Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County Nos. INC077393, INC077394 Randall Donald White, Judge.
George F. Kossler, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joseph Baxter and Sara Baxter for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
Hollenhorst, J.
Plaintiff George F. Kossler (Kossler) appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to vacate a default and default judgment against defendant Sossa Enterprises, Inc. (Kossler v. Sossa Enterprises, Inc., E048249). Kossler also appeals the trial court’s order granting a similar motion to vacate a default and default judgment against defendant, the Sossa Family Trust (Kossler v. The Sossa Family Trust, E048250). This court ordered these two cases consolidated for purposes of this appeal, with case No. E048249 designated the lead case.
The records on appeal in both cases, including the reporter’s transcripts and clerk’s transcripts, are essentially identical since the pleadings, motions, opposition, and other documents are, for the most part, the same, with the exception of the identity of the particular defendant at issue. The reporter’s transcripts in both cases are identical. The clerk’s transcript in case No. E048250 contains one additional document, not included in case No. E048249, entitled, “supplemental brief of the Sossa Family Trust in support of motion to set aside default and default judgment.”
The Sossa Family Trust is the sole owner of Sossa Enterprises, Inc. In this opinion, we refer to the two defendants, the Sossa Family Trust and Sossa Enterprises, Inc., collectively as “the Sossa defendants.”
Kossler contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Sossa defendants’ motions to set aside default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (473 relief). Kossler argues there was no showing of excusable neglect and no showing of reasonable diligence in making the motion after discovering entry of default. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting default relief and affirm the judgment.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1. Factual and Procedural Background
On May 16, 2008, Kossler signed a substitution of attorney form, substituting out as the Sossa defendants’ attorney in the case of Lee v. Sossa (Riverside Superior Court case No. INC060482). Attorney Jeffrey E. Fromberg (Fromberg) substituted in as the Sossa defendants’ attorney and also signed the form on May 16, 2008. After the court clerk rejected the attorney substitution form, Kossler changed his signature date to May 20, 2008, and resubmitted the form, which was filed with the court on June 25, 2008.
Meanwhile, on May 19, 2008, Kossler filed two complaints, one against Sossa Enterprises, Inc. and the second against the Sossa Family Trust. In the complaints, Kossler sought to recover unpaid attorney’s fees from the Sossa defendants.
On May 22, 2008, Kossler’s two complaints were personally served on the Sossa defendants by personally delivering them to Lila Sossa (Lila). Lila was authorized to accept service as the president of Sossa Enterprises, Inc. and as trustee of the Sossa Family Trust.
We refer to Lila Sossa by her first name, not out of familiarity or disrespect, but for ease of reference, since there are other parties and individuals involved in this matter that use the name, “Sossa.”
The 30-day period to file an answer to the complaints expired on Saturday, June 21, 2008. The Sossa defendants failed to file timely responses. On Tuesday, June 24, 2008, Kossler filed a request for entry of default and clerk’s judgment under section 585, subdivision (a). Copies of the requests for entry of default were mailed to Lila on June 24, 2008. On June 24, 2008, the court clerk entered default in both cases and on June 25, 2008, a judgment by default was entered on each of Kossler’s complaints.
The clerk’s default judgment against the Sossa Family Trust amounted to $85,305.24. The default judgment against Sossa Enterprises, Inc. amounted to $107,484.02. The judgments both state the “Defendant was sued only on a contract or judgment of a court of this state for the recovery of money, ” but the record on appeal does not include copies of any such contracts or any documentation supporting the damages award.
A. Motion to Set Aside Default
On October 27, 2008, the Sossa defendants, through their attorney, Judith M. Elsworth (Elsworth), filed motions to set aside entry of default and default judgment pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b). Under the discretionary provision of section 473, subdivision (b), the Sossa defendants claimed excusable neglect on the ground that, up until September 25, 2008, three months after entry of default, Lila was unable to find an attorney willing to represent the Sossa defendants in this matter.
