It is clear from the Iowa decisions that legal excuse need not be pleaded by a party to avail himself of the rule. Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 45 N.W.2d 216; Townsend v. Armstrong, 220 Iowa 396, 260 N.W. 17; Sanford v. Nesbit, 234 Iowa 14, 11 N.W.2d 695. In the Koob case, supra, 45 N.W.2d at page 218, the court states:

The record indicates that the distance from where the pickup truck came back on the road from the shoulder to the point of collision was approximately 80 feet. O'Guin was traveling 30 to 40 miles per hour. At 30 miles per hour a car would travel 44 feet per second. If we take the view most favorable to O'Guin, i.e., that he was traveling 30 miles per hour, less than 2 seconds would have elapsed from the time O'Guin's truck came back on the road until it reached the point of impact with Owens' motorcycle. In Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 45 N.W.2d 216 (1950), the Iowa court held that negligence should not ordinarily be predicated on an emergency confronting a driver who has only three seconds to make a decision. We are concerned here with a situation in which the estimates of speed and distance on which we have to base our decision were made by individuals under the stress and panic of a pending collision.

" Counsel for the defendants have cited no Iowa cases which would contravene the statement of the South Dakota court. That Iowa applies the general principles of the so-called "emergency doctrine", see Rupp v. Kohn, 210 Iowa 969, 232 N.W. 174; Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 45 N.W.2d 216. We find that under the evidence in this case, plaintiff was confronted with a sudden emergency not created by his own antecedent negligence, and that therefore his failure to act in any of the particulars suggested by the defendants did not constitute negligence on his part, and that the negligence of the decedent, Wineman, was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and the damages sustained by the plaintiff.

Defendant did not need to plead sudden emergency. Stevenson v. Abbott, 251 Iowa 110, 113, 99 N.W.2d 429, 431; Miller v. Griffith, 246 Iowa 476, 482, 66 N.W.2d 505, 508; Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1298, 45 N.W.2d 216, 218; Sanford v. Nesbit, 234 Iowa 14, 19, 11 N.W.2d 695, 698; McKeever v. Batcheler, 219 Iowa 93, 96, 257 N.W. 567, 568. See also Merchants Motor Freight v. Downing, 8 Cir., 227 F.2d 247. Defendant's general allegation of sudden emergency was more than he needed to plead and plaintiff cannot be heard to complain that defendant had failed to plead specific facts.

Plaintiff's driver did not testify. When, if ever, he saw defendant's approaching vehicle does not appear. Plaintiff testified that she did not see defendant's car until the moment of impact. For discussions of sudden emergency see Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1298, 1299, 45 N.W.2d 216; Pinckney v. Watkinson, supra, loc. cit. 150, 151 of 254 Iowa; and McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 44-47, 120 N.W.2d 509. There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant was proceeding other than in a lawful manner.

" [10] It is true, as we pointed out in Menke v. Peterschmidt, supra, that negligence should not ordinarily be predicated on an emergency confronting a driver who has only two or three seconds to make a decision. Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1298, 1299, 45 N.W.2d 216, 218. Something better than an opportunity for the jury to guess must be furnished by the one who assumes the burden of proving the applicability of the doctrine of the last clear chance. We discussed the questions of sudden emergency and time sufficiently to determine the best course to pursue, in the recent case of Tilghman v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co., supra, 253 Iowa 1339, 1348, 115 N.W.2d 165.

The time for action was short, 4 to 5 1/2 seconds after the box had started down. Under like circumstances in a long line of cases we have held an emergency instruction was proper and required. Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d 643; Harris v. Clark, 251 Iowa 807, 103 N.W.2d 215; Menke v. Peterschmidt, 246 Iowa 722, 69 N.W.2d 65; Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 45 N.W.2d 216. [15] A good statement of the rule is found in the Harris case where we said at page 810 of 251 Iowa, page 217 of 103 N.W.2d: "The general rule is stated in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, section 252, page 1134, as follows: `Emergency.

[2, 3] II. Appellant alleges error, as to Count I, in the court's holding that there had been a failure of proof as to actionable negligence upon the part of defendant Lang. The trial court recognized the rule that one acting in a sudden emergency, not of his own making, without sufficient time to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as would be required of him if he had time for deliberation. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, section 17a; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, section 41. While it also recognized the rule that ordinarily the question whether such an emergency existed and whether one so confronted acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted when so confronted is a question for the jury (65 C.J.S., Negligence, section 252a) it also recognized the rule announced in Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1299, 45 N.W.2d 216, and cited in Menke v. Peterschmidt, 246 Iowa 722, 733, 69 N.W.2d 65. It is there said that negligence should not ordinarily be predicated on an emergency, not of his own making, confronting a driver who has only three seconds to make a decision. See also Rich v. Herny, 222 Iowa 465, 269 N.W. 489; Strom v. Des Moines and Central Iowa Ry. Co., 248 Iowa 1052, 82 N.W.2d 781, supra.

We have at least twice approved the statement, "`To predicate negligence on two seconds of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement.'" Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1299, 45 N.W.2d 216, 218; Menke v. Peterschmidt, 246 Iowa 722, 733, 69 N.W.2d 65, 72. In resistance to plaintiff's contention the last-clear-chance doctrine is applicable (considered in Division III hereof) defendant argues in effect, we think with reason, it did not have time to be negligent after plaintiff left the highway junction.

We have recently held that negligence should not ordinarily be predicated on an emergency confronting a driver who has only three seconds to make a decision. Koob v. Schmolt, 241 Iowa 1294, 1298, 1299, 45 N.W.2d 216, 218. We there quoted with approval from Rollison v. Wabash Railroad Co., 252 Mo. 525, 541, 160 S.W. 994, 999: "`To predicate negligence on two seconds of time is in and of itself a monumental refinement.'"