Summary
applying N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215's one-year limitation period to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
Summary of this case from Hwang v. Grace Rd. ChurchOpinion
April 7, 1997
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated March 14, 1996, as granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the cause of action sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress as time barred.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim to recover damages for the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, since she clearly failed to commence the action within the one-year Statute of Limitations period applicable to that claim ( see, CPLR 215; Foley v. Mobil Chem. Co., 214 A.D.2d 1003; Weisman v. Weisman, 108 A.D.2d 853). The plaintiff was not entitled to the six-month extension afforded by CPLR 205 (a) following the dismissal of her similar and timely-commenced Federal action, inasmuch as that action was terminated by voluntary discontinuance pursuant to rule 41 (a) (1) (ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ( see, CPLR 205 (a); see generally, George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 180; Feit v. Emons Indus., 119 Misc.2d 157; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ Prac ¶ 205.06; cf., Extebank v. Finkelstein, 188 A.D.2d 513; Censor v. Mead Reins. Corp., 176 A.D.2d 600).
Contrary to the plaintiff's current contention, her claim for tortious interference with her life does not state a cognizable cause of action ( see generally, Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744; M.J. K. Co. v. Matthew Bender Co., 220 A.D.2d 488; Goldstein v. Tabb, 177 A.D.2d 470). Sullivan, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.