The motions, which are essentially identical, stated the following. Kossler represented the Sossa defendants in Lee v. Sossa, which is an ongoing dispute in which the labor board matter was resolved in favor of the Sossa defendants on appeal. The Sossa defendants discovered that Kossler was “charging for services not rendered, padding his billing, charging in excess of the amount agreed to in the retainer agreement, and generally failing to competently represent [the Sossa defendants].” According to the Sossa defendants, Kossler never provided a copy of the original retainer agreement. As a consequence, the Sossa defendants allegedly were not required to pay Kossler more than $1,000 on either of his two lawsuit claims, totaling almost $200,000. In addition, Kossler allegedly charged $150 an hour more than the amount agreed upon when he was retained.
Kossler was substituted out as the Sossa defendants’ attorney of record on June 25, 2008. On May 19, 2008, the day before Kossler signed the substitution of attorney form, and thus while he was still the Sossa defendants’ attorney of record, Kossler filed the instant lawsuits against the Sossa defendants. The Sossa defendants acknowledged that Kossler initially signed the substitution of attorney form on May 16, 2008, but it was rejected by the court clerk, and thereafter the date of Kossler’s signature was changed to May 20, 2008.
Lila stated in her declarations, filed in support of the motions for default relief, that Kossler had represented the Sossa defendants in several matters, including Lee v. Sossa and labor board matters. He was also involved with the Sossa family’s legal matters for many years and was conservator for the original Sossa Family Trust trustee, Helen Sossa, who was Lila’s mother. He assisted in making modifications to the Sossa Family Trust.
Lila complained in her motion declaration that Kossler continued billing Sossa Enterprises through May 13, 2008, on the Lee v. Sossa matter, after Sossa Enterprises was dismissed from the case on May 24, 2007. Kossler also billed for time he did not actually spend providing services and abandoned the Sossa defendants as clients, yet fraudulently continued billing them for services which were never rendered.
Lila claimed she never received a copy of the retainer agreement but, when Kossler was hired, he said he would be charging $200 hourly. His bills, however, reflect he was billing $300 and $350 hourly. Lila never received notice his rates were increasing nor gave consent to pay the higher rates.
In September 2008, Lila discovered that in Lee v. Kossler, Kossler had erroneously permitted the settlement to reflect that Anthony Lee and Christine Lee (Lees) had paid $35,000 into escrow, which the Lees had never actually paid. As a consequence, the Sossa defendants never received the $35,000, which should have been paid to them as part of the overall settlement.
On May 22, 2008, the day Lila was served with Kossler’s complaints against the Sossa defendants, Lila began looking for an attorney to represent the Sossa defendants. She first contacted Fromberg. He said he did not want to handle any case against Kossler. Fromberg suggested the Sossa defendants use an attorney from out of the area and referred Lila to a San Bernardino County attorney. Lila contacted the attorney, who also declined to take the case. Lila called several other local attorneys and met with at least one attorney. None of the attorneys wanted to represent the Sossa defendants against Kossler.
Lila’s difficulty retaining an attorney was exacerbated by a lack of funds to pay for the retainer fee. Kossler refused to return to Sossa Enterprises, Inc. the $54,000, which was paid for a bond in the labor board action. The trial court returned the money to Kossler’s attorney-client trust account after Sossa Enterprises, Inc. won the labor board action on appeal. Lila and Fromberg requested Kossler to return the money to the Sossa defendants but Kossler refused. This impeded Lila’s ability to pay the necessary retainer fee required to retain an attorney. Also, despite Lila and Fromberg’s requests, Kossler did not return the complete Lee v. Sossa file.
On July 8, 2008, Lila went to the courthouse and attempted to file the Sossa defendants’ answers to Kossler’s complaints. The court clerk told her it was too late to file the answers and gave Lila a printout of the portion of the register of actions showing entry of default and default judgment on June 24 and 25, 2008. The clerk suggested Lila seek legal advice.
