Opinion
10 Civ. 9160 (BSJ)
08-18-2011
AMY KOSLOFSKY, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SANTATURS, INC., Defendant.
Memorandum and Order
Amy Koslofsky ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Santaturs, Inc. ("Defendant"), claiming that she is entitled to unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant as a pharmaceutical sales representative ("PSR"). Defendant is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Diego, California. Plaintiff is a resident of Staten Island, New York and has been employed by Defendant in New York since September 27, 2004. As a PSR, Plaintiff calls on practicing physicians in order to deliver information regarding Defendant's pharmaceutical drugs.
Defendant is a national firm and employs a total of 112 PSRs throughout the country. Currently, 14 PSRs work in New York State, the highest number of PSRs in any one state, while 10 PSRs are employed in California. From its corporate headquarters in San Diego, California, Defendant manages the day-to-day activities of PSRs. Senior employees of the Company make broad decisions of company policy relating to job responsibilities, sales training, and administrative exemptions from Defendant's California headquarters.
Plaintiff brings this proposed collective action against Defendant under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). She claims that Defendant improperly classified her as exempt from overtime pay and, as a result, failed to pay her statutorily mandated overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per work week. Plaintiff thus seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the practices complained of are unlawful under the NYLL and the FLSA; and (2) monetary damages for alleged unpaid wages, overtime wages, and unlawful deductions from pay.
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). "The primary goal of section 1404(a) is to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Fellner v. Cameron, No. 09-CV-98S, 2010 WL 681287, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010). "District Courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under section 1404 (a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis." D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006).
"The decision whether to transfer a case from one judicial district to another is a two-part inquiry." Beckerman v. Heiman, No. 05 Civ. 5234, 2006 WL 1663034, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006). "First, the court must determine whether the case sought to be transferred could have been brought in the proposed transferee court." Id. "Second, the court must decide whether transfer is warranted for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice." Id.
When evaluating a motion to transfer venue, a court should consider the following factors in its analysis: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. See, e.g., Greenwich Life Settlements, Inc. v. Viasource Funding Group, LLC, No. 08 Civ. 3062, 2010 WL 3895481 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010). The burden of demonstrating the desirability of transfer lies with the moving party, and absent a strong showing that the balance of factors favors the alternative forum, Plaintiffs' choice of forum will not be disturbed. See Fellner, 2010 WL 681287, at *3; see also Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
1. Weight Accorded Plaintiff's Choice of Forum
A plaintiff's choice of forum is generally granted substantial deference, particularly when plaintiff resides in the chosen forum. Orb Factory, Ltd. v. Design Science Toys, Ltd., 6 F.Supp.2d 203, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Moreover, a plaintiff's chosen venue is also entitled more weight when there is a material connection between the forum state and the events allegedly underlying the claim. In re Nematron Corp. Sec. Litiq., 30 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Kiss My Face Corp. v. Bunting, 2003 WL 22244587, at *4 (S.D.N.Y 2003) ("[w]here there is on-going business activity in the chosen forum...plaintiff's choice of forum is given more deference than it would be if the connection to [the] forum were truly de minimus."). Plaintiff resides in New York and chose to file suit in her home forum. Further, Defendant conducts substantial business in New York, and currently employs Plaintiff at its New York site. This factor thus weighs against transfer.
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff's suit is a collective action, her choice of forum is entitled only minor deference. This Court disagrees. It is true that, a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled less deference in a purported class action, where "numerous potential plaintiffs ... [are] each possibly able to make a showing that a particular forum is best suited..." Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 677 F.Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). However, unlike class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, members of a § 216(b) collective action are not bound by the court's decision unless they "opt-in." See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982).
Other courts "have noted that the 'opt-in' structure of collective actions under § 216(b) of the FLSA strongly suggests that Congress intended to give plaintiffs considerable control over the bringing of a FLSA action." Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85569, at *10 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal citations omitted), citing, e.g., Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221, at *10-11 (E.D. La. 2005) (declining to transfer FLSA case to another district for consolidation because plaintiffs had chosen to "opt-in" to litigation in original district); Salinas v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., 358 F.Supp.2d 569, 571 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that in FLSA collective actions, "as opposed to Rule 23 class actions, 'no person can become a party plaintiff and no person will be bound by or may benefit from judgment unless he has affirmatively "opted into" the class that is given his written, filed consent'"). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's choice of forum in a FLSA collective action is entitled more deference than the choice of forum in Rule 23 national class actions. Thus, Plaintiff's selection of the Southern District of New York weighs against transfer.
