Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829 ( 264 S.E.2d 271). See also Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900). We consequently find no error in the charge as given.
Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829 (1979). See also Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900). It should be noted that the trial judge in his charge used the terms "[i]ntent may be shown ... may be inferred ..." which terms in themselves have only permissive and discretionary force. We must also take issue with appellant's contention that the rebuttable permissive presumption on which the trial court instructed was irrational on the grounds that it was not more likely than not, under the facts in the case at bar, that defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions. "Obviously it is more likely than not that a normal defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts ... [T]he presumption was entirely rational."
The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted this language as creating no more than a permissive inference that comports with the constitutional standards of Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra. See Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 521, 260 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1979). The question, however, is not what the State Supreme Court declares the meaning of the charge to be, but rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning.
Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829, 264 S.E.2d 271 (1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886, 101 S.Ct. 241, 66 L.Ed.2d 112 (1980). Accord Huffman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 203, 265 S.E.2d 603 (1980); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979). As we stated in Lamb, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that inferences that operate to shift only a low burden of production โ and not the burden of persuasion โ to the defendant are constitutionally acceptable if there is a rational connection between the inference and the underlying facts.
Moreover, this interpretation is in accord with analysis of the legal significance of the charge by the Georgia Supreme Court. See Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979). Even though the Georgia Supreme Court is the final authority on questions of state law, this Court must still ask how a jury might have interpreted the trial court's charge.
In this petition, the appellant presents for the first time a claim that at the guilt/innocence phase of his trial, the jury instructions on intent were unconstitutionally burden-shifting as being in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellant argues that in a line of cases commencing with Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979), the jury instructions under attack here had been repeatedly upheld by this court; however, the Supreme Court of the United States, on April 25, 1985, in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. ___ ( 105 S.C. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344) (1985), held that jury instructions virtually identical to those given here are unconstitutionally burden-shifting. The superior court dismissed the appellant's habeas corpus petition as being successive.
In many cases where we have upheld charges to the jury against attacks based on Sandstrom, it appears that the juries were instructed that criminal intent is never presumed, that the burden of proving intent rests on the State, or that intent is always an issue for the jury. Collins v. State, 248 Ga. 687 ( 286 S.E.2d 8) (1982); Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 471) (1980); Blair v. State, 245 Ga. 611 (5) ( 266 S.E.2d 214) (1980); Patrick v. State, 245 Ga. 417 (8) ( 265 S.E.2d 553) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Smith v. State, 244 Ga. 814 (4) ( 262 S.E.2d 116) (1979); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). See also Code Ann. ยง 26-605.
Taken as a whole, this charge would not lead a reasonable juror to believe that any burden was placed on appellant to disprove malice or intent. Wells v. State, 247 Ga. 792 (2) ( 279 S.E.2d 213) (1981); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 (11) ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980); Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141 (8, 9) ( 263 S.E.2d 666) (1980); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). Nonetheless, we disapprove and will continue to disapprove the practice of casting criminal jury instructions in terms of "presumptions."
Taken as a whole, the charge was not impermissibly burden-shifting as to the element of intent. Similar charges were approved in Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 ( 271 S.E.2d 478) (1980), and Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). 4.
We agree that, taken as a whole, the charge did not impressibly shift the burden of proof as to intent to the petitioner. Simmons v. State, 246 Ga. 390 ( 271 S.E.2d 468) (1980); Skrine v. State, 244 Ga. 520 ( 260 S.E.2d 900) (1979). 2.