On September 25, 2008, two and a half months later, a “legal document assistant” showed Lila section 473 and called Elsworth, who agreed to represent the Sossa defendants. Lila met Elsworth on October 9, 2008. Because Kossler had still not returned the $54,000 to the Sossa defendants, Elsworth agreed to modify the terms of her standard retainer agreement and not charge for her travel time to and from her home in Oceanside to make court appearances.
The Sossa defendants argued in their motions for default relief that default was entered by reason of excusable neglect. Lila was diligent in attempting to obtain counsel and her efforts were impeded by local attorneys not wanting to handle the case because it was against Kossler. Retention of an attorney was also hindered by Kossler’s refusal to return to the Sossa defendants the $54,000 in bond money needed to pay for the attorney retainer. By the time Lila attempted to file a complaint response without an attorney, she discovered the default had already been entered. Lila eventually found an attorney through a legal document assistant who referred Lila to an attorney who agreed to represent the Sossa defendants.
The Sossa defendants further argued in their motions that Kossler knew that Fromberg had substituted in as the Sossa defendants’ attorney in Lee v. Sossa. Kossler nevertheless failed to inform Fromberg that the Sossa defendants were in default, before Kossler proceeded with requesting default in the instant lawsuits for recovery of his attorney’s fees billed in Lee v. Sossa. In addition, Kossler committed acts of moral turpitude by failing to return the Sossa defendants’ funds, abandoning them as clients, not acting in their best interests, and suing them to collect fees.
The Sossa defendants claimed they had a complete defense to Kossler’s lawsuits, consisting of Kossler allegedly overbilling them and not providing them with a retainer agreement. The Sossa defendants also requested leave to file a cross-complaint against Kossler for recovery of $54,000, and alleged Kossler committed professional negligence, breach of contract, common counts, and breach of fiduciary duty. The Sossa defendants attached to their motions proposed answers and cross-complaints.
B. Kossler’s Opposition to the Motions for Default Relief
On December 19, 2008, Kossler filed opposition to the Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief. Kossler argued in his opposition that the motions were “grossly untimely, defectively noticed, fails to set forth any grounds, contains no factual basis as required, the sole declaration fails to contain the minimal statutory requirements to qualify as a legal declaration, and fails to contain any facts showing mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Additionally, the motion contains a healthy dose of misleading claims as more fully set forth in the Declaration of George F. Kossler in opposition. The motion fails to meet the burden of proof, lacks any semblance of merit, and should be denied.”
Kossler asserted in his opposition that Lila’s declaration was defective because it failed to state on the signature page where it was executed, in violation of section 2015.5. Kossler also argued that Lila did nothing for four months after she was served with the complaints and failed to provide any explanation for the delay. There was another month delay in filing the motion, after Lila contacted her present counsel on September 25, 2008. Kossler argued that the Sossa defendants therefore were not reasonably diligent in filing their motion for default relief. Kossler further argued in his opposition that Lila’s declaration contained erroneous statements.
Although not raised by Kossler, more significantly, Lila’s declaration did not state that it was made under penalty of perjury (§ 2015.5).
Kossler attached to his opposition, in the case against the Sossa Family Trust, his own declaration, stating that he was the former attorney for the Sossa Family Trust, which owns numerous assets, including various real property, which Kossler listed in his declaration.
Kossler’s declaration, attached to his opposition to Sossa Enterprises, Inc.’s motion for default relief, differs in that Kossler stated that, as former attorney for Sossa Enterprises, Inc., he had personal knowledge of a recent court-ordered sale in 2008, of real property for $2 million. Kossler does not state who the seller of the property was, although it can be inferred that Sossa Enterprises, Inc. was, based on Kossler’s statement that Lila’s suggestion that the corporation needed $54,000 to hire a lawyer was “preposterous, ” “disingenuous, ” and displayed a “lack of any genuine basis for relief.” Kossler added in his declaration that Sossa Enterprises, Inc. also owns and operates two convenience stores that gross, on average, approximately $100,000 a month, and easily owns assets exceeding $2 to $4 million.
