Opinion
No. 1D20-1843
05-11-2021
Joshua KOOP, Appellant, v. MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, Appellee.
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant. Leonard A. Carson of Carson & Adkins, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Leonard A. Carson of Carson & Adkins, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, J.
Joshua Koop appeals an order of the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), rejecting his complaint asserting a violation of Florida's veterans’ preference laws. Koop alleged that the Miami Shores Village's Police Department violated a veterans’ preference statute when it failed to promote him to the position of sergeant. We affirm because Koop was not entitled to the preference as the police department had promoted him once before.
Facts
The police department hired Koop as a police officer in 2008. Koop, a member of United States Navy Reserve, was called to active duty the next year. He served in Operation Iraqi Freedom. When Koop returned at the end of 2009, the police department reinstated him as a police officer.
Koop did not seek any promotion within the police department until 2017. That year, the police department announced openings for the positions of detective and sergeant. Koop applied for both. He completed all the necessary requirements, and the police department considered him for both positions.
Seven months later, the police department announced that it had selected two officers for the position of detective and two for the position of sergeant. Koop and Justin Zalonis advanced to the position of detective. Abner Vargas and Paul Cazzola advanced to the position of sergeant. Then, when another sergeant position opened a year later, the police department selected Zalonis for the position.
It was then that Koop learned that he might have been eligible for preference in the selection based on his status as a veteran. Koop filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Veterans’ Affairs, asserting that the police department had to give him preference over other candidates when it made its selections for the position of sergeant. The FDVA determined that Koop was a preference-eligible veteran, that he was entitled to the preference when the police department filled the sergeant positions, and that the police department failed to give Koop preference.
But the police department disagreed. It argued that Koop was not entitled to a promotion preference in the sergeant selection because the police department had promoted Koop once before—from police officer to detective. The police department also disputed FDVA's finding that the other candidates for the sergeant position were less qualified than Koop.
Koop then filed a complaint with PERC, alleging that the police department used a numerically based examination in the selection of sergeant and that the veterans’ preference laws required the police department to add ten points to his exam score. Koop asserted that the police department violated the veterans’ preference laws when it added no points to his exam score and when it promoted less qualified candidates over him.
PERC disagreed. It found that the police department did not use a numerically based examination to fill the sergeant position. And so it did not need to add any points to Koop's examination scores. PERC also found that the applicants promoted to the position of sergeant were more qualified than Koop. Based on these findings, PERC concluded that the police department did not violate the veterans’ preference laws. This timely appeal follows.
Analysis
We review PERC's factual findings for competent, substantial evidence, and we review its legal conclusions de novo. See J.S. v. C.M. , 135 So. 3d 312, 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Koop asserts that PERC erred in two respects. First, it erred in finding that the police department's promotion process was not numerically based. Second, PERC erred when it determined that the applicants promoted to the position of sergeant were more qualified than he was. But we do not reach either argument because we affirm PERC's order on different grounds. See Robertson v. State , 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (holding that the "tipsy coachman" doctrine allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record). Instead, we find that Koop was not eligible for a veterans’ preference for promotion because the police department had already promoted him once after he returned from military service.
The Legislature enacted Florida's veterans’ preference laws "in appreciation for [veterans’] service to this state and country, and in recognition of the time and advantage lost toward the pursuit of a civilian career ...." Ch. 98-33, Laws of Fla. Veterans’ preference laws are also "a recognition of the qualities and traits developed by military service which tend to make of veterans superior public servants." See Yates v. Rezeau , 62 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1952). These laws give veterans returning to the civilian workforce several advantages. For veterans applying for a new position, the state and its political subdivisions must give preference in hiring to qualified veterans. See § 295.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (requiring the award of points on hiring examinations or procedures to ensure that employers give veterans special consideration at each step of the hiring process). For a veteran previously employed by an employer, the employer must allow the veteran to return to their prior position following military service. § 295.09(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). And as to promotions, employers must give preference to qualified veterans over all others who are as well or less qualified. Id. Even so, the promotion preference is available only for the first promotion after an employer reinstates a qualified veteran following military service. See § 295.09(1)(c), Fla. Stat (2018) ; Keller v. Pub. Emps. Rels. Comm'n , 691 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
Koop argues that he was entitled to the promotion preference when he applied for the position of sergeant. We disagree. Koop had been promoted to detective after he was reinstated following active duty. As a result, the police department did not have to consider Koop's veteran status when filling the sergeant position because it had promoted him once following his reinstatement.
Koop's argument applies only to the police department's promotion of Zalonis. He does not challenge on appeal PERC's conclusion that his veterans’ preference complaint was untimely as to the promotions of Vargas and Cazzola because it was filed more than sixty days after Koop learned of their promotions. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 55A-7.016(2), (4).
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After Koop returned from military service, the police department reinstated him to the position of police officer. Then, in July 2018, the police department selected him for the position of detective. Koop's advancement to the detective position bears all the hallmarks ordinarily associated with a promotion. Koop had to apply for the position and sit for an exam. And he had to have at least one year's experience as a police officer. When the police department appointed him to the position, it increased Koop's salary from $37.74 per hour to $38.69 per hour, which amounted to an annual raise of almost $2,000. The police department then held a ceremony for Koop's promotion to detective. Koop received a new badge and took a new oath of office when he became a detective. These facts show that obtaining the position of detective was a promotion under the plain language of section 295.09(1)(a).
Even so, Koop argues that his advancement from the position of police officer to detective was not a promotion under the statute. He asserts that the law enforcement community does not consider the position of detective to be a promotion from the position of police officer. Nor does the collective bargaining agreement between the police department and its officers treat the advancement from police officer to detective as a promotion.
We disagree with Koop's narrow construction of the statute. Our interpretation of the term "promotion" does not turn on the meaning given the term under the collective bargaining agreement or on the meaning ascribed to the term by the law enforcement community. The veterans’ preference laws apply across a broad range of employment settings in Florida. The meaning of the term "promotion" in section 295.09(1)(a) must be construed in that broader context. And so, because Koop's advancement to the position of detective bears all the hallmarks of a promotion as that term is ordinarily understood, it was a promotion under the veterans’ preference laws.
Because section 295.09(1)(c) applies only to the first promotion, Koop was not entitled to the veterans’ preference for this subsequent promotion opportunity. And thus we AFFIRM PERC's determination that Koop failed to show that the police department violated the veterans’ preference laws.
Roberts and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.