the popular understanding as reflected in our Commonwealth's history that an adjournment of the General Assembly does not terminate an impeachment proceeding. See id.

The Majority identifies policy concerns to support its addition of a temporal limitation to the Senate's Article VI, Section 5 duty to try all impeachments. Maj. Op. at 50. Specifically, the Majority claims that all future sessions of the Senate would be obligated to try impeachments regardless of how long ago the House passed the articles of impeachment, and that the former House of Representatives' impeachment managers would be permitted to serve indefinitely in that capacity. Id. However, there are countervailing concerns with confining an impeachment proceeding to a two-year legislative session. One significant problem is that it invites an impeached official who does not want to stand trial in the Senate to "run out the clock" on the impeachment process by resorting to delay tactics, such as filing motions in the Senate or initiating legal actions in the judicial system, to stave off a trial until the General Assembly's sine die adjournment for that session. Conversely, an official impeached late in the House's two- year session who wanted to rehabilitate his or her reputation by an acquittal in the Senate would be denied due process by virtue of the clock running out.⁶ However, because the constitutional language is clear and controlling, these policy concerns ultimately should not factor into this Court's analysis. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 801 (Pa. 2018).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.⁷