2. Convenience of Witnesses
Further, this Court must consider the materiality, nature, and quality of each witness, in addition to the number of witnesses located in each district, to determine whether the convenience of witnesses favors transferring this action. See Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc. v. The Protective Group, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 4741, 2005 WL 3367044 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Royal & Sunalliance, 167 F.Supp.2d at 577). A party moving to transfer on the ground that witnesses will be inconvenienced is obliged to "name the witnesses who will be appearing and describe their testimony so that the court may measure the inconvenience caused by locating a lawsuit in a particular forum." Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 1314, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the District of Southern California is a more convenient venue for the witnesses. Defendant identifies several party witnesses relating to job responsibilities, sales training, and administrative exemptions that are located in California. Defendant notes further that it would incur substantial expenses should this case remain in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the case should remain in this forum because she intends to call more New York than California-based witnesses. However, "[a] court does not merely tally the number of witnesses who reside in the current forum in comparison to the number located in the proposed transferee forum. Instead, the court must qualitatively evaluate the materiality of the testimony that the witnesses may provide." Herbert Ltd. Partnership v. Electronic Arts Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); accord Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., 415 F.Supp.2d at 373. This is a wage dispute suit alleging that, as a matter of policy, Defendant misclassified an entire class of employees and consequently withheld overtime pay. Thus, the witnesses of central relevance — senior and management level employees with policy-making and implementing authority — are located in California. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
3. Convenience of Parties
Defendant argues that is inconvenient for it to litigate in the Southern District of New York. Defendant contends further that the Southern District of California would also provide a more convenient forum for Plaintiff's putative class members because "90% of the putative class members are located outside of New York." (Def. Reply Brief, 7). However, the vast majority of potential "opt-in" Plaintiffs reside closer to New York than California. Moreover, Plaintiff resides in New York and would be inconvenienced if the lawsuit were transferred to the District of Southern California. "The parties' convenience becomes a neutral factor in the transfer analysis if transferring venue would merely shift the inconvenience to the other party." Wechsler v. Macke Int'l Trade, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 5725, 1999 WL 1261251, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
4. Location of Relevant Documents and
Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
Because documents now are easily scanned, stored, and electronically transmitted, moving them no longer creates the onerous burden it may once have imposed. Indeed, documents may be transferred from one district to another with little difficulty using electronic means of duplication and transmission. Thus, while Defendant argues that transferring documents to the Southern District of New York may prove difficult, this factor bears little on the transfer analysis. See, e.g., Eres N.V. v. Citgo Asphalt Refining Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
5. Locus of Operative Facts
The "locus of operative facts" has been interpreted as the place where events and actors material to proving liability are located. See TouchTunes Music Corp. v. Rowe International Corp., 676 F. Supp. 2d 169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). It is true that Defendant conducts substantial business in New York. However, at issue in this case is a company-wide classification of PSRs made at corporate headquarters by senior level employees. Thus, the Court finds that California has a stronger material connection to the lawsuit than New York.
6. Availability of Process to
Compel the Attendance of Unwilling Witnesses
The sixth factor requires a consideration of the court's power to compel attendance of unwilling witnesses, as a district court only can subpoena witnesses within the district or within 100 miles of the district. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b)(2). Plaintiff intends to call several non-party witnesses located in New York. Thus, transferring this case to the Southern District of California may potentially deprive Plaintiff of the ability to compel the attendance of any non-party witness domiciled in New York. Accordingly, this factor militates against transfer.
7. Relative Means of the Parties
It is undisputed that Defendant has more overall resources at its disposal than does Plaintiff. However, in order to resist transfer on the grounds of "relative means," Plaintiff "must offer documentation to show that transfer . . . would be unduly burdensome to his finances." Seltzer v. Omni Hotels, No. 09 Civ. 9115, 2010 WL 3910597, at *5 (Sept. 30, 2010). There has not been a sufficient showing by Plaintiff that a transfer from New York to California would materially affect her ability to prosecute this action. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
8. Forum's Familiarity with Governing Law
This case involves a federal statute, Section 201, in which the Courts of both Districts are well versed. Therefore, this factor is neutral.
9. Trial Efficiency and the Interests of Justice
As Defendant notes, this District has a heavier caseload than that of the Southern District of California. However, the difference between the two courts' dockets is not substantial. See De Jesus v. National R. Passenger Corp., 725 F.Supp. 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring a large disparity in median number of months before disposition to substantially bear on transfer analysis). Thus, this factor is neutral.
Having considered the balance of factors, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to make a sufficiently strong showing that transfer to the alternative forum is warranted. Therefore, Plaintiff's choice of forum will not be disturbed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above Defendants Motion to Transfer Venue (document number 10) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion.
SO ORDERED:
/s/ _________
BARBARA S. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: New York, New York
August 18, 2011