On January 5, 2009, the day before the hearing on the Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief, Lila filed an amended declaration, which was essentially identical to her original declaration, with the exception it stated the location of execution of her declaration (Indio, California) and was signed under penalty of perjury.
C. First Hearing on Motions
On January 6, 2009, the trial court heard the Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief. The court noted the two motions were the same. They concerned collection actions against Kossler’s former clients, the Sossa defendants, arising from Kossler representing them in the case of Lee v. Sossa. The court noted Kossler had objected to Lila’s supporting declaration because it did not state the location of execution. The Sossa defendants’ attorney, Elsworth, stated that on January 5, 2009, Lila executed an amended declaration, which corrected this defect.
Elsworth also informed the court that on October 15, 2008, the Sossa defendants retained her but right after that, Elsworth had surgery. Elsworth filed the motions on October 27, 2008. She acknowledged overlooking the minor defect in Lila’s declaration, the absence of the location of execution of the declaration. That defect was cured in Lila’s amended declaration. Elsworth argued that the defaults should be set aside and the matter heard on the merits since the Sossa defendants had a meritorious defense. Elsworth also asserted that the delay in bringing the motions was because Lila had difficulty finding another attorney.
Kossler argued that, not only was Lila’s original declaration defective, it also failed to provide any grounds for granting default relief. There was no showing of excusable neglect and the delay of over three months in seeking relief required automatic denial of the motions.
The court stated it had not received Lila’s amended declaration, which was filed with the court the day before. The court therefore continued the motions to April 21, 2009.
D. Supplemental Briefing
On April 14, 2009, Kossler filed supplemental opposition to the Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief. Kossler noted Lila had filed an amended declaration correcting the defect in her original declaration. Kossler further reasserted the same arguments previously raised in opposition to setting aside the defaults.
On April 15, 2009, the Sossa Family Trust (the Sossa Trust defendant) filed a supplemental brief. It requested relief from default and leave to file a cross-complaint against Kossler. The Sossa Trust defendant explained in greater detail how Kossler had committed attorney malpractice and overbilled Sossa. The Sossa Trust defendant further stated that its inability to retain counsel was exacerbated by the financial hardship Kossler caused, including his malpractice in the Lee v. Sossa partition action and failing to return $54,000.
The Sossa Trust defendant further reiterated that the delay in bringing the motions for default relief was because no local attorneys would oppose Kossler. Lila tried to file an answer to the complaint but default had already been entered. She ultimately found an attorney in Oceanside who filed the motions. Also, at the time Kossler filed the default requests, the Sossa defendants were represented by Fromberg, yet Kossler did not contact him or take any steps to resolve the fee dispute informally.
Attached to the Sossa Trust defendant’s supplemental brief was a supplemental declaration by Lila, filed in February 2009, in the Lee v. Sossa action. Lila stated that the Lees failed to deposit funds in escrow, as agreed in the settlement agreement. As a consequence, escrow was ultimately closed because the Lees never made any deposits.
E. Final Hearing on Motions
On April 21, 2009, the trial court heard the Sossa defendants’ continued motions for default relief. The Sossa defendants’ attorney, Elsworth, stated that she had just been informed that Kossler was a court commissioner and therefore the venue should be changed from Indio to Riverside. In addition, she was still trying to retrieve the Sossa defendants’ case files from Kossler and therefore requested a continuance. In response, the court stated that it was not aware of Kossler ever being appointed commissioner in the court assigned the instant matter.
Kossler argued that the default was not taken while he was attorney of record and there was no showing of excusable neglect. Lila’s claim that she could not find an attorney was “frivolous” and any “lack of funds” was not a valid excuse as a matter of law. Furthermore, Kossler established the Sossa defendants had millions of dollars in assets. In addition, the Sossa defendants were not reasonably diligent in bringing their motions.
After hearing oral argument, the court took the motions under submission and then later that same day issued a minute order denying a continuance and granting the Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief.
2. Default Relief
Kossler contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Sossa defendants’ motions to set aside the defaults and default judgments. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Section 473 permits the trial court to “relieve a party... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) To support such a claim, “the moving party must show good cause for that relief by proving the existence of ‘a satisfactory excuse for the occurrence of that mistake.’ [Citation.]” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1440.) Normally, a party seeking default relief under section 473 “‘has the double burden of showing (1) diligence in making the motion after discovering its own mistake, and (2) a satisfactory excuse for the occurrence of that mistake.’” (Eigner v. Worthington (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 188, 196.)
“It is axiomatic that a motion for relief under section 473 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. More importantly, the discretion to be exercised is that of the trial court, not that of the reviewing court. Thus, even if the reviewing court might have ruled otherwise in the first instance, the trial court’s order will yet not be reversed unless, as a matter of law, it is not supported by the record. [Citation.]” (Martin v. Johnson (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 595, 604.)
“[A]n ‘order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.’ [Citation.]” (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718.) We will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 828.) But whether the default or the default judgment complied with constitutional and statutory requirements are questions of law which we review de novo. (Ibid.)
Kossler contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Sossa defendants’ motion for 473 relief because the Sossa defendants failed to provide any evidence of excusable neglect or establish that the Sossa defendants were reasonably diligent in bringing their motions.
B. Excusable Neglect
Kossler argues there was no showing of excusable neglect since Lila’s supporting declarations did not provide any evidence as to when Lila contacted various lawyers, the identity of such lawyers, or that the lawyers declined representation because the Sossa defendants were unable to pay the retainer. Kossler claims that Lila, who was the president of a multi-million dollar corporation and trustee of the family trust worth millions of dollars, was sophisticated and simply chose not to respond to Kossler’s complaints. But there is no evidence establishing this presumption.
On the other hand, Lila’s amended declaration states that she attempted to retain various local attorneys but they declined to represent the Sossa defendants. Lila then personally attempted to file an answer 47 days after she was served with the complaints but discovered default had already been entered on June 24, 2008.
Although it is unclear as to precisely what Lila did thereafter for the next two and a half months, she indicated in her declaration that she continued to look for an attorney and, finally, on September 25, 2008, was referred to her current attorney, who was not a local attorney and therefore was willing to take the case. According to Lila’s declaration, she spent three months looking for an attorney and had a difficult time finding one because local attorneys did not want to take the case against Kossler, and the Sossa defendants did not have cash readily available to pay the retainer fee.
While Kossler argues that Lila’s claims as to excusable neglect and reasonable diligence are groundless, they are sufficiently supported by Lila’s amended declaration. Because these are factual issues, to be decided by the trial court, we must defer to the findings of the trial court and will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings since they are supported by adequate evidence. (Falahati v. Kondo, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.)
We cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute our own findings for those of the trial court and must affirm the trial court’s ruling granting default relief, particularly since “it is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits, and appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order where the result is to compel a trial on the merits than they are when the judgment by default is allowed to stand and it appears that a substantial defense could be made. [Citation.]” (Orange Empire Nat. Bank v. Kirk (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 347, 352.)
Unlike in Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, this is not a case in which the defendants “made no attempt to answer the complaint, or otherwise respond to the litigation, until some six months had passed.” (Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1143, discussing Davis, supra.) In the instant case, Lila established in her amended declaration that she took timely and adequate steps to avoid default by attempting to retain various attorneys prior to entry of default, all of whom declined to take the case. Finally, 47 days after service of the complaint, Lila personally attempted to file answers to Kossler’s complaints but, because Kossler had immediately proceeded with seeking entry of default and default judgment right after the 30-day period to answer had run, the Sossa defendants’ answers to the Kossler’s complaints were rejected as untimely.
The Sossa defendants provided sufficient evidence that any neglect in failing to file timely responses to Kossler’s complaints before entry of default was excusable.
C. Reasonable Diligence
Kossler further argues that the Sossa defendants did not bring their motions to set aside default within a reasonable time. He claims there was an unexplained delay exceeding four months in bringing the motions. Kossler notes that “the longer the delay in bringing the motion, the more substantial the justification for the delay must be in order for relief to be appropriately granted.” (Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185.)
In Stafford, the court denied default relief, finding that the party seeking to set aside default failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to vacate default. (Stafford v. Mach, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1187.) But, unlike in the instant case, in Stafford, the motion for default relief was brought “six months to the day after the default was entered and four and one-half months after it became aware of the default judgment.” (Id. at p. 1185.)
Here, the Sossa defendants were personally served with the summons and complaint, through Lila, on May 22, 2008. Although Kossler also sent Lila a copy of the request for entry of default on June 24, 2008, Lila indicates in her amended declaration that she was not aware default and default judgment had actually been entered until she personally attempted to filed the Sossa defendants’ answers to the complaints on July 8, 2008.
The Sossa defendants’ motions for default relief were filed approximately three and a half months after Lila discovered in early July that default had been entered. During this time, according to Lila’s amended declaration, she did not idly stand by, taking no action in the matter, as Kossler claims. She claims in her declaration, albeit without providing specifics, that she continued looking for an attorney and eventually found one in September 2008, two and a half months after the court rejected the Sossa defendants’ answers and informed Lila default had been entered. Within the following month, Lila met with the attorney, Elsworth, who agreed to represent the Sossa defendants and prepared and filed the motions to set aside default.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in granting default relief. The record reflects the trial court carefully considered the motions, opposition, and supporting declarations. The court permitted supplemental briefing and opposition, amended declarations, and oral argument on two separate occasions. The court took the matter under submission after the second hearing and issued its ruling granting default relief. Based upon our review of the record, we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting default relief.
3. Notices of Motions for Default Relief
Kossler urges this court to reverse judgment on the ground the Sossa defendants’ notices of their motions for default relief were deficient. Kossler asserts that the motion notices failed to set forth the grounds for bringing the motions. Kossler raised this objection in the trial court in his written opposition to the motions.
Under section 1010, generally a motion notice must state “the grounds upon which it will be made, ...” (§ 1010.) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110 further states that a notice of motion must “state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order.”
The Sossa defendants’ notices of motion stated that the Sossa defendants “will move this Court for an ORDER setting aside the Default and Default Judgment herein and for leave to file its Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint.”
The subsequent paragraph stated the following:
“MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
“Defendant... hereby moves for an order setting aside the default and default judgment in this matter. This motion is made pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure §473, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Lila Sossa, and exhibits submitted herewith and such further oral testimony, argument and evidence as may be offered at hearing.”
The motion points and authorities thereafter elaborated on the grounds upon which the Sossa defendants sought default relief. Kossler complains on appeal that the points and authorities fail to specify whether the motion was based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and defense counsel never stated during the two hearings on the motions what the grounds were for bringing the motions.
While the notices of motion provided in the first paragraph of the Sossa defendants’ motions do not state the grounds for the motions, such deficiency is not fatal to the trial court’s ruling granting relief. The flaw is a technical defect of a minor nature that was not prejudicial to Kossler. It is apparent from the record that the court and Kossler were well aware of the grounds upon which the motions for default relief were based.
The notice deficiency did not deprive Kossler in any significant way from addressing the Sossa defendants’ contentions asserted in the motions. The notices clearly stated the relief sought. It was apparent from the notices that the defendants were seeking relief under section 473, and the second paragraph and subsequent points and authorities adequately stated the grounds for seeking such relief.
If the defect was a serious impediment to Kossler receiving due process in a court of law, he could have simply requested during either of the two hearings that the court ask defense counsel to state the grounds for the motions. Kossler did not do so, no doubt because the grounds were patently clear. Even though a general statement of the grounds should have been included in the first paragraph of the motions, this court will not reverse judgment based upon such a trivial technical defect, which does not constitute prejudicial error by any measure.
4. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. The Sossa defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
We concur: Ramirez P. J